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ABSTRACT
Standard security mechanism such as Access control, Firewall and Encryption only
focus on controlling the release of information but no limitations are placed on con-
trolling the propagation of that confidential information. The principle problem of
controlling sensitive information confidentiality starts after access is granted. The
research described in this thesis belongs to the constructive research field where the
constructive refers to knowledge contributions being developed as a new framework,
theory, model or algorithm. The methodology of the proposed approach is made up
of eight work packages. One addresses the research background and the research
project requirements. Six are scientific research work packages. The last work pack-
age concentrates on the thesis writing up.
There is currently no monitoring mechanism for controlling information flow
during runtime that support behaviour configurability and User interaction. Con-
figurability is an important requirement because what is considered to be secure
today can be insecure tomorrow. The interaction with users is very important in
flexible and reliable security monitoring mechanism because different users may have
different security requirements. The interaction with monitoring mechanism enables
the user to change program behaviors or modify the way that information flows while
the program is executing. One of the motivation for this research is the information
flow policy in the hand of the end user.
II
The main objective of this research is to develop a usable security mechanism for
controlling information flow within a software application during runtime. Usable
security refers to enabling users to manage their systems security without defining
elaborate security rules before starting the application. Our aim is to provide us-
able security that enables users to manage their systems’ security without defining
elaborate security rules before starting the application. Security will be achieved by
an interactive process in which our framework will query the user for security re-
quirements for specific pieces of information that are made available to the software
and then continue to enforce these requirements on the application using a novel
runtime verification technique for tracing information flow.
The main achievement of this research is a usable security mechanism for con-
trolling information flow within a software application during runtime. Security will
be achieved by an interactive process to enforce user requirements on the application
using runtime verification technique for tracing information flow. The contributions
are as following.
 Runtime Monitoring: The proposed runtime monitoring mechanism en-
sures that the program execution are contains only legal flows that are defined
in the information flow policy or approved by the user.
 Runtime Management: The behaviour of a program that about to leak
confidential information will be altered by the monitor according to the user
decision.
 User interaction control: The achieved user interaction with the monitoring
mechanism during runtime enable users to change the program behaviors while
the program is executing.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Objectives
 Motivate the needs of information flow control.
 Highlight the original contribution and identify the research question.
 Provide the research methodology and define the success criteria.
 Provide the thesis organization.
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1.1 Introduction
As our businesses, government and military become increasingly dependent on mod-
ern information technology, computer application security protection against mali-
cious code and software system bugs become increasingly important. The more sen-
sitive the information, such as credit card data, government intelligence, military
or personal medical information being processed by software, the more important
it is to ensure information confidentiality. The leakage of confidential information
may cause financial damage in case of loss or destroy private or sensitive secret in-
formation. As an example Trusted Solaris Sun Microsystems (2000) uses a security
technique that determines which information is accessible by users, using a manda-
tory access control mechanism.
However, in many cases discretionary access mechanisms that are usable, reliable
and can protect the confidentiality and integrity of sensitive information accessed
by any untrusted software are more suitable as they do not involve the source level
of administration and grant users discretion about how their information is being
used. Information flow occurs from a source (subject) to a target or destination
(object) whenever information stored in a source is propagated directly or indirectly
to a target object. An example flow would be the copying of a file into an email that
is subsequently sent through the network. The following informal example illustrate
this.
Assuming that some sensitive information is stored on a computer system, how
can we prevent it from being leaked? The first approach that comes to mind is to
limit access to this sensitive information, by using any type of access control mecha-
nisms or using encryption or firewalls mechanisms. These are very useful approaches
which, however, have their limitations. Standard security mechanisms are focused
only on controlling the release of information but no restrictions are placed on the
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propagation of that information and thus are unsatisfactory for protecting confiden-
tial information. For this reason, the proposed approach of this thesis is controlling
the flow of the information from source to destination during runtime based on Java
bytecode instrumentation.
1.2 Scope of the Thesis
Standard security mechanisms such as Access control, Firewall and Encryption (An-
derson 2001, Bishop 2003) only focus on controlling the release of information but
no limitations are placed on controlling the propagation of that confidential informa-
tion. The approach controls the flow of the information only within one application.
The scope of the thesis includes in particular.
 Configurable information flow Configurability is an important requirement
because what is considered to be secure today can be insecure tomorrow. A
property of configurable information flow is that it provides flexible security
mechanisms that can control changeable security requirements.
 User interaction control Interaction with users is very important in flexible
and reliable security monitoring mechanism because different users may have
different security requirements. These cannot always be anticipated prior to
the execution of the program. Users interact with a monitoring mechanism
during runtime, enabling them to change program behaviours or modify the
way that information flows.
This research is part of a wider research project that addresses information flow
and dissemination control in a wider information system context. The focus is on a
single Java application that represents untrusted code. This is particularly relevant
in the light of increasing smart phone applications that are freely available to a very
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large number of users. End users have little or no assurance that the execution of
there (apps) does not communicate their personal information to untrusted parties.
1.3 Research Question
The overall and the central research question investigated in this thesis is.
How to control information flow from source to destination during the
runtime of an application and with support of user interaction.
In order to answer the central research question, a set of common issues has been
defined to address the problems of information flow control in detail:
 Dynamic information flow policy.
 User ability to modify the flow policy during runtime in response to incidents.
 Changing the programs behaviour that is leaking confidential information ac-
cording to the user decision.
1.4 Original Contribution
The main contribution of this research is to develop a usable security mechanism for
controlling information flow within a software application during runtime. Usable
security refers to enabling users to manage their systems security without defining
elaborate security rules before starting the application. Security will be achieved by
an interactive process in which our framework will query the user for security re-
quirements for specific information that are made available to the software and then
continue to enforce these requirements on the application using runtime verification
technique for tracing information flow. The original contributions of the thesis are
as follows:
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 Runtime Monitoring: The monitoring mechanism ensures that the program
contains only legal flows those are defined in the information flow policy or
approved by the user. Traditional runtime monitoring are not suitable for
monitoring information flow or managing the program behaviour at runtime,
as there is no feedback from the monitor to the observed software.
 Runtime Management: The behaviour of a program leaking confidential
information will be altered by the monitor according to the user decision.
Analysing the impact of a user or policy induced program alteration with the
program original functional requirements is an open question.
 User interaction control: The achieved user interaction with the monitor-
ing mechanism during runtime enable users to change program behaviours or
modify the way that information flows while the program is executing. To our
knowledge these have not been done before.
1.5 Research Methodology
The research method used in this approach is a typical scientific research technique
(Wilson 1991). As in the majority of the computer science approaches the described
research belongs to the constructive research field where the constructive refers to
knowledge contributions being developed as a new framework, theory, model or
algorithm.
The methodology of the proposed approach is made up of eight work packages. One
addresses the research background and the research project requirements. Six are
scientific research work packages. The last work package concentrates on the thesis
writing up. The investigation work packages are illustrated in Figure 1.1.
5
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Theory of information flow
Prototype implementation of tracing information flow
Evaluation
Writing up
Research background
Policy based management framework to express information flow
Algorithmic Development
Information flow policy and user interaction
Architecture
Figure 1.1: Research work packages
 Work package 1: The research background.
The research background will start with a theoretical literature review in-
cluding understanding of all approaches related to the research question. To
achieve the objective of this step, digital resources such as the Google search
engine, IEEE Xplore, SpringerLink, ACM Digital Library and CiteSeer are
going to be used.
 Work package 2: Architecture.
This work package will focus on the design of the framework architecture to
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capture the research objectives as expressed in the research question. This
work package will specify all components of the proposed framework. The
research in this work package explicitly states how the framework components
interact to achieve the research objectives. In this work package the work is
split into two tasks.
1. Policy model for information flow control.
2. User interaction.
 Work package 3: Theory of information flow.
The research investigation in this stage will focus on the development of a
novel theory for controlling information flow which supports user interaction
during runtime. This work package is split into two tasks.
1. Direct information flow control.
2. Indirect information flow control.
 Work package 4: Algorithmic Development.
This research work package investigates each of the Java program phases be-
fore execution such as loading, linking and initialization. The main part of
this work package is focused on providing a new instrumentation algorithm
to monitor the program behaviour and to provide a flexible instrumentation
mechanism that is applicable to Java bytecode. In this work package the
research will concentrate on describing the architecture used to validate infor-
mation flow requirements expressed as policies using runtime verification. This
work package focus on the Java bytecode instrumentation process to monitor
and control the target program behaviour with the respect of the information
flow policy. This work package is split into two tasks.
1. Loading of Java bytecode.
7
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2. Java bytecode instrumentation algorithms.
 Work package 5: Information flow policy and user interaction.
The investigation in this work package will concentrate on how to monitor and
control the flow of the information with respect to an information flow policy.
The main objective is to show how the user interacts with the monitoring
mechanism, the user ability to change the program behaviour and modifying
the information flow policy during runtime. The research in this work package
is split into two tasks.
1. Development of an information flow policy.
2. User feed back.
 Work package 6: Prototype implementation of tracing information flow.
This work package of the research will describe the design and implementa-
tion of our prototype for tracing the information flow which depends on the
completion of work package 5.
 Work package 7: Evaluation.
After building the architecture of the runtime monitoring mechanism the ef-
fectiveness evaluation of the proposed approach will take place using small but
representative case studies.
This work package is split into two tasks.
1. A small scale case study that shows how a Java program will be traced.
2. A medium scale case study of file sharing system showing how the infor-
mation flow will be controlled.
This work package demonstrates the practical applicability of the presented
research. A conclusion was provided from the experiences of the evaluation
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phase. A number of potential extensions for this research study was raised to
motivate further investigation in the field of information flow.
 Work package 8: Write up.
Writing up of the thesis which is based on the results of all work packages.
1.6 Success Criteria
The measure of success is that both the framework model and their supporting
algorithm indeed resolve the proposed research question and demonstrate it by ex-
periments through the implementation prototype. The prototype demonstrates that
the research output results match the research objectives as follows:
 User ability to modify the flow policy during runtime in response to incidents.
 Modifying the behaviour of the program that is leaking confidential informa-
tion according to the user decision.
 With reasonable performance. Some experiments will be used to measure the
performance overhead in both computation time and memory usage.
1.7 Thesis Organisation
The previous sections have provided an overview of the thesis scope, original contri-
butions and research question of this thesis. The research was undertaken along a
theoretical to applied axis and was structured in work packages and was transformed
into thesis chapters in the writing up stage. The rest of the thesis is organised in
chapters as follows.
 Chapter 2 introduces basic concepts of security and information flow. This
chapter provides an introduction to the principles of security, static informa-
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tion flow analysis and dynamic information flow analysis. It gives an overview
of existing approaches of bytecode instrumentation and information flow con-
trol and discusses the difficulties and problems of the related research. This
chapter provides an introduction and critically reviews related work in the
areas of access control model and take grant model; Static information flow
analysis, dynamic information flow analysis, bytecode instrumentation, infor-
mation flow control, information flow analysis, program slicing and program
dependences techniques.
 Chapter 3 provides a general overview of the proposed framework and de-
scribes the framework architecture. In this chapter the focus is on how compo-
nents of the proposed framework interact to trace and control the information
flow within a Java application.
 Chapter 4 provides an introduction to Java bytecode, class loader in the
Java virtual machine and how Java class file will be instrumented in order to
monitor and control information flow within a Java application. The focus in
this chapter is on loading and instrumenting a target program. This chapter
also shows how Java bytecode instructions will be instrumented.
 Chapter 5 describes the second step of our runtime monitoring mechanism:
how a class file will be executed and monitored to control information flow
based on the information flow policy. This chapter describes the event recog-
nizer and runtime checker algorithms for controlling information flow within
a Java application.
 Chapter 6 discusses the information flow policy and user feedback compo-
nent. The chapter provides a general overview of information flow require-
ments and describes the information flow policy language. This chapter also
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focused on the user interaction with the runtime monitoring mechanism dur-
ing runtime to change the program behavior and modify the information flow
policy.
 Chapter 7 provides an introduction to high level design of the developed
prototype for controlling information flow. It also gives a brief introduction to
the runtime monitoring mechanism components that are used in the prototype
and how they interact to load, instrument and control the flow of information
in the target class files.
 Chapter 8 provides two case studies to illustrate the practical applicability
of the presented research. The first case study is provided to demonstrate the
work of instrumentation process, event recognizer and the runtime checker.
The second case study is presented to show how a Java class file will be traced
and monitored.
 Chapter 9 evaluates the research which has been described in this thesis and
discusses the limitations of the proposed approach.
 Chapter 10 summarises the research and proposes future work.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Research
Objectives
 Provide an introduction to the security principles, static information flow anal-
ysis and dynamic information flow analysis.
 Give an overview of existing approaches.
 Identify the difficulties and problems of the related research.
12
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2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an introduction to the principles of security, static information
flow analysis and dynamic information flow analysis. It gives an overview of existing
approaches of bytecode instrumentation and information flow control and discusses
the difficulties and problems of the related research. This chapter is divided into
nine sections. Section 2.2 provides an introduction to security and a critical review
of related work in the areas of access control model and take grant model. Sec-
tion 2.3 introduces the notion of information flow control and highlights its different
types. Section 2.4 provides an introduction to static information flow analysis and a
critical review of related research in the areas of type system approaches and seman-
tic approaches. Section 2.5 discusses dynamic information flow analysis and gives
a critical review of related approaches in the areas of dynamic analysis at binary
code level, source code level and event level. Section 2.6 provides different mecha-
nisms of Java bytecode instrumentation. Section 2.7 critically reviews the related
research in the area of information flow control including explicit information flow
control and implicit information flow control. Section 2.8 presents some examples
of existing implementations of information flow analysis (JFlow, Flow Caml and
Bytecode verifier). Section 2.9 discusses different types of program slicing including
forward slicing, backward slicing, static slicing and dynamic slicing. Finally 2.10
presents program dependencies techniques including control dependencies and data
dependences.
2.2 Security
Security in information flow control can be defined as the prevention of sensitive
information to leak. Security in the context of information flow has the following
13
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three components.
 Requirements Information flow requirements should define the information
flow goals. They should provide the answer the question.
How the information should flow in the system?
 Information flow policy The information flow policy defines the meaning
of secure information flow. It provides the answer to the question.
What steps should be taken to detect and prevent the leak of the information?
 Information flow mechanisms The information flow mechanism enforces
the information flow policy. That should provide the answer to the question.
What tools and methods are used to ensure that the previous steps are followed?
2.2.1 Access Control Model
Access control mechanism is the first technique that has been developed and it is
widely deployed because of the assumptions that it enforces confidentially. This
assumption comes from the fact that the subject user and process can not leak
confidential information about any object without having access to that object.
Therefore, the main idea behind access control techniques is to place access restric-
tion on processes to limited the access to a number of objects. There exist various
access control models.
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) is the most used way of access control.
In this type of access the access rights of every subject on every object file should be
14
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explicitly stated by the owner of that object in a policy. The owner should also state
what privileges the subjects have on that object as in UNIX discretionary access
control used for data protection in a file system, where the owner of the object can
modify the access policy to control the access to it.
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) in this type of access control the policy is
under the control of an administrator not under the control of the owner. Each sub-
ject and object in mandatory access control has an associated security level security
clearance. The most popular example of mandatory access control is Bell-LaPadula
model (LaPadula & Bell 1973). In this model the decision of accessing an object
is taken by comparing the subject security level with the target or object security
level and the security levels form a lattice. Therefore, the subject can (access, read,
write, execute) object only if the subject security level is greater than or equal to
the object security level. In mandatory access control the Trusted Computing Base
(TCB) (H.Saltzer & D.Schroeder 1975) is usually used to compute the security level
of newly created data. Another example of MAC is the Chinese Wall Security Policy
(Brewer & Nash 1989).
Non-Discretionary Access Control (NDAC) is the third common access con-
trol mechanism which is based on the subject’s role or tasks assigned to the subject
to allow or reject object access. Non-discretionary access control is also called task-
based access control or role-based access control. It works well when security based
on roles or tasks is needed. As mentioned by Bandara (Bandara et al. 2007) ”au-
thority is vested in some users, but there are explicit controls on delegation and
propagation of authority”.
Of course these techniques are important and very useful for limiting the access of
data. However, these techniques are insufficient for protecting the confidentiality
of the information because, once the access is granted there is not any control the
propagation of that information.
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2.2.2 Take Grant Model
Another important security model that should be mentioned is provided by the Lip-
ton and Snyder (1977) Take Grant Protection Model. It is a formal model provided
to disprove or establish safety properties in a given system. This model uses directed
graph to present the subject access to an object. The nodes in the graph represent
subjects and objects. The edges between the subject and object are labeled and
indicate the access rights that the subject of the edge has over an object. The two
fundamental access rights in this model are take and grant rules.
 Take allows any subject s1 in the graph to take the rights of any other subject
s2.
 Grant allows any subject s1 in the graph to grant its own rights to any other
subject s2.
This model of dynamically rewriting rules in the graph describes acceptable changes
in the graph, e.g. adding new entities or creating new edges with respect to take
and grant rights (Janicke 2007).
2.3 Information flow control
Information flow control aims to fill the gaps left by standard security mechanism
(Anderson 2001, Bishop 2003) by considering the flow of the information within a
system when enforcing an information flow security policy. Information flow occurs
from source objects to target objects, whenever information is read from a source it
is potentially propagated to the target object. There are two types of information
flow direct information flow and indirect information flow (Genaim & Spoto 2005,
Denning & Denning 1977).
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2.3.1 Direct Information Flow
Direct information flow is defined as the operation that generates a flow between a
source and a target independent of any other objects. Direct information flow can
be explicit or implicit.
Direct explicit information flow
Direct explicit information flow is a data flow that arises at for example assignment
statements Listing 2.1 is an example of direct explicit information flow.
Listing 2.1: Example of direct explicit information flow
Dest := Source;
For statement Dest = Source in Listing 2.1 there is direct explicit flow
Source −→ Dest. i.e. a value is directly passing from the Source object to the Dest
object (see Figure 2.1).
Dest
Public Confidential
Leak
Source
Figure 2.1: Directly passing data value from Source to Destination
Direct implicit information flow
Direct implicit information flow is a data flow that arises from for example a condi-
tional statement, see Listing 2.2.
Listing 2.2: Example of direct implicit information flow
low:=0;
if high==1 then
low:=2
else
skip;
For statement if High==1 then in Listing 2.2 there is a direct implicit information
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flow High −→ Low since changes of the values of the High object are observable
from the values of the Low object.
Low = 2
High == 1
Public
Low = 0
True False
Leak high information to low
Figure 2.2: High process updates a low variable.
2.3.2 Indirect Information Flow
Indirect information flow means that there is an operation generating a flow from
a source to destination and the operation is dependent on the value of other ob-
jects. Indirect information flow, also called transitive flow arises for example as a
composition of direct information flow, see Listing 2.3.
Listing 2.3: Example of indirect information flow
x = y + z;,
w = x;
For statement x = y + z; in Listing 2.3 there is a direct information flow from
y and z to x (y −→ x , z −→ x) and in the second statement w = x; there is direct
information flow from x to w (x −→ w) which leads to an indirect information flow
from y to w and z to w (y −→ w and z −→ w), see Listing 2.3. Hence, direct
information flow does not require any mediation between the objects to exchange,
read, write or execute information. In contrast indirect information flow always
requires mediation between two objects (Zhang & Yang 2002, Herrmann 2001).
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Direct
Y
X W
Z
Direct
Direct
Indirect
Indirect
Figure 2.3: High process updates a low variable.
2.4 Static Information Flow Analysis
The static verification involves the analysis of source text by humans or software
which can help to discover errors early in the software process (Havelund & Gold-
berg 2005). Security requirements in information systems change more frequently
than functional requirements especially when new users or new data is added to the
system. Runtime verification (Janicke et al. 2005, Kim et al. 1999, Lee et al. 1998)
has been used to increase the confidence that the system implementation is correct
by making sure it conforms to its specification at runtime. Static information flow
analysis is a form of information flow analysis that does not require the system to
be executed or operated. The majority of information flow analyses approaches are
based on static information flow analysis, that attempt to analyse how information
flows in the software to determine whether it obeys some predefined policy with
respect to an information flow without running the program (Banerjee & Naumann
2005, Myers 1999). Software inspection is one of the most important form and
widely used techniques for static analysis in the earlier stages of the software de-
velopment. Software inspection is concerned with detecting software defects such
as Fagan inspection (Fagan 1986, Michael Fagan Associates 2010) that is a process
focused on detecting faults in the software development life cycles. NASA also has
another process that inspect software statically called Software Formal Inspection
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Process Standard (NASA 1993, SATC 2002).
The research domain in the field of static analysis for information flow has been
influenced by the proposed work of Goguen and Meseguer (1982) where they define
the notion of non-interference as handling the occurrence of illegitimate information
flow in a system specification. Suppose that two security level of confidentiality high
and low exist and that highly secret data should never flow to low level subjects.
Non-interference declares that information cannot flow from high to low whenever
high level cannot interfere with low level. It can also be defined as that the process
is said to be non interfering if its low outputs do not depend on it is higher inputs.
Sabelfeld and Myers (2003) in their recent survey present about 147 research ref-
erences on information flow security. The vast majority of these publications are
concerned with describing and defining the notion of Non-interference, e.g. (P.Allen
1991, Bieber & Cuppens 1992, McCullough 1988, Sutherland 1986, Wittbold &
M.Johnson 1990). Most of these approaches are based on Goguen and Meseguer
(1982) approach for non-interference, the idea of non-interference is based on, how
to characterise the absence of any flow that resides at a more abstract level than
the security access control models and providing it as a formal semantics to the one
path flow intuition behind terms like read and write. The most important categories
of static analysis approaches are type system approaches and semantic approaches.
2.4.1 Type System Approaches
Security type system can be expressed as a set of typing rules in the form of judg-
ments that can used to describe which security level is allocated to a program (or
expression) based on security levels of sub-programs or sub-expressions. The idea of
security type system comes from a lattice L, ≤, where L is a set of security levels,
e.g. Top-secret, secret, confidential and unclassified including a lowest or bottom
element ⊥ and highest or top element >. The most earlier and useful work related
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to certification of secure information flow is done by Denning et al. (1977). They
provided a static certification mechanism that verifies secure information flow in the
program. Their certification method is essentially a type based approach based on
a lattice structure of security classes to validating secure information flow. In their
method each object is assigned a security class with respect to a lattice structure.
A partial order relation is a class of binary relations with the following characteris-
tics.
1. Reflexivity.
a ≤ a if the relation ≤ returns true for the input (a,a).
2. Anti symmetry.
if a ≤ b and b ≤ a then a equal b.
3. Transitivity.
if a ≤ b and b ≤ c then a ≤ c.
The relation ≤ is a partial order relation if it satisfies all previous properties. A
partially ordered set is a set together with a partial order relation and is called a
poset. A lattice is a poset in which all non-empty finite subsets have both a least
upper bound and a greatest lower bound. Denning (1976) describes a lattice of
subset of W = {a, b ,c} as follows.
Security class = powerset(W)
a −→ b iff a ⊆ b
a ⊕ b = a ∪ b
a ⊗ b = a ∩ b
L=φ , H=W
Description
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{a,b,c}
{b,c}{a,b} {a,c}
{b}{a}
{φ}
{c}
Figure 2.4: Lattice representation
In their certification method (Denning & Denning 1977) the security classes are
declared in the declaration part of the program with respect to a lattice structure
e.g.
Listing 2.4: Declaration of security classes
i,j:integer security class L;
a,b:boolean security class L;
x : file security class L;
h :integer security class H;
y,z:file security class H;
Their approach is sufficiently simple so that it can be used in the analysis phase
of any compiler. They tried to prove that a program can not cause public output
that depend on secret input. However, their method certifies only secure programs
because it doesn’t distinguish between secure and insecure executions of the same
program. Thus, the whole program will be rejected as insecure because the set of
all possible paths of the program execution must be secure. Andrews and Reitman
(1980), Denning and Denning (1977) build their argument for secure information
flow on the intuition that a secure information flow can be produced from a com-
bination of secure information flows. However, both of them never formally prove
that, the rules of secure information flow in type system approach are used to verify
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weather a typing environment y is compatible with a given software. A typing en-
vironment can be mapped to a security class according to variables identified with
respect to the lattice structure (L, ≤). The rules of a sound type system approach
for secure information flow as provided by Volpano, Smith and Irvine (1996) is that
if a typing environment (y) is compatible with a given program S and y(x) ≤ y(x)
then the output of x after the execution of given program S is not affected by the
value of y.
Listing 2.5 shows the language grammar of Volpano, Smith and Irvine which has
been proposed for non-interference analysis of sequential program.
Listing 2.5: Grammar of the language of Volpano Smith and Irvine
s::= var := exp
| s; s
| If exp then s else s end
| While exp do s
| skip
Where var stands for variables, exp stands for expressions and S stands for
program statements. They provided a syntax directed security type system for
annotating all program components including variables, procedure parameters and
commands with specific security levels. Figure 2.5 illustrates a typing system equiv-
alent to a security type system of Volpano, Smith and Irvine (2003).
The typing rules ` exp: τ in Figure 2.5 means that the expression (exp) has
a type τ . The judgement [pc]` S means the program S is typable in pc security
context. The security level can be low or high. Considering the rules E1 and E2
any expression (exp) can have high security level and also a low security level if exp
has no occurrence of h. In C1, C2 and C3 the rules [pc] ` skip and [pc] ` h:= exp
means that Skip and h:= exp are typable in any security context and l := low is
typable only if the expression has low security type. In C4 the judgement [pc]` S1
and [pc]` S2 means that the programs S1 and S2 are typable in the security context
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Figure 2.5: Security type system equivalent to the one of Volpano, Smith and Irvine
pc. Rules C5 and C6 considers the if and loop statements where all branches should
be typable in high security context. The last rule C7 ensures that if the program
S is typable in a high security context it leads to the program is typable in a low
security context. Another function of rule C7 is that it allows to reset the PC to low
security level after any high statement, e.g. loop or condition (Sabelfeld & Myers
2003). Banerjee and Naumann (2002) considered the problem of a sequential object
oriented language with Volpano’s security type system. Therefore, they extended
the Volpano approach to support more sequential object oriented language, e.g.
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pointers, private field, inheritance, recursive classes, methods, dynamic binding,
class based visibility and type tests where programs have specific security classes.
However, these type system approaches are unable to compute the security level
associated with each variable in the program neither output nor input. In order to
automatically analyse the information flow based on type system it is necessary to
include any security mechanism that is able to compute the security level of these
variables. Such as the security control mechanism described by Weissman that is
able to compute the security level of new created files dynamically (Weissman 1969).
In addition, these type system approaches for information flow control are simple to
implement, but they are often too imprecise. Consider this sub program:
Listing 2.6: Example of Non-interference
low := high;
low := 0;
Most type system approaches reject this program based on the directly passing
of a high security level to a low security one as illustrated Figure 2.6, but clearly the
program satisfies Non-interference while the output of the low level variable does not
depend on the value of the high level variable. Therefore, the majority of security
type system approaches would reject any program with insecure sub-programs.
2.4.2 Semantic Approaches.
The semantic approach is concerned with controlling information flow based on se-
mantic security models that controls information flow in terms of program behaviour
(Agat 2000, Sabelfeld & Sands 2000, Pottier & Conchon 2000, Sabelfeld & Sands
2001). Leino and Joshi (2000, 1998) provide a new technique that statically analyse
the secure information flow based on a semantic notion of program equality. In their
approach they define the equality between two program terms as follows.
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S is secure iff (HH ; S ; HH
.
= S ; HH)
They denote program equality by symbol
.
=. They wrote (S is secure) to denote
that the program S has only secure flow. A key component in their definition is that
the high security variable has been assigned to h an arbitrary value in the program
which they denote by HH (havoc on h). S is secure if and only if the initial value
of any variable with high security level has not any effect on the final value of any
variable with low security level in the program. Assume that they denote h to be
the variables with high security level and L denote to be low security level variables.
Thus, the definition may be described as follows. The occurrence of HH on both
sides means that the final value of L is of an interest and an observation of the prefix
HH means that both programs are equal based on the output of S (final value of L)
independent on the initial value of the high level variables h. Finally, they tried using
their definition to prove that the observations of the values (initial or final) of low
level variables do not leak information about the initial value of high security level
variables. Sabelfeld and Sands (2001, 1999) extended the semantic approach of Leino
and Joshi (2000, 1998) to formalize a security specification of secure information flow
in sequential program by partial equivalence relations (PERa). The semantics of the
program in information flow control can be defined as a mapping over the probability
distributions of the information flow in the program. Most of the information flow
semantic approaches are semi-semantics because they are not analysis all the possible
program behaviours. The advantage of semantic models of secure information flow
is that it can be applied to any program structure whose semantics is defined.
2.5 Dynamic Information Flow Analysis
Dynamic information flow analysis attempts to analyze the flow of the information
while a program is executing. Dynamic information flow analysis does not require
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that all possible paths in the program must be operated or executed. Dynamic
information flow analysis always supports a modifiable information flow policy to
overcome changeable security requirements which can not be captured statically.
Using dynamic information flow analysis it is more easy to handle language fea-
tures, e.g. arrays, pointers and exceptions than static analysis. Finally and the
most important, it is user centric which allows user interaction because the security
requirement depends on the type of the user. Despite a long history and a huge
amount of research on controlling information flow (Banerjee & Naumann 2005,
Volpano et al. 1996, Smith & Volpano 1998, Pottier & Simonet 2003, Fenton 1974b),
it seems to be very little work done on dynamic information flow analysis and en-
forcing information flow based policies. Dynamic information flow analysis (Fenton
1974b, Brown & Knight 2001, Lam & Chiueh 2006, Birznieks 1998, Vachharajan
et al. 2004) has less development than static analysis. Dynamic analysis started
very early by the BLP model which attempted to deal with military information
flow confidentiality (LaPadula & Bell 1973, Binder et al. 1973). The model aimed
to annotate each data element with a security level (label) to dynamically control
information flow with their two security properties of information flow.
 The simple security property no read up
 The star property no writes down
Dynamic information flow analysis can be described at machine code level (binary),
source code level (program) and system level (event).
2.5.1 Dynamic Analysis at Binary Code Level
Applying dynamic analysis at binary code level does not require the source code of
the program. Several work has been done in dynamically ensuring security of data
flow. Fenton (1974b) proposed the data mark machine which is an abstract model
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of implementing memoryless subsystems confinement. In this machine each variable
has an associated security class. In his small machine the program counter’s PC
data mark is computed dynamically for the other storage location is fixed which can
be null or priv. Null denotes to non-private (input or output) and priv denotes
private (input or output) which means that the storage location can only contain
(public or secret) information. The data mark machine also includes a stack return
address that can be used for program counter declassification. Any return address
may be pushed into the stack and any other classified process may then pop the
unclassified address into program counter to declassify itself.
Brown and Knight (2001) describes the problem of ensuring secure information
flow supported by hardware extension as a set of hardware mechanisms. They prac-
tically implemented their model in Hash execution unit (HEX). Simply they add
a few hardware mechanisms and software routines to the Trusted Computing Base
(TCB) to dynamically guarantees that the flow of the information is secure. The
main ideas of Fenton (1974b) and Brown (2001) is that they enforce a security pol-
icy with respect to the lattice structure where ⊥ is the greatest lower bound or
least restrictive class and > is greatest upper bound or the most restrictive class.
Therefore, storing any data value X to a fixed data mark location L requires that
the machine checks the data mark security level greater than or equal to > most
restrictive class of the data mark value of X and of the program counter if not the
storage operation will be ignored. Vachharajani et al. (2004) addresses an informa-
tion flow security using RIFLE. They designed this architecture to support users
interaction to enforce their information flow policy using both hardware extension
and binary instrumentation. The main goal of their architectural framework is the
users ability to set data policies rather than relying on some one else. The main
disadvantage of dynamic information flow analysis at binary code level is the dif-
ficulty to deal with implicit information flow. Suppose that there are information
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flows created by any piece of software that are not operated or executed. Therefore,
many researchers have restricted their work of tracing and monitoring information
flow only on explicit information flow.
2.5.2 Dynamic Analysis at Source Code Level
Dynamic analysis of information flow at source code level is easier than the one at
binary code level because of the fact that understanding the program binary code
to control the flow of the information is harder than understanding the source code.
However, there has been a little work done on dynamic information flow analysis
at source code level. For example, Birznieks (1998) provided Special mode called
(Perl Taint Mode) in Perl script language that deals with the notion of taint. In
this model each data element is tagged with tainted or untainted security level to
prevent users from relying on data that are outside his/her script in order to prevent
the operation of any bad commands. Perl taint mode is widely deployed because of
the believe that it prevents buffer overflows. However, it is not sufficient to protect
confidentiality. Perl also uses taint check (Schwartz et al. 2005) to check perl scripts
from any security bugs. When the taint check started all user input will be tagged
as tainted. The interpreter will detect any operation that uses taint data which will
be considered as an unsafe state of execution that will lead to termination of the
execution with an error. Recently, Lam and Chiueh (2006) provided a framework
for dynamic taint tracking called GIFT. In their framework each variable in the
program is associated with a 4-byte tag that can be used to present different type
of information such as security class, user ID, file name. These tags are not inter-
preted by the GIFT compiler but are interpreted by the application programmer.
Therefore, the main idea behind the GIFT compiler is to insert a piece of code to
call programmer provided tag.
Unfortunately all previous work in dynamic information flow analysis at source code
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level did not take in their consideration implicit information flow. Shroff, Smith and
Thober in (2007) provided a new approach for dynamic monitor of information flow
dependency. The main goal of their approach is to handle any information flow
created by a piece of program that is not executed. Their approach is based on
the simple idea that implicit information flow appears only if there exist another
explicit information flow path. The analysis will get information about all explicit
and implicit information flow after an undetermined number of program executions.
Therefore, their approach is sound regarding to detecting all information flow types.
Of course this approach is of dynamic analysis type but not sufficient to enforce
confidentiality from the beginning. Masri and Podgurski (2005) described a new
approach of dynamic information flow analysis to detect attacks against a program.
In their monitoring approach they tried to detect and prevent any violation of spec-
ified information flow policies in multi-threaded program. Thus, their monitoring
mechanism does not support configurable information flow policies.
2.5.3 Dynamic Analysis at Event Level
Dynamic information flow analysis at event or system level does not require the study
of program code either at source or binary code level. The dynamic analysis at this
level attempts to detect and prevent information to flow to any unauthorized part
or lower security level in a large system. One of the foundational work on dynamic
information flow analysis at event level is Bell and LaPadula Model (1973). This
model describes how subjects can write to or read from shared objects. Weissman
describes a security control mechanism which dynamically computes the security
level of newly created files (Weissman 1969). Weissman provides a security control
mechanism that is able to classify the security level of created files dynamically.
His mechanism is based on a set of access rights as a theoretical model for security
control where each process executing on the machine is associated with a security
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level. Nagatou and Watanabe provided a monitoring approach for runtime detection
of unauthorized information flow using covert channel in a system that is serving
multiple users (Nagatou & Watanabe 2006). In their approach they tried to detect
and prevent principals to transfer any sensitive information to unauthorized parts
or lower security levels. A covert channel is a mechanism that used to transmit
information from one principal of a system to another one. More recently, Guernic
in 2009 proposes a dynamic non-interference analysis to enforce confidentiality of
secret information at run time (Guernic 2009). His approach is partly dynamic
because the approach uses dynamic analysis to detect explicit information flow and
static analysis to detect implicit information flow. The approach is restricted to only
sequential programs. Thus, the approach did not consider concurrent programs.
Cavadini and Cheda presented two information flow monitoring techniques that use
dynamic dependence graphs to track information flow during runtime (Cavadini &
Cheda 2008). But, their two approaches did not consider the users ability to modify
the flow policy at runtime and the security requirements to be dependent on the
requirement of individual users and their interaction with the monitoring system.
2.6 Java Bytecode Instrumentation
Several research approaches deal with bytecode instrumentation. For the rest of this
section, some existing projects and approaches in the area of bytecode instrumen-
tation will be presented.
Many tools use techniques based on program instrumentation to carry out differ-
ent tasks such as program tracing and optimization techniques (Srivastava & Wall
1994a, 1993). Many tools have been developed using program instrumentation tech-
niques that are used for studying program behavior such as Pixie (Smith 1991),
Epoxie (Wall 1992) and QPT (Larus & Ball 1994) that rewrite program executables
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to generate address traces and instruction counts. MPTRACE (Susan L. Graham
& McKusick. 1993) and ATUM (Agarwal et al. 1986) used techniques to report in-
formation about the timing and structure of the program. Also, there are software
testing and quality assurance tools that detect memory leaks and access errors such
as Purify (Hastings & Joyce 1992) they catch programming errors by using these
techniques. Purify inserts instructions directly into the object code produced by ex-
isting compilers. These instructions check every memory read and write performed
by the program, to report any error. One of the limitations of these tools that they
are designed to perform a specific task and are difficult to modify to meet the user
needs. Modification of a customized tool to obtain less of more trace information
requires a user to access the tool’s source code and understand the low level details
of the tool. The above mentioned tools operate on object codes for a variety of op-
erating systems and architectures, but none of them works on Java virtual machine
class files. There is a tool called NetProf (Parthasarathy et al. 1996) that visualizes
Java profile information by translating Java byte codes to Java source code. Srivas-
tava and Eustace provided an analysis tools with OM called ATOM (Srivastava &
Wall 1994b). ATOM is a framework for building a number of customized program
analysis tools. BIT (Lee & Zorn 1997) is a set of interfaces that brings the function-
ality of ATOM (Srivastava & Eustace 1994) to the Java world by allowing a user
to instrument the Java virtual machine class file to observe the runtime behavior of
programs for optimization.
Binary Component Adaption provided by (Keller & Horlzle 1998) is a tool that
rewrites Java bytecode at load time. The idea of BCA is to add a method to a class
to perform symbolic manipulation without doing any operations at the bytecode
level. The Java Object Instrumentation Environment JOIE (Cohen et al. 1998) is
a tool that enables the rewriting or modification of Java bytecode at load time. In
fact, most instrumentation frameworks (Parthasarathy et al. 1996, Tatsubori et al.
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2001, Tilevich & Smaragdakis 2002) void instrumenting system classes, modifying
only user created classes or limit their functionality to only user classes. FERRARI
(Binder et al. 2007b,a) instruments all system classes statically including those that
are never used by an application. Chander in 2001 provided a Java bytecode instru-
mentation mechanism for mobile code security (Chander et al. 2001). This approach
replaces each method call that attempts to access any private or secret data with an-
other method call to restrict and limit the functionality. The approach discusses the
replacement of target objects with other classes called safe subclasses to implement
the security of the mobile code. The obvious limitation of most of the presented
techniques is that the bytecode instrumentation process does not cover the execu-
tion code of the native methods. (Binder et al. 2006) provides an instrumentation
mechanism using a new JVMTI feature in JDK 1.6 called native method prefixing
that instruments the native method invocations.
2.7 Information Flow Control Approaches
The field of Information flow control has a long history and a huge amount of re-
search (Banerjee & Naumann 2005, Volpano et al. 1996, Smith & Volpano 1998,
Pottier & Simonet 2003, Fenton 1974b). Denning in (1975) proposed a secure infor-
mation flow approach in computer systems. His proposed approach is at compiler
time to solve all problems of an implicit information flow. Fentons Data Mark Ma-
chine (1974a, 1974b) was one of the earliest systems that was used for information
flow control during runtime to enforce security policies. However, his machine is an
abstract machine. RIFLE’S architecture (Vachharajan et al. 2004) is provided to
be implemented to control information flow security during runtime. Their architec-
ture was designed with the aim of supporting end user choice of the policy decision.
Their approach uses a combination of hardware architecture and program binary
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translation to trace the flow of the information.
Beres and Dalton (2003) proposed a dynamic instruction stream modification frame-
work to track individual data movements within an application. However, the pro-
posed approach ignored implicit information flow. Chandra in 2006 proposed a
hybrid approach that instruments the bytecode with taint propagation code (Chan-
dra 2006) and Haldar (2005) use instrumentation mechanism to enforce security
policies. However, both approaches do not consider the native functions call and
implicit information flow. Newsome and Song (2005) use the concept of tainting to
track untrusted data from potentially unsafe input channels, like networks. How-
ever, when detecting attacks a flag will be raised and the execution will be halted.
There is no chance of recovery or change of program behaviour.
Other approaches such as Brown and Knight (2001) describe the problem of ensur-
ing secure information flow supported by hardware extension as a set of hardware
mechanisms. Their approaches work well for dynamically guaranteeing that the in-
formation flow is secure but only if the security class is explicitly specified to high
or low.
Another approach of information flow control that should be mentioned is provided
by Haffman and Davis (1990). They proposed adding a processor named security
pipeline interface (SPI) to be as intermediate between a data host and destination.
All data that is send from the host to the destination goes through the SPI. The SPI
can analyse, change or delete the data being output. However, using their security
pipeline interface they tried to address the integrity of the information flow rather
than the confidentiality of the information flow.
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2.8 Existing Implementation
In spite of a long history and a huge amount of work, there is a very little practical
software that enforces and analyses information flow based policies. This might be
due to the restrictions and limitations of many existing mechanism of information
flow analysis. But, there are some interesting examples that should be mentioned.
 JFlow Myers provided Jif or JFlow which is an extension to the Java language
that adds statically checked information flow primitives. It is an imperative
language. Jflow compiler works as a source to source translator for Java to
check information flow safety. Therefore, its output code can be compiled by
any Java compiler. JFlow supports some language features including objects,
access control, sub classing, exceptions and dynamic type tests. JFlow uses
a decentralized label model where every data item has an associated security
label with security policies (Myers 1999).
 Flow Caml is an extension of the functional language called Objective Caml
language Flow Caml. Flow Caml supports multilevel security with respect
to suitable lattice structure where each data item is annotated with acon-
stant security level for tracing information flow. Flow Caml uses a source to
source translator that takes a source code to statically check the flow of the
information with respect to the information flow policy as specified by the
programmers and then produces Caml code. Its objective Caml code can be
compiled by any compiler (Simonet 2003).
 Bytecode verifier The Java runtime environment contains a bytecode verifier
that enables Java to check untrusted code before running it. The compilation
of the source program is to ensure that control flow, type safety and memory
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are correct. That may be help of security guarantees (Lindholm & Yellin
1997).
2.9 Program Slicing
Program slicing is an analysis mechanism that was originally provided by Weiser
(1979, 1981). The program slicing techniques used while debugging or re-engineering
the program. It involves focusing on some parts of a given program that are currently
of interest. Weiser used a control flow graph to implement his slicing algorithm as
an intermediate representation. There are the following types of program slicing:
 Forward slicing: for any statement in the program, all program statements
that id may be affected by a given statement (Horwitz et al. 1990). The
forward slice concerned with what statements in the program are affected by
the variables value in a given statement.
 Backward slicing: In this the slice is computed from the point of interest
finding all statements in the program that can affect the specified variables at
the point of interest and discarding the other program statements. (Herrmann
2001).
 Static slicing: is computed symbolically to solve the static analysis problem
without considering the input of the program (Weiser 1979).
 Dynamic slicing: a slice is calculated for a fixed input or data value. Dy-
namic slicing is smaller than static slicing, but with restriction of applicability
to particular input (Korel & Laski 1988).
Dynamic slicing is closely related to dynamic information flow analysis because
both of them are concerned with execution tracing to data dependency and control
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Program Slicing
Input a,b;Input a,b;
Program
i:=a;i:=a;
j:=0; j:=0;
Repeat Repeat
i:=i-b;i:=i-b;
j:=j+1;j:=j+1;
until i>=b;until i>=b;
output j;output j;
output i;output i;
Figure 2.6: Backward slicing of a statement (output i)
flow relationship; while, dynamic slicing is focusing on identifying any subset of
program statements that influence a particular statement, dynamic information flow
analysis is focusing on identifying any subset of program objects that influence a
particular object action (Masriand & Podgurski 2005).
2.10 Program Dependencies
The program dependencies techniques are concerned with dependence relations in
the program. Dependencies in the program are usually represented by a direct graph
between the program statements as nodes for expressions, statements and edges for
the dependence relation. To differ between control dependence and data depen-
dence, suppose that the value of expression B controlled by the execution of the
statement A then statement A is control dependent on B. If a statement A uses
any variable from statement B then statement A is said to be data dependent on B
(Ferrante et al. 1987, Cavadini & Cheda 2008). Consider this example below for a
program dependence graph.
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Dependence graph
1: Start
Program
2: input G
3: if G<50 then
4: output(fail)
5: else
6: output(pass)
7: endif
8: output G
9: End
1
2 3 8 9
6 4
T F
Figure 2.7: Program and its dependence graph
Note the numbered cycles in the graph stands for program statements and square
nodes stands for control dependence conditions. From Figure 2.7 one can conclude
that.
 Statements 2,3,8 and 9 are guaranteed to execute with respect to control de-
pendencies on statement 1.
 If statement number 3 determines that statement 4 is being executed then
statement 4 is control dependent on statement 3.
 In addition, if the same statement 3 determines that statement 6 is being
executed then statement 6 is control dependent on statement 3.
Statement 8 is data dependent on statement 2. Program dependencies are closely
related to information flow, that is due to the fact that if statement A depends on
statement B either direct or indirect then the information flow can occur from B
to A. If there is not any type of dependencies between A and B then it can be
guaranteed that, there is not any possibility of information flow between A and B.
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2.11 Summary
The presented chapter has discussed the related research of this thesis. It has pro-
vided an introduction to the principles of security, static information flow analysis
and dynamic information flow analysis. It has provided an overview of existing ap-
proaches of bytecode instrumentation and information flow control and discussed the
difficulties and problems of the related research. The following are some common
problems of the previous mentioned works in this chapter either static or dynamic
information flow analysis.
 Fixed information flow policy.
 Works well for sequential programs, but not for concurrent ones. Concurrence
refers to programs that are executed in parallel.
 The previous information flow security mechanisms are not usable in practice.
 The user is unable to modify the information flow policy during runtime in
response to incidents.
 The behaviour of a program leaking confidential information can not be alter
by the monitor according to the user decision.
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Architecture
Objectives
 General overview of the proposed framework.
 Describe the framework architecture.
 Show how the framework components interact.
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3.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a general overview of the proposed framework and describes
the framework architecture. In this chapter the focus is on how each component of
the proposed framework interacts to trace and control the information flow within a
Java application. The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2
provides general overview of the framework. Section 3.3 provides a brief description
of the security requirements specification. Section 3.4 describes the information
flow policy. Section 3.5 introduces the assertion points. Section 3.6 provides a brief
description of the event recognizer. Section 3.7 provides a brief introduction to
the runtime checker component. Finally Section 3.8 describes the user feed back
component.
3.2 General Overview of the Framework
In static program analysis all possible paths of the program execution must be free
of any illegal information flow. If any illegal information flow is detected then the
static analysis mechanism will reject the whole program as insecure.
Graphically we can depict the set of possible program behaviours by a blank circle
and the set of all insecure program behaviour (defined in the policy) by a hashed
circle. In these terms a program is rejected by static analysis if the intersection of
both is not empty. In Figure 3.1 we depict the case for dynamic information flow
analysis. Consider that a program is in a state 0 and performs an operation α that
causes an information flow. We can distinguish two cases:
1. After the execution of α the program is in a secure state.
2. After the execution of α the program is in an insecure state.
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α α α
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α
α
α’
Policy
Policy’
Policy
System observation
behavior
2
A B
Figure 3.1: Monitoring mechanism
The hypothetical third case, that the program exhibits a behaviour that is defined
by the policy as insecure, but is outside of the set of possible behaviours, can be
ignored. In our framework we check whether the program is about to enter an
insecure state by intercepting the operation α.
 In case 1, that α leads to another secure state the program will be allowed to
perform α.
 In case 2, the runtime monitoring mechanism will send feedback to the user
asking about the violation of information flow.
The user has two options on how to proceed:
A. The user changes the operation α to another operation α’ so that the resulting
state is secure with respect to the policy. Such changes can for example be
the termination of the program or (manually) sanitizing the information that
flows in α.
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B. The other option is to modify the Policy into a Policy’ such that α leads to
a secure state. This could for example be introducing a one-off exception for
the current flow or defining a separate context in which the information flow
is considered legal.
Our approach is based on the observation of information flow during application
run time. The user feedback component handles all interactions with the system
and the user. It runs in a separate thread of control so that user interaction can be
overlapped with information flow control. The user feedback component also allows
the user to administrate the policy.
When the software is running, the user feedback component receives feedback from
the runtime checker (Steering). If the software is about to enter an insecure state
then the user will be asked to determine whether the information flow should be
aborted or allowed to flow and continue under a modified policy as illustrated in
Figure 3.2. For example given a policy that states that Bob’s password must not be
0
1 2 3
α α α
0
0
2
22a
α
α
α’
Policy
Policy’
Policy
System observation
behavior
Bob
Disallow Alice Allow Alice
Figure 3.2: Monitoring mechanism
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shared with any other user (Alice and Eve). If Bob now wants to give his password
to Alice to perform some function on his behalf, our approach will detect this viola-
tion of information flow and ask Bob how to proceed. Bob can then choose to stop
the operation that would violate the flow (i.e. Alice does not obtain the password)
or he allows this flow and changes the policy accordingly to reflect this decision.
Moreover, this change can be temporary (a one of exception) or permanent (He can
pass the password again to Alice).
Security will be achieved by an interactive process in which our framework will query
the user for security requirements for specific information that are made available
to the software and then continue to enforce these requirements on the application
using runtime verification technique for tracing information flow. The assertion
points will be inserted in the application bytecode and the event recognizer receives
low level information from the assertion points and sends any event that attempts
to make information flow to the runtime checker. The runtime checker checks the
received event against the flow policy and sends a feedback to the user throughout
the user feedback component.
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Figure 3.3: Runtime verification of information flow
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As illustrated in Figure 3.2 the runtime verification of information flow frame-
work consist of several components:
3.3 Security Requirements Specification
Stakeholders normally have a number of concerns that come with their desired sys-
tem and are typically high-level strategic goals. In this component the stakeholders
specify the desired characteristics that a system or subsystem must possess with
respect to sensitive information flow. In our previous example Figure 3.2, this is the
requirement that Bob’s password must not be shared with any other user (Alice and
Eve). The stakeholders should provide the source of the information and the out-
put channel a destination which will be formally expressed in the information flow
policy, to enable our runtime monitoring mechanism to (dis)allow the information
flows from source to destination. Such properties can ensure the confidentiality of
the information flow.
3.4 Information Flow Policy
An information flow policy is a type of security policy that defines the authorized
paths or the way information moves throughout the system (Bishop 2003) as ob-
tained from the stakeholders, which can be a set of rules, axioms and laws that are
provided to regulate how information must flow to prevent leak of sensitive informa-
tion. The information flow policy is designed to preserve information confidentiality.
In our framework, the information flow policy expresses the security requirements
as specified by the stakeholder/user as a set of rules that are understandable by
our runtime monitoring mechanism. The goals of the information flow policy is to
prevent secret information from flowing to a user or client software not authorized
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to receive it. For example, an information flow policy can state more context depen-
dent flows, such as (Bob’s password can only flow to Alice if Bob explicitly agrees).
Chapter 6 describes the notion of information flow policy in detail.
3.5 Assertion Points
Assertion points are program fragments as a collection of probes that will be added
into the target software. The main functionality of the assertion point is to send the
relevant state information to the event recognizer. This will ensure the monitoring
of relevant objects during the execution of the software. The probes are inserted
into all locations where monitored objects are updated such as (program variables
and function calls); unlike traditional runtime verification approaches our assertion
points are inserted before the operation to be able to intercept updates and thus
prevent the system from entering an insecure state. In order to send state informa-
tion to the event recognizer our framework uses a novel instrumentation mechanism
(Chapter 4) to insert assertion points.
3.6 Event Recognizer
The event recogniser is the part of the framework that detects an event from the
information received from the assertion point. The event recognizer is used as a
communication interface between the assertion points and the runtime checker. The
event recognizer sends any event that attempts to change the state of the software to
the runtime checker (according to the information flow policy). Although, it is pos-
sible to combine these two components the assertion point and the event recognizer,
we separated them to make the implementation of our architecture more extensible
and to minimize the interference with the monitored application, such as allowing
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the integration of several runtime checkers that verify different type of requirements.
For example, the management of obligations related to information flow could be
placed in a logically separate component. Chapter 5 provides a description of how
the events will be recognized and sent to the runtime checker.
3.7 Runtime Checker
The runtime checker component checks whether the execution trace belongs to the
set of all acceptable behaviours as defined by the security requirements specifica-
tion and expressed in the information flow policy. The runtime checker verifies and
decides whether or not the current execution trace as obtained from the event rec-
ognizer satisfies the information flow policy and sends feedback to the user feedback
component when it determines that the software is about to enter an insecure state,
e.g. any information flow that violates the policy. Chapter 5 describes how the
runtime checker checks the information flow policy and sends a feedback to the user
feed back component.
3.8 User Feedback Component
The user feedback component is an interface between the system and the user. An
essential functionality of the user feedback component is that all user interaction
passes through this component. The user feedback component informs the user
about policy violations detected by the runtime checker. As illustrated in Figure
3.1 if the runtime checker determined that this state execution would violate the
information flow policy then it sends feedback to the user, the system behaviour
will be changed accordingly, or the policy will be modified according to the user
decision. The user feedback component is described in Chapter 6.
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3.9 Summary
The presented chapter has provided a brief overview of the proposed framework ar-
chitecture. It describes all components of our framework and identifies the technol-
ogy that will be used in the framework. The following chapters give the specification
of each component of the presented framework. An instrumentation mechanism for
inserting different type of assertion points is provided in Chapter 4. The event rec-
ognizer and runtime checker algorithms are given in Chapter 5. The definition of
the information flow policy and user feedback component is provided in Chapter 6.
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Bytecode Instrumentation
Objectives
 Introduction to Java bytecode and virtual machine.
 Class loading, linking and initialization.
 Instrumentation algorithm.
 Instrumentation examples.
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4.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an introduction to Java bytecode, class loader in Java virtual
machine and how a Java class file will be instrumented in order to monitor and
control the information flow within a Java application. All computations in the Java
virtual machine are centred on the stack. Due to that the Java virtual machine do
not deal with registers for storing any arbitrary values, whereas everything is pushed
onto the stack frame of the current executed method before it can be used in the
computation. The focus in this chapter is on the loading and instrumentation of the
target program. This chapter also provides examples of Java bytecode instructions
and how they are instrumented. Our approach consist of two main steps:
 Loading and Instrumentation of class files of the target program.
 Execution of the target program and monitoring the information flow with
respect to the information flow policy.
Figure 5.1 shows a flowchart of our runtime monitoring mechanism.
Load & Instrument
Execute & Monitor
Figure 4.1: Monitoring mechanism flow chart
The bytecode instrumentation is a process that inserts method calls in the byte-
code, such that information can be extracted from the target program while it is
being executed. The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2
introduces Java bytecode. Section 4.3 provides an example of a Java source file and
51
CHAPTER 4. BYTECODE INSTRUMENTATION
its bytecode format. Section 4.4 describes the class loader in Java virtual machine.
Section 4.5 explores the loading phase. Section 4.6 describes the linking process
phase. Section 4.7 describes the initialization process. Section 4.8 describes the
instrumentation of assertion points and provides examples of Java bytecode instruc-
tions before and after instrumentation. Section 4.9 shows the instrumentation of
explicit information flow instructions. Finally Section 4.10 shows the instrumenta-
tion of implicit information flow instructions.
4.2 Bytecode
Bytecode is object code that is the result of program compilation, usually executed
by a virtual machine, rather than by hardware. The virtual machine converts each
bytecode instruction into specific machine instructions that are understandable by
the computer’s processor. Hence, Java bytecode makes it possible for Java code to
run on many different platforms. Each instruction of bytecode has a size of one byte
(Lindholm & Yellin 1997, Meyer & Dowing 1997). This bytecode representation of
a Java source file is also known as a Java class file. The bytecode (Opcode) of each
Java instruction is provided in Appendix A.
4.3 Example: Java Bytecode
This section provides an example of a Java source file and its corresponding class
file after compilation. Listing 4.1 represents a Java source file before converted into
Java bytecode (class file).
Listing 4.1: Source file of Add.java
1 public class Add {
2 public static void main(String[] args) {
3 int i=2;
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4 int j=3;
5 System.out.println(i+j);
6 }
7 }
Listing 4.2 shows the class file (Generated bytecode) of the Java source file presented
in Listing 4.1.
Listing 4.2: Class File of Add.java
0: iconst_2 // push int constant 2 onto the stack
1: istore_1 // pop 2 into local variable position 1,
2: iconst_3 // Push int constant 3 onto the stack
3: istore_2 // pop 3 into local variable position 2,
4: getstatic #2 =Field java.lang.System.out(Ljava/io/PrintStream;)//push field onto the stack.
7: iload_1 // push 2 from local variable position 1 onto the stack
8: iload_2 // push 3 from local variable position 3 onto the stack
9: iadd // pop top two values from stack, add and push the result onto stack
10: invokevirtual #3 = Method java.io.PrintStream.println((I)V)// Call println method, print i+j
13: return // Return void.
In Java bytecode each invoked method has a corresponding bytecode array. These
bytecode values correspond to the index within the bytecode array where each op-
code and its arguments are stored. The numbers that appears on the left of each
bytecode instructions line (0,1,2,3,4,7,8,9,10 and 13) are the index of each instruc-
tion in the opcode array that contains the bytecode of the Java virtual machine for
this method.
As illustrated in Listing 4.2 the opcodes indexes are not sequential. The opcodes
indexes are not sequential because some of the opcodes have parameters that take
up space in the bytecode array, e.g. the iconst 2 instruction has no parameters and
it occupies one byte in the bytecode array. Therefore, the next opcode, istore 1, is
at Opcode index 1. The opcode, getstatic is at index 4. However, iload 1 is Opcode
index 7 because the getstatic opcode and its parameters occupy location 4, 5, and
6. Index 4 is used for the getstatic opcode, Opcode indexes 5 and 6 are used to hold
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the getstatic opcode parameters. These parameters are used to construct an index
into the runtime constant pool for the class reference, where its value is stored. In
JVM each method has its own stack frame. Such a frame is composed by a local
variable array that contains all the local variables used in the current method and
by the operand stack to execute the bytecode instruction. Considering our example
Listing 4.1, a snap shot of the local variable array and the operand stack required
to execute such program are illustrated in Figure 4.2.
VariableSlot
1
...
...
2
i
j
...
...
(a) Variable Array
Operand StackBytecode Instruction
iadd
invokedvirtual
Value of i, 2
Value of j, 3
Value of i+j, 5
Value of i, 2
...
...
iload 1
iload 2
...
(b) Operand Stack
Figure 4.2: JVM - Bytecode instruction execution
An important feature of the JVM is that the bytecode instructions are typed.
In the first four Opcode indexes, index 7 and 8 (iconst 2, istore 1 and iload 1 ) as
shown in Listing 4.2, the prefix is a representative of the type that the opcode is
working with (prefix i means integer). Other opcodes prefixes are (a) for object
reference (b) for byte, (c) for char, (d) for double, etc. This prefix gives immediate
knowledge about what data type is being manipulated. The iadd instruction in
Opcode index 9 requires that the stack initially contains at least two elements and
these two elements are of type int. Then iadd pushes back a result of type int onto
the stack.
Similarly, for the getstatic #2 instruction at Opcode index 4 in Listing 4.2.
The #2 represents a runtime constant pool index with a hash sign and follow the
instruction is a comment identifying the runtime constant pool item referenced to
access the instance field out of type Ljava/io/PrintStream; declared in the class
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Java.lang.System. This opcode requires that the top of the stack contains a reference
to an instance of class Java.lang.System. Then the value of the class is pushed onto
the stack. The same is true for all other Java virtual machine instructions that are
prefixed by a hash sign. More generally, in JVM the code must meet the following
conditions:
 Type correctness, instruction arguments must be of expected type.
 No stack overflow or underflow.
 Code containment, the program counter must always point to the appropriate
instruction.
 Register initialization, a load from a register must follow at least one store in
this register.
 Object initialization, when an instance of a class is created, one of the initial-
ization method of this class must be invoked.
 Access control, class reference, method invocation and field access must respect
the different types (public, protected, private, etc) of class, method or field.
4.4 Class Loader in Java Virtual Machine
A Java program is composed of many individual class files, each of which corresponds
to a single Java class. These class files are loaded as needed by the program (De-
veloperWorks 2001, Liang & Bracha 1998), by a special class called a class loader.
The concept of the class loader is responsible for the loading, linking and file system
interaction transport to JVM. This means that the class files can be loaded from
remote locations, e.g applets loaded their classes via HTTP, without requiring a
change in the JVM. The loading, linking and initialization of classes or interfaces
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used by an application are necessary steps before any application is executed by
JVM (Meyer & Dowing 1997, Lindholm & Yellin 1997). Figure 4.3 shows the JVM
processes.
Loading
Linking
Verification
Preparation
Resolution (Option)
Initialization
(a) Class Loading,
Linking and Initializa-
tion
Loading
Linking
Verification
Preparation
Resolution (Option)
Initialization
Instrumentation
(b) Class Loading, In-
strumenting, Linking
and Initialization
Figure 4.3: Processes in JVM
4.5 Loading
Loading is the first operation performed by the class loader. The aim of the loading
process is to obtain a binary form of a class file (Meyer & Dowing 1997, Lindholm
& Yellin 1997). The main components of this process are the Java Class file and the
Class loader.
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4.5.1 Java Class File
A Java class file contains all necessary information that are used by JVM to define
a class or interface during runtime:
 Bytecode of the methods declared and implemented in a Java class.
 Symbolic reference to the super class of the class defined by a class file.
 List of all fields defined in the class.
 Constant pool containing literals, descriptor of methods and fields declared in
or used by the class.
 Other information of a Java class such as local variable table and exception
table.
4.5.2 Class Loader
The main aim of this component is to dynamically load and instrument a class
represented by a given class file. To generate a complete trace during execution, the
class loader is not only expected to load a class represented by a given class file, but
all classes used by a class corresponding to the given class file (Chiba 2007, Liang &
Bracha 1998). Generally, whenever a class is used for the first time the class loader
will load, link and initialize it.
4.6 Linking
In the linking process, the binary form of a class or interface is converted into a
runtime state for use within the JVM. This phase is divided into three different
steps (Meyer & Dowing 1997, Lindholm & Yellin 1997).
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4.6.1 Verification
Verification is the first step of the linking process. The main aim of the verification
step is to ensure that the binary representation of the given class file (Bytecode)
is structurally valid. To ensure that every bytecode instruction has a valid opcode,
each method has a correct signature and that the bytecode instruction sequence does
not violate the type discipline of Java (Meyer & Dowing 1997, Lindholm & Yellin
1997), e.g. if the bytecode tries to load an integer value from the local variable array
using a bytecode instruction for loading float values then the verifier will throw an
exception as it will violate the type discipline of Java.
4.6.2 Preparation
During preparation, the JVM will create static field for the class or interface and
then initialize them with their default values. This step is only the preparation of
an execution, thus, no virtual machine code is executed, yet.
4.6.3 Resolution
During resolution, the Java virtual machine will replace all the symbolic references
to class and fields stored into the constant pool to actual references. It is not
mandatory to resolve a symbolic reference until it is used for the first time, it is up
to the implementation to decide when to resolve symbolic references (Lindholm &
Yellin 1997, Venners 1999, Liang 1999).
4.7 Initialization
Initialization is the process of executing defined class static initializers and initializers
for static fields. In case of an interface only initializers for static fields are executed
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(Lindholm & Yellin 1997). The initialization process has two steps:
1. Initialize the direct super class of the class (if not initialized already)
2. Execute the class or interface initializer (if present)
4.8 Assertion Points
Assertion points are program fragments that act as a collection of probes (filters)
that will be inserted into the class file. The essential functionality of an assertion
point is to send pertinent state information to the event recognizer. This will ensure
monitoring of relevant objects during the execution of the software. Our assertion
points are inserted before the monitored bytecode instruction to be able to intercept
updates and thus prevent the system from entering an insecure state as specified in
the information flow policy.
4.8.1 Overview of Instrumentation Process
Instrumentation is an effective technique against well specified attacks, which in-
clude denial of service and information leaks via specific pathways from source to
destination (Chander et al. 2001). Bytecode instrumentation is a process to insert
assertion points in the bytecode, that should be performed after loading and before
linking and initialization of the class file as show in Figure 4.3(b).
The following presents the technical details of our instrumentation process. Our
instrumentation process illustrated in Figure 4.4 uses a special Java library called
Java agent.
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Figure 4.4: Instrumentation process
4.8.1.1 Java Agent
A Java agent is a pluggable library that runs embedded in a Java virtual machine
and intercepts the class loading process. This allows our instrumentation process
to monitor the class loading process and instrument (insert assertion points) the
bytecode of the classes to provide the required information. Our instrumentation
process uses the Java agent and Javassist open source because the core Java pack-
ages do not have support for programmatic manipulation of bytecode.
The agent class implements a public static premain method similar in principle to
the main application entry point. After the Java Virtual Machine has initialized,
each premain method will be called in the order the agents were specified, then
the real application main method will be called. The premain method allows the
instrumentation process to manipulate classes in two ways: class file transformation
and class file redefinition.
 Class file redefinition is used to redefine (replace) the definition of already
loaded classes.
 Class file transformation. Registering a transformer allows that all future class
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definitions will be seen by the transformer. The transformer is called when
classes are loaded and redefined.
The bytecode instructions are divided into 20 different categories, according to
their relation with the information flow at bytecode level. Table 4.1 illustrates
these instructions categories. The categorization is based on the instruction manip-
ulation of the operand stack. Our instrumentation process considers the following
constraints to ensure the class file validation.
1. The stack can not overflow or underflow.
2. The operands will always be the correct type.
3. Branches will be within its bounds of the code array for the method.
4. The target addresses of all control flow instructions are points to the start of
an instruction.
5. No instruction can access or modify a local variable at an index greater than
or equal to the number of local variables that its method indicates it allocates.
6. All references to the constant pool must be to an entry of the appropriate
type.
7. The code does not end in the middle of an instruction.
4.8.2 Bytecode Filters
The bytecode filter analyses the loaded class file and inserts assertion points prior
to the verification and linking of the bytecode. In this way, JVM only receives
bytecode that has been analysed. The essential functionality of the filter is to keep
track of all application objects, such as program variables and function calls to
send pertinent state information to the event recognizer. Instrumentation can be
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Category Instruction Description
aconst null, iconst m1, iconst 0, iconst 1, iconst 2, This category includes all
iconst 3, iconst 4, iconst 5,lconst 0, lconst 1, instructions that pushed
Const fconst 0, fconst 1, fconst 2, dconst 0, dconst 1, constant onto operand stack
bipush, sipush, ldc, ldc w, ldc2 w
iload,lload,fload,dload,aload,iload 0,iload 1,
Load iload 2,iload 3,lload 0,lload 1,lload 2,lload 3, Push the local variable value
fload 0,fload 1,fload 2,fload 3,dload 0,dload 1, onto the operand stack
dload 2,dload 3,aload 0,aload 1,aload 2,aload 3
istore,lstore,fstore, dstore, astore, istore 0,
istore 1, istore 2, istore 3, lstore 0, lstore 1, Pop value from the top of
Store lstore 2, lstore 3, fstore 0, fstore 1, fstore 2, operand stack, and store it
fstore 3, dstore 0, dstore 1, dstore 2, dstore 3, in the local variable.
astore 0, astore 1, astore 2, astore 3
Astore iastore, lastore, fastore, dastore, aastore, bastore, Pop the arrayref, index, and
castore, sastore value from the operand stack.
Pps pop, pop2, swap Pop 1 or 2 values on the top
of the operand stack.
Dup dup, dup x1, dup x2, dup2, dup2 x1, dup2 x2 Duplicates the value on the
top of the operand stack
Return ireturn, lreturn, freturn, dreturn, areturn, return pop the return value from stack
LoadField getfield, getstatic Fetch the objectref value
and push it onto the stack
Storefield putfield, putstatic Pop the top stack value
iadd, ladd, fadd, dadd, isub, lsub, fsub,dsub, imul,
lmul, fmul, dmul, idiv, ldiv, fdiv, ddiv, irem, lrem,
Union frem, drem,ishl, lshl, ishr, lshr, iushr, lushr, iand, Pop two values from the stack
land, ior, lor, ixor, lxor, iaload, laload, faload, and push the result onto stack
caload, saload, arraylength,daload, aaload, baload,
New new Push the objectref onto the stack
NewArray newarray, anewarray, multianewarray Push the arrayref onto the stack
Monitor monitorenter,monitorexit Pop the objectref from the stack
Pop the argument and objectref
Invoked invokevirtual, invokespecial, invokestatic, from the stack. In invokestatic
invokeinterface the argument only popped
Ifcond ifeq, ifne, iflt, ifge, ifgt, ifle, ifnull, ifnonnull Pop the top value on the stack
and compare it against zero
Ifcmp if icmpeq, if icmpne, if icmplt, if icmpge, Pop 2 values on the top of the
if icmpgt,if icmple, if acmpeq, if acmpne stack and compare them.
Endif goto,, goto w, Pop the objectref from the stack
Switch tableswitch, lookupswitch Pop int value from the stack.
ineg, lneg, fneg, dneg, iinc, i2l, i2f, i2d, l2i, l2f,
Out l2d, f2i, f2l, f2d, d2i, d2l, d2f, i2b, i2c, i2s, lcmp, Instructions in this category
of fcmpl, fcmpg, dcmpl, dcmpg, jsr, jsr w, ret, wide, have no implication for
scope checkcast, instanceof, breakpoint, impdep1, impdep2, information flow
Table 4.1: Instruction categories
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done either statically or dynamically. Static instrumentation means inserting the
assertion points after loading and before linking the class file Figure 4.3(b), whereas
dynamic instrumentation involves inserting the assertion points at runtime.
Our runtime monitoring mechanism uses static instrumentation to avoid incur extra
overhead at run-time to determine when it is secure to insert and remove filters. Also,
dynamic instrumentation requires a complex instrumentation mechanism (Miller
et al. 1995). Instrumentation can be done in two ways. The user has access to the
source code of the program, then inserts filters into the system according to the
source code. The automatic instrumentation determines what assertion points are
suitable for each bytecode instruction to be inserted. Our approach uses automatic
instrumentation however, the weak points of automatic instrumentation are that it
may not be easy to define an event of high level behaviour based on low level state
information and it may not be easy to handle complex programs. All classes being
loaded within an application will be instrumented in terms of keeping track of all
application objects.
4.8.3 Class Instrumentation
Java programs are composed of classes. Classes are composed of members. Members
are either fields or methods. The purpose of class instrumentation is to instrument
bytecode of a given class file such that the instrumented class file produces required
trace information to be sent to the event recognizer.The class instrumentation algo-
rithm is in Listing 4.3.
Listing 4.3: Class instrumentation algorithm
Let Mc be the set of methods detected in the class C.
Let Super(C) be the super class of C.
Load(C):
Read bytecode of C
If Super(C) is not loaded then
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load(Super(C))
else
For each m in Mc
if m is not native then
Instrument Method(m)
Listing 4.3 shows the class instrumentation algorithm that loads class and its super
classes. The algorithm also stated that all not native methods in class and its super
classes will be instrumented.
4.8.4 Method Body Instrumentation
The method body instrumentation instruments the byte code of the method in such
a way that whenever an instruction of the method causes an information flow, then
the assertion point sends the required trace information to the event recognizer.
Listing 4.4: Method instrumentation algorithm
Step 1: Get method m code.
Step 2: for each opcode x in m
x is Const: Instrument const.
x is Load: Instrument load.
x is Store: Instrument store.
x is Astore: Instrument astore.
x is Pps: Instrument pps.
x is Dup: Instrument dup.
x is Return: Instrument return.
x is Loadfield: Instrument loadfield.
x is Storefield: Instrument storefield.
x is Union: Instrument union.
x is New: Instrument new.
x is Newarray: Instrument newarray.
x is Monitor Instrument monitor.
x is Invoked method
x is native:
x is NativeWrite : Instrument write.
x is NativeMethod: Instrument native.
x is method: Instrument method.
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x is constructor: Instrument SpecialMethod.
x is Ifcond: Instrument ifcond.
x is Ifcmp: Instrument ifcmp.
x is Switch: Instrument switcth.
Step 3: Get method m code.
Step 4: for each opcode x in m
x is Ifcond: Instrument Endif.
x is Ifcmp: Instrument Endif.
The method body is a sequence of opcodes. The method instrumentation algorithm
categories the method opcodes and shows how to examine each opcode to deter-
mine in which opcode category it belongs as indicated in Table 4.1. In order to send
appropriate state information the method instrumentation algorithm has two itera-
tions. The first iteration is performed by steps 1 and 2 of Listing 4.4 to instrument
all types of Java bytecode. The second iteration is performed by steps 3 and 4 of
Listing 4.4 to instrument Endif assertion point. Because Java bytecode instructions
do not have end if statement. In addition, the offset address of the if conditions
may changes while method instrumentation as will be shown in Examples 1 and 2
of Section 4.10.4.
The method instrumentation algorithm has different subcategories for invoked method
such as native write method and normal method otherwise instrumented as native
method invocation. This distinction allows for capturing the required code informa-
tion to enable event recognizer and runtime checker to control the information flow.
Our instrumentation mechanism has divided the instrumentation of the instructions
into two types.
 Explicit information flow instrumentation to control the explicit flow of the
information.
 Implicit information flow instrumentation to control the implicit flow of the
information.
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The algorithm in Listing 4.4 is performed for all class methods. The categories
and subcategories in the method instrumentation algorithm of Listing 4.4 are ex-
plained in detail in the next sections by showing each instruction before and after
instrumentation.
4.9 Explicit Information Flow Instrumentation
In Java bytecode, explicit information flow occurs with an assignment statement
and may occur with the method invocation. The next subsections show the instru-
mentation of the categories that deal with the explicit information flow indicated in
the method instrumentation algorithm (Listing 4.4).
4.9.1 Instrument const
Const comprises all instructions that push a constant value onto the top of the stack
as illustrated in Table 4.1. All types of this category will be instrumented as follows:
Listing 4.5: Constant instrumentation
Before instrumentation:
iconst_1
After instrumentation:
invokestatic #387 = Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Const(()V)
iconst_1
Listing 4.5 indicates that const assertion point involves one line of opcode that
inserted to call const() method in the event recognizer.
66
CHAPTER 4. BYTECODE INSTRUMENTATION
4.9.2 Instrument load
All instructions that belong to category load in Table 4.1 push one value from the lo-
cal variable array to the top of the stack will be instrumented as follows. Listing 4.6
indicates that Aload assertion point involves three lines of opcode that inserted to
duplicate the loaded object, push label 1 into the stack and calling Aload() method
in the event recognizer.
Listing 4.6: Load instrumentation
Before instrumentation:
aload_1
After instrumentation:
aload_1
dup
ldc w #352 = ”1”
invokestatic #354 = Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Aload((ILjava/lang/String;)V)
4.9.3 Instrument store
Store involves all instructions that pop values from the current method stack and
store it in the local variable table as indicated in Table 4.1. Store instrumentation
is as follows:
Listing 4.7: Store instrumentation
Before instrumentation:
astore_2
After instrumentation:
dup
ldc w #514 = ”2”
invokestatic #517 = Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Store((Ljava/lang/Object;Ljava
/lang/String;)V)
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astore_2
Listing 4.7 indicates that Store assertion point involves three lines of opcode
that inserted to duplicate the loaded object, push label 2 into the stack and calling
Store() method in the event recognizer.
4.9.4 Instrument astore
Astore includes all instructions that pop three values from the top of the current
method stack and store them as an array. These popped three values represent
(Array object reference, value and an index in the array). Astore instrumentation
is as follows:
Listing 4.8: Astore instrumentation
Before instrumentation:
iastore
After instrumentation:
invokestatic #125 = Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Astore(()V)
iastore
Listing 4.8 indicates that Astore assertion point involves one line of opcode that
inserted to call Astore() method in the event recognizer.
4.9.5 Instrument pps
Pps comprises three instructions that are provided for the direct manipulation of
the stack as indicated in Table 4.1.
 Pop: pops the top value from the stack.
 Pop2: pops the top one or two values from the stack.
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1. Pop one if the value is of type long or double.
2. Pop two if the value is of type (Boolean, byte, char, short, int, float,
reference or returnAddress)
 Swap: swaps the top two values on the top of the stack.
The instrumentation is as follows:
Listing 4.9: Pop instrumentation
Before instrumentation:
pop
After instrumentation:
iconst 1
invokestatic #252 = Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Pps((I)V)
pop
Listing 4.9 indicates that Pps assertion point involves one line of opcode that
inserted to call Pps() method in the event recognizer.
4.9.6 Instrument dup
Dup instructions are provided for the direct manipulation of the stack values as
described in Table 4.1.
The instrumentation is as follows:
Listing 4.10: Dup instrumentation
Before instrumentation:
dup
After instrumentation:
iconst 1
iconst 0
invokestatic #112 = Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Dup((II)V)
dup
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Listing 4.10 indicates that Dup assertion point involves one line of opcode that
inserted to call Dup() method in the event recognizer.
4.9.7 Instrument return
Return comprises five instructions that pop values from the method stack as return
values and one instruction return that does not pop any value from the stack because
its method does not has a return value.
The instrumentation is as follows:
Listing 4.11: Return instrumentation
Before instrumentation:
return
After instrumentation:
iconst 1
invokestatic #117 = Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Return((I)V)
return
Listing 4.11 indicates that Return assertion point involves two lines of opcode
that inserted to push constant 1 into the stack and calling Return() method in the
event recognizer.
4.9.8 Instrument loadfield
Loadfield includes two instructions getfield and getstatic. Our instrumentation pro-
cess prefixes fields name with 0 to distinguish between local variables and fields as
shown in Listing 4.12.
The instrumentation is as follows:
Listing 4.12: Load field instrumentation
Before instrumentation:
getstatic #35 = Field java.lang.System.out(Ljava/io/PrintStream;)
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After instrumentation:
ldc #205 = ”0out”
invokestatic #207=Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.LoadField((Ljava/lang/String;)V)
getstatic #35 = Field java.lang.System.out(Ljava/io/PrintStream;)
Listing 4.12 indicates that LoadField assertion point involves two lines of opcode
that inserted to push label 0out into the stack and calling LoadField() method in
the event recognizer.
4.9.9 Instrument storefield
Storefield involves two instructions putfield and putstatic. Again 0 will be added to
the left of the field name.
The instrumentation is as follows:
Listing 4.13: Store field instrumentation
Before instrumentation:
putfield #54 = Field java.lang.String.hash(I)
After instrumentation:
ldc w #2631 = ”0hash”
invokestatic #264=Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.StoreField((Ljava/lang/String;)V)
putfield #54 = Field java.lang.String.hash(I)
Listing 4.13 indicates that StoreField assertion point involves two lines of opcode
that inserted to push label 0hash into the stack and calling StoreField() method in
the event recognizer.
4.9.10 Instrument union
Each of union instruction in Table 4.1 is responsible for popping two values from
the top of the stack. These popped two values will be pushed as one element after
combined them.
The instrumentation is as follows:
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Listing 4.14: Union instrumentation
Before instrumentation:
iadd
After instrumentation:
invokestatic #2670 = Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Union(()V)
iadd
Listing 4.14 indicates that Union assertion point involves one line of opcode that
inserted to call Union() method in the event recognizer.
4.9.11 Instrument new
New includes creating new object (class, array, or interface type). The object
reference name will again be prefixed with 0.
The instrumentation is as follows: Example:
Listing 4.15: New instrumentation
Before instrumentation:
new #94 = Class java.io.File
After instrumentation:
ldc w #393 = ”0java.io.File”
invokestatic #395 = Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.New((Ljava/lang/Object;)V)
new #94 = Class java.io.File
Listing 4.15 indicates that New assertion point involves two lines of opcode that
inserted to push label 0java.io.File into the stack and calling New() method in the
event recognizer.
4.9.12 Instrument newarray
Newarray includes three instructions:
 newarray: Create new array.
72
CHAPTER 4. BYTECODE INSTRUMENTATION
 anewarray: Create new array of reference.
 multianewarray: Create new multidimensional array.
Newarray instructions pop the count (array size) from the stack and push the ar-
rayref onto the top of the stack.
The instrumentation is as follows:
Listing 4.16: Newarray instrumentation
Before instrumentation:
newarray byte
After instrumentation:
ldc w #298 = ”0NewArray”
invokestatic#301=Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.NewArray((Ljava/lang/String;)V)
newarray byte
Listing 4.16 indicates that NewArray assertion point involves two lines of opcode
that inserted to push label 0NewArray into the stack and calling NewArray() method
in the event recognizer.
4.9.13 Instrument monitor
Monitor category includes two instruction monitorenter and monitorexit. These
instructions should be instrumented because they manipulate the stack as follow
 monitorenter pushes the monitored object onto the stack.
 monitorexit pops the monitored object from the stack.
Thus, these two instructions may change the way that information flow.
The instrumentation is as follows:
Listing 4.17: Monitor instrumentation
Before instrumentation:
monitorenter
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After instrumentation:
invokestatic #1557 = Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Monitor(()V)
monitorenter
Listing 4.17 indicates that Monitor assertion point involves one line of opcode
that inserted to call Monitor() method in the event recognizer.
4.9.14 Instrument invoke
There are several different mechanisms for invoking methods in the JVM.
 Invokevirtual : invoke instance method; dispatch based on class.
 Invokespecial : invoke instance method; special handling for superclass, private,
and instance initialization method invocations.
 Invokestatic: invoke a class (static) method.
 Invokeinterface: invoke interface method.
Let m be the method name. The actual method to be instrumented is selected
according to Listing 4.4.
4.9.14.1 Instrument native write
If m is native and named write then it will be instrumented as follows.
Listing 4.18: Write native method instrumentation
Before instrumentation:
invokevirtual #110 = Method java.io.OutputStream.write((I)V)
After instrumentation:
iconst 1
iconst 0
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invokestatic #394 = Method Monitor.EventRecognizer.NativeWrite((II)V)
invokevirtual #110 = Method java.io.OutputStream.write((I)V)
Listing 4.18 indicates that NativeWrite assertion point involves three lines of
opcode that inserted to push constant 1 (parameters) and constant 0 (return values)
into the stack and calling NativeWrite() method in the event recognizer.
4.9.14.2 Instrument native method
If m is another native method then it will be instrumented as follows:
Listing 4.19: Native method instrumentation
Before instrumentation:
invokevirtual #30 = Method java.io.Writer.flush(()V)
After instrumentation:
iconst 1
iconst 0
invokestatic#886=Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.NativeMethod((II)V)
invokevirtual #30 = Method java.io.Writer.flush(()V)
In the Listing 4.19 the flush() method is instrumented as native method with
one parameter (iconst 1 ) and 0 return value (iconst 0 ).
4.9.14.3 Instrument method
If m is another method then it will be instrumented as follows:
Listing 4.20: Method instrumentation
Before instrumentation:
invokevirtual #45 = Method java.nio.ByteBuffer.position(()I)
After instrumentation:
ldc w #1560 = ”position”
iconst 1
iconst 1
invokestatic #152=Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Method((Ljava/lang/String;II)V)
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invokevirtual #45 = Method java.nio.ByteBuffer.position(()I)
As shown in Listing 4.20 the following information about position() method is
sent to the event recognizer:
 The method name: position
 The method parameters number: iconst 1
 The number of expected return values: iconst 1
All this information is detected from the method signature before instrumentation.
4.9.14.4 Instrument special method
If m is constructor then it will be instrumented as follows.
Listing 4.21: Special method instrumentation
Before instrumentation:
invokespecial #96 = Method java.io.File.<init>((Ljava/lang/String;)V)
After instrumentation:
invokestatic #401 =Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.SpecialMethod(()V)
invokespecial #96 = Method java.io.File.<init>((Ljava/lang/String;)V)
Listing 4.21 indicates that SpecialMethod assertion point involves one line of
opcode that inserted to call SpecialMethod() method in the event recognizer.
4.10 Implicit Information Flow Instrumentation.
In Java bytecode, the scope of the implicit information flow occurs within condition
or repetitive commands. The stack maybe manipulated in different ways according
to the branch of branching instruction offset address that may cause performing a
different number of pop and push operations. The following subsections show the
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instrumentation of the instructions that deals with the implicit information flow as
indicated in the method body instrumentation Listing 4.4.
4.10.1 Instrument ifcond
Ifcond involves all condition instructions that pop one value from the stack as illus-
trated in Table 4.1.
The instrumentation is as follows:
Listing 4.22: If condition instrumentation
Before instrumentation:
ifle 31
After instrumentation:
invokestatic #1141 = Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.ifcond(()V)
ifle 43
As shown in List 4.22 that the offset address of the condition ifle is addresses to
31. However, after instrumenting all bytecode instructions the offset address may
changed according to the size of the inserted assertion points as is illustrated in
Listing 4.22 the offset address has changed to 43.
4.10.2 Instrument ifcmp
Ifcmp includes all condition instructions that pop two values from the stack as
indicated in Table 4.1.
The instrumentation is as follows:
Listing 4.23: Ifcmp condition instrumentation
Before instrumentation:
if_icmpeq 75
After instrumentation:
invokestatic #378 = Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.ifcmp(()V)
if_icmpeq 94
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4.10.3 Instrument switch
Switch includes compound conditional branch instructions:
 Tableswitch: Access jump table by index and jump.
 Lookupswitch: Access jump table by key match and jump
The instrumentation is as follows:
Listing 4.24: Table switch instrumentation
Before instrumentation:
tableswitch {
default: 34
0: 28
1: 30
2: 32
}
After instrumentation:
invokevirtual #39 = Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.ifcond(()V)
tableswitch {
default: 93
0: 55
1: 67
2: 81
}
4.10.4 Instrument endif
Similar to (Ball 1993), a condition region should be created for each If <cond> to
control implicit information flow. The condition region will be created according to
the offset address of the if statement. The start of the region is at the beginning
of the if statement and the end of the region is at the end of the if statement.
As indicated in the instrumentation algorithm Listing 4.4 the assertion point of the
start of the region is inserted after step 2 as illustrated in Sections 4.10.1 and 4.10.2
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respectively. The end of the region is where the Endif should be instrumented which
is after fourth step of the instrumentation algorithm.
Each type of ifcmp and ifcond statements in Table 4.1 has its own offset address.
Endif will be instrumented according to the offset address of the If <cond> in-
struction opcode. The offset address must be within the method that contains the
If <cond> instruction. If the opcode instruction before the target opcode index is
not a goto statement then the assertion point Endif will inserted in the index as
specified in the If <cond> offset address. as illustrated in the examples of Listings
4.25 and 4.26 respectively.
Example 1:
Assume that the if statement has a conditional form as illustrated in Figure 4.5.
When the condition is true, the statements between the if condition and the en-
if <cond> then
statement1;
statement2
.....
.....
endif
Figure 4.5: Condition statement form example 1
dif will be performed. Listing 4.25 shows the if condition original bytecode, the
instrumented bytecode after performing step 2 of the method body instrumentation
algorithm in Section 4.8.4 and the changes in the bytecode after performing step 4
of the method body instrumentation algorithm after inserting the Endif assertion
point.
Listing 4.25: Example 1 Endif instrumentation
Before instrumentation:
03: ifne 8
06: iconst_1
07: istore_1
08: iconst_2
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After step 2 of the method body instrumentation algorithm:
18: invokestatic #44 = Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.ifcond(()V)
21: ifne 35
24: invokestatic #46 = Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Const(()V)
27: iconst_1
28: dup
29: ldc #47 = ”1”
31: invokestatic #49 = Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Store((Ljava/lang/Object;
Ljava/lang/String;)V)
34: istore_1
35: invokestatic #51 = Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Const(()V)
38: iconst_2
After step 4 of the method body instrumentation algorithm:
18: invokestatic #44 = Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.ifcond(()V)
21: ifne 38
24: invokestatic #46 = Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Const(()V)
27: iconst_1
28: dup
29: ldc #47 = ”1”
31: invokestatic #49 = Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Store((Ljava/lang/Object;
Ljava/lang/String;)V)
34: istore_1
35: invokestatic #61 = Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Endif(()V)
38: invokestatic #51 = Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Const(()V)
41: iconst_2
The if condition in the original bytecode Listing 4.25 is started at opcode index
03 and has offset address 8. The end of the if condition is at opcode index 8 as
illustrated in Figure 4.6 (Before instrumentation). However, after performing step
2 of the method body instrumentation algorithm of Section 4.8.4, all original byte-
code are instrumented and the start of the region is inserted in the first iteration of
the instrumentation process. The offset address of the if condition will be changed
according to the instrumented bytecode inside the if condition as shows in Listing
4.25 at opcode index 21.
The offset address is changed to 35 as illustrated in Figure 4.6 (after step 2 of the
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method body instrumentation algorithm). Finally, step 4 of the method body instru-
mentation algorithm is performed where the end of the region (Endif ) is inserted.
The offset address of the if condition will be modified to point to the opcode index
38. The Endif assertion point will be inserted before offset address of the if condi-
tion as show in Listing 4.25 at opcode index 35. Figure 4.6 illustrates the creation
of the region in the instrumentation process.
8:
35:
38:
35: Endif
21: If <cond> offset address 353: If <cond> offset address 8
Before instrumentation After step 2 of
the method instrumentation
After step 4 of
the method instrumentation
21: If <cond> offset address 38
Figure 4.6: Region creation of example 1
Example 2:
Assume that the if statement has a conditional form as illustrated in Figure 4.7.
if <cond> then
statements;
.....
else
statements;
.....
endif
Figure 4.7: Condition statement form example 2
When the condition is true, the statements between the if condition and else will
be performed, otherwise the statements between else and endif will be performed.
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Listing 4.25 shows the if condition original bytecode, the instrumented bytecode
after performing step 2 of the method body instrumentation algorithm of Section
4.8.4 and the bytecode after inserting the Endif assertion point. In this form of the
condition both cases true or false will cause an information flow, thus the end of the
region will be inserted at the end of the if condition.
Listing 4.26: Example 2 of Endif instrumentation
Before instrumentation:
03: ifne 11
06: iconst_1
07: istore_1
08: goto 13
11: iconst_2
12: istore_1
13: iconst_1
After step 2 of the method body instrumentation algorithm:
18: invokestatic #45 = Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.ifcond(()V)
21: ifne 38
24: invokestatic #47 = Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Const(()V)
27: iconst_1
28: dup
29: ldc #48 = ”1”
31: invokestatic #50 = Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Store((Ljava/lang/Object;
Ljava/lang/String;)V)
34: istore_1
35: goto 49
38: invokestatic #52 = Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Const(()V)
41: iconst_2
42: dup
43: ldc #53 = ”1”
45: invokestatic #55 = Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Store((Ljava/lang/Object;
Ljava/lang/String;)V)
48: istore_1
49. invokestatic #57 = Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Const(()V)
52: iconst_1
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After step 4 of the method body instrumentation algorithm:
18: invokestatic #45 = Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.ifcond(()V)
21: ifne 38
24: invokestatic #47 = Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Const(()V)
27: iconst_1
28: dup
29: ldc #48 = ”1”
31: invokestatic #50 = Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Store((Ljava/lang/Object;
Ljava/lang/String;)V)
34: istore_1
35: goto 49
38: invokestatic #52 = Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Const(()V)
41: iconst_2
42: dup
43: ldc #53 = ”1”
45: invokestatic #55 = Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Store((Ljava/lang/Object;
Ljava/lang/String;)V)
48: istore_1.
49:invokestatic #69 = Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Endif(()V)
52: invokestatic #57 = Method uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Const(()V)
55: iconst_1
In this example the opcode instruction before the target address is a type of goto
statement then the assertion point Endif will be inserted at the target address of
the goto statement as illustrated in Listing 4.25. The if condition in the original
bytecode of Listing 4.25 starts at opcode index 03 and has offset address 11. The end
of the if condition is at opcode index 8 as illustrated in Figure 4.8 (Before instru-
mentation). However, after performing step 2, all original bytecode is instrumented
and the start of the region is inserted in the first iteration of the instrumentation
process. The offset address of the if condition will be changed according to the
size of the instrumented bytecode inside the if condition as shown in Listing 4.25
at opcode index 21. The offset address is changed to 38 as illustrated in Figure 4.8
(after step2 of the method instrumentation algorithm). Finally in the fourth step
of the method body instrumentation algorithm the second iteration of the method
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bytecode is performed to insert the end of the region (Endif ).
The instrumentation process gets the offset address of the if condition which is 38
as specified at opcode index 21. Checks the instruction that just before the index of
the offset address which is the instruction goto because the index of the instruction
that is before the offset address 38 is opcode index 35. If the checked instruction
is of type goto as in the example, then the instrumentation process gets the offset
address of the goto which is 49 and inserts the Endif assertion point at the offset
address 49. Figure 4.8 illustrates the creation of the region in the instrumentation
process for this form of the if condition.
11:
49: Endif
21: If <cond> offset address 383: If <cond> offset address 11
Before instrumentation After step 2 of
the method instrumentation
After step 4 of
the method instrumentation
21: If <cond> offset address 38
8: goto 13
13:
12
3
38:
35: goto 49
49:
1
2
3
38:
35: goto 49
12
3
Figure 4.8: Region creation of example 2
However, in case of a return statement inside a region, the return assertion
point of Section 4.9.7 has a parameter that holds a counter of the If condition.
This counter will be increased by 1 each time that If condition is performed and
decreased by 1 for each performed Endif.
4.11 Summary
The presented chapter has introduced the Java bytecode, class loader in Java vir-
tual machine and how a Java class file will be instrumented in order to monitor
and control the information flow within a Java application. The chapter provided
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example of a Java source file and its bytecode format. This chapter has described
the class loader in Java virtual machine and explored the loading phase. The pre-
sented chapter has also described the linking process and the initialization process
phases. This chapter has discussed a novel instrumentation mechanism for inserting
assertion points and provided some examples of Java bytecode instructions before
and after instrumentation. Finally, it has discussed the instrumentation of explicit
information flow instructions and implicit information flow instructions.
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Runtime Monitoring
Objectives
 Describe how a class file will be executed.
 Describe how information flow will be monitored with respect to an informa-
tion flow policy.
 Provide the event recognizer and runtime checker algorithms for controlling
information flow.
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5.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the event recognizer and runtime checker algorithms for con-
trolling information flow within an Java application (the second step of our runtime
monitoring mechanism as illustrated in Figure 5.1).
Load & Instrument
Execute & Monitor
Figure 5.1: Monitoring mechanism flow chart
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 describes the event recognizer.
Section 5.3 provides the explicit information flow algorithms for tracing and con-
trolling explicit information flow. Section 5.4 extends this algorithm for implicit
information flow. Section 5.5 describes the runtime checker process. Section 5.6 de-
scribes the user feed back component. Finally Section 5.7 describes the information
flow policy and its enforcement.
5.2 Event Recognizer
The Java virtual machine is stack oriented, with most operations taking one or
more operands from the operand stack of the Java virtual machine’s current frame or
pushing results back onto the operand stack (Lindholm & Yellin 1997). Our runtime
monitoring mechanism is similar as the Java virtual machine runtime frames. In our
runtime monitoring mechanism a new runtime frame is created each time a method
is invoked. The runtime frame consists of a stack called information flow stack (IFS)
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and Symbol Table for the use by the current method to store its variables. At any
point of the execution, there are thus likely to be many frames and equally many
information flow stacks (IFS) and Symbol Tables per method invocation. Only the
runtime frame (IFS and Symbol table) of the current method is active. The event
recognizer receives an event that attempts to change the state of the information
flow within the application. The event recognizer manipulates all labels of variables
using the current runtime frame (IFS and Symbol table) and implicit information
flow stack (IMFS) as illustrated in Figure 5.2.
IFS
Runtime frames
Method
Symbol table
Method
IFS
Method
Symbol table
Method
IFS
Method
Symbol table
Method
runtime
frame
Current
IMFS
Figure 5.2: runtime frame of the current method and IMFS
5.2.1 Symbol Tables
An information flow Symbol Table holds information needed to trace the informa-
tion flow during runtime. To reduce the time of searching our event recognizer uses a
hash table data structure to implement the information flow Symbol Table as shown
in Figure 5.3.
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Position Labels
0
1
2
...
...
label 1, ...........
label 1, label 2, ...........
label 1, label 2, ...........
...
...
Figure 5.3: Information flow Symbol Table
As shown in Figure 5.3 the information flow Symbol Table consists of positions
and labels. The position holds the location of the stored information in the Sym-
bol Table. Labels are implemented as a set of strings that can hold any number of
labels. The event recognizer performs the following operations on the information
flow Symbol Table:
1. Get labels from a specific position.
2. Put labels at a specific position.
5.2.2 Information Flow Stack (IFS)
Each runtime frame contains a last-in-first-out (LIFO) stack known as its informa-
tion flow stack (IFS). The event recognizer supplies instructions to load labels from
Symbol Tables onto the IFS. The information flow stack is also used to prepare
parameters to be passed to other runtime frames and to receive results of other
method traces. Our event recognizer uses the information flow stack to control
explicit information flow.
5.2.3 Implicit Information Flow Stack (IMFS)
An implicit information flow stack (IMFS) is smiler to the information flow stack
(IFS). Our event recognizer uses a shared implicit information flow stack between
all runtime frames as illustrated in Figure 5.2. The implicit information flow stack
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is shared to control any implicit information flow that may occurs during runtime
such as a method invocation inside a conditional statement.
We now move on to the technical details of the event recognizer. The following two
Sections 5.3 and 5.4 provide algorithms for inserting assertion points to trace and
control information flow.
5.3 Explicit Information Flow Algorithm
As mentioned in Section 4.9 the explicit information flow occurs when using the
assignment statement and may occur when using method invocations. The next
subsections provide explicit information flow algorithms for all categories of opcodes
in Table 4.1 that may cause explicit information flow.
5.3.1 Const Algorithm
The Const assertion point is informing the event recognizer to push the constant
label [Const] onto the current runtime frame IFS as indicated in the Const algorithm
Listing 5.1.
Listing 5.1: Const algorithm
uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Const()
1. Let x be a List containing the label Const. // [Const]
2. IFS.push(x).
Figures (5.4a and 5.4b) illustrate the changes in the runtime frame of the current
method and IMFS after performing the Const assertion point.
As shown in Figure 5.4b the constant label [Const] is pushed onto the top of the
current runtime frame IFS.
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Symbol table of the current method IFS IMFS
Current Runtime Frame
Figure 5.4a: Runtime frame and IMFS before performing the Const assertion point
Symbol table of the current method IFS IMFS
Current Runtime Frame
[Const]
Figure 5.4b: Runtime frame and IMFS after performing the Const assertion point
5.3.2 Load Algorithm
A load assertion point has different types as described in Table 4.1. A load assertion
point causes the event recognizer to get a label from the current runtime frame Sym-
bol Table and push it onto the top of the current runtime frame (IFS) as indicated
in Listing 5.2.
Listing 5.2: Load algorithm
uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Load(String keyInSymbolTable)
1. Let temp= Symbol Table.get(keyInSymbolTable)
2. IFS.push(temp)
Assuming that both current runtime frame IFS and IMFS are empty, the cur-
rent runtime frame Symbol Table location 0 contains Const and location 1 contains
object named 0java,io,File as illustrated in Figure 5.5a.
The event recognizer receives information that a load operation is going to be
performed on location 1. The event recognizer pushes the contents of the Sym-
bol Table location 1 onto the current runtime frame IFS. Figure 5.5b illustrates the
changes in the current runtime frame and IMFS after performing the load asser-
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Symbol table of the current method
IFS IMFS
Current Runtime Frame
Const0
1 0java.io.File
Figure 5.5a: Runtime frame and IMFS before performing the Load assertion point
Symbol table of the current method
IFS IMFS
Current Runtime Frame
Const0
1 0java.io.File
[0java.io.File]
Figure 5.5b: Runtime frame and IMFS after performing the Load assertion point
tion point where the contents of current runtime frame Symbol Table location are
is pushed onto the current runtime frame IFS and there is no change in the IMFS.
5.3.3 Store Algorithm
A store assertion point has different instructions as described in Table 4.1. A store
assertion point causes the event recognizer to pop the top element from the current
runtime frame IFS and combine it with all contents of the IMFS in one list.Then
store the list in current runtime frame Symbol Table as indicated in Listing 5.3.
Listing 5.3: Store algorithm
uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Store(String keyInSymbolTable)
1. Let V and S be an empty lists
2. V = V U {IFS.pop()}
3. V = V U IMFS
5. Symbol Table.put(KeyInSymbolTable, V).
Assuming that the current runtime frame IFS contains one label [0java.io.File],
IMFS contains [/home/secret/file.txt] and Symbol Table location 0 has label Const
and location 1 contains [0java.io.File] as illustrated in Figure 5.6a. The event
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Symbol table of the current method
IFS IMFS
Current Runtime Frame
Const0
1 0java.io.File
[home/secret/file.txt][0java.io.File]
Figure 5.6a: Runtime frame and IMFS before performing the Store assertion point
Symbol table of the current method
IFS IMFS
Current Runtime Frame
Const0
1 0java.io.File
[home/secret/file.txt]
0java.io.File
home/secret/file.txt
2
Figure 5.6b: Runtime frame and IMFS after performing the Store assertion point
recognizer receives information that the store operation is going to be performed
on location 2. The event recognizer pops the top element from the current runtime
frame IFS 0java.io.File and pops all contents of the IMFS /home/secret/file.txt.
Then the event recognizer combines all popped elements from both stacks in one
list 0java,io,File, /home/secret/file.txt. Finally, it stores the combined elements
in the current runtime frame Symbol Table location 2. Figure 5.6b illustrate the
changes in the runtime frame and IMFS after performing the Store assertion point.
5.3.4 Astore Algorithm
The Astore assertion point includes eight different instructions (iastore, lastore,
fastore, dastore, aastore, bastore, castore, sastore) as indicated in Table 4.1. An
Astore assertion point is reporting to the event recognizer that the Astore operation
will be the next operation. Then the event recognizer pops the top element from
the current runtime frame IFS (object reference) and gets the location Key of this
popped label from the current runtime frame Symbol Table. It pops the top two
elements from the current runtime frame IFS the value and array index. It then pops
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all contents of the IMFS and combine them with the two popped elements from the
current runtime frame IFS into one list. It then stores the list in the current runtime
frame Symbol Table location key and pushes all popped elements from the IMFS
back in the same order as indicated in Listing 5.4.
Listing 5.4: AStore algorithm
uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Astore()
1. Let ObjectRef, V and S be empty lists
2. ObjectRef = IFS.pop()
3. Let Key be a string contains the Objectref location in the current runtime frame
Symbol Table
4. Let V = IFS.pop() U IFS.pop
5. V = V U IMFS
6. Symbol Table.put(Key, V).
Figures 5.7a and 5.7b illustrate the current runtime frame and the IMFS before
and after performing the Astore assertion point.
Symbol table of the current method
IFS
IMFS
Current Runtime Frame
0out
[I@1decdec, 0NewArray]
[Const]
[Const]
I@1decdec, 0NewArray
0
1
Figure 5.7a: Runtime frame and IMFS before performing the Astore assertion point
Symbol table of the current method
IFS IMFS
Current Runtime Frame
[0out]
[Const]
0
1
Figure 5.7b: Runtime frame and IMFS after performing the Astore assertion point
As shown in Figure 5.7a the current runtime frame IFS contains three elements
the first element is a label to array reference [I@1decdec, 0NewArray] and the next
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two elements are labels to constants [Const] and [Const]. The current runtime
frame Symbol Table location 0 contains 0out and location 1 contains I@1decdec,
0NewArray. The event recognizer pops the top element [I@1decdec, 0NewArray]
from the current runtime frame IFS and get its location 1 from the current runtime
frame Symbol Table. The event recognizer compares the first element in the IFS
with all values in the current runtime frame (Symbol Table) to get the location of
the array reference in the Symbol Table as shown in Figure 5.7a. Then the top
two labels [Const] and [Const] are popped from the current runtime frame IFS
and all contents of the IMFS which in our example is empty. All popped elements
from both stacks will be combined together and stored in the current runtime frame
Symbol Table location 1 as shown in Figure 5.7b.
5.3.5 Pps Algorithm
The Pps assertion point includes three different instructions as described in Table
4.1. The Pps assertion point has an integer value to specify which type of pps
instruction (pop, pop2, swap) will be performed as indicated in the Pps algorithm
Listing 5.5.
Listing 5.5: Pps instructions algorithm
uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Pps(int type)
if type = 1 // pop
1. IFS.pop()
else if type = 2 // pop2
1. x=IFS.pop().
2. if x is of type (long | double)
2.1 IFS.pop()
else if type = 3 // Swap
1. Let x = IFS.pop().
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2. Let y = IFS.pop().
3. IFS.push(x)
4. IFS.push(y)
As indicated in Listing 5.5, if the event recognizer receives:
 Type 1, the top element on the current runtime frame IFS will be popped.
 Type 2, the top element on the current runtime frame IFS will be popped and
if the type of popped element is long or double then another element will be
popped from the current runtime frame IFS.
 Type 3, the two top elements on the current runtime frame IFS will be
swapped.
5.3.6 Dup Algorithm
The Dup assertion point includes six different instruction types (dup, dup x1, dup x2,
dup2, dup2 x1 and dup2 x2 ). The Dup assertion point has two integer values to
specify the instruction type as illustrated in the Dup algorithm Listing 5.6.
Listing 5.6: Dup instructions algorithm
uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Dup(int category, int type) // in
instrumentation.
if ( category = 1 | (category = 4 & type=1)) // duplicated
Dup1()
else if ((category = 2) | (category = 5 & type=1)
| (category = 3 & type= 1) | (category = 6 & type =1)) // dup x1
Dup2()
else if ((category = 3 & type= 2) | (category = 6 & type =2)) // dup x2
Dup3()
else if category = 4 & type=2 // dup2
Dup4()
else if category = 5 & type = 2 // dup2 x1
Dup5()
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else if category = 6 & type = 3 // dup2 x2
Dup6()
else if category = 6 & type = 4
Dup7()
Dup1()
1. Let x = IFS.pop()
2. IFS.push(x)
3. IFS.push(x)
Dup2()
1. Let x = IFS.pop()
2. Let y =IFS.pop()
3. IFS.push(x)
4. IFS.push(y)
5. IFS.push(x)
Dup3()
1. Let x = IFS.pop()
2. Let y = IFS.pop()
3. Let z = IFS.pop()
4. IFS.push(x)
5. IFS.push(y)
6. IFS.push(z)
7. IFS.push(x)
Dup4()
1. Let x = IFS.pop()
2. Let y = IFS.pop()
3. IFS.push(x)
4. IFS.push(y)
5 IFS.push(x)
6. IFS.push(y)
Dup5()
1. Let x = IFS.pop()
2. Let y = IFS.pop()
3. Let z = IFS.pop()
4. IFS.push(x)
5. IFS.push(y)
6. IFS.push(z)
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7. IFS.push(x)
8. IFS.push(y)
Dup6()
1. Let x = IFS.pop()
2. Let y = IFS.pop()
3. Let z = IFS.pop()
4. IFS.push(y)
5. IFS.push(x)
6. IFS.push(z)
7. IFS.push(y)
8. IFS.push(x)
Dup7()
1. Let x = IFS.pop()
2. Let y = IFS.pop()
3. Let z = IFS.pop()
4. Let w = IFS.pop()
5. IFS.push(y)
6. IFS.push(x)
7. IFS.push(w)
8. IFS.push(z)
9. IFS.push(y)
10.IFS.push(x).
As indicated in Listing 5.6, if the event recognizer receives:
 Category 1, the top element on the current runtime frame IFS will be popped,
duplicated and the duplicated elements pushed onto the current runtime frame
IFS.
 Category 2, duplicate the top element on the current runtime frame IFS and
insert the duplicated element two elements down in the current runtime frame
IFS.
 Category 3 and type 1, duplicate the top element on the current runtime
frame IFS and insert the duplicated element two elements down in the current
runtime frame IFS.
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 Category 3 and type 2, duplicate the top element on the current runtime frame
IFS and insert the duplicated element three elements down in the current
runtime frame IFS.
 Category 4 and type 1, duplicate the top element on the current runtime frame
IFS and push the duplicated element onto the current runtime frame IFS.
 Category 4 and type 2, duplicate the top two elements on the current runtime
frame IFS and push the duplicated elements back onto the current runtime
frame IFS in the original order.
 Category 5 and type 1, duplicate the top element on the current runtime frame
IFS and insert the duplicated value two elements down in the current runtime
frame IFS.
 Category 5 and type 2, duplicate the top two elements on the current runtime
frame IFS and insert the duplicated elements in the original order, one element
beneath the original elements in the current runtime frame IFS.
 Category 6 and type 1, duplicate the top element on the current runtime frame
IFS and insert the duplicated value two elements down in the current runtime
frame IFS.
 Category 6 and type 2, duplicate the top element on the current runtime frame
IFS and insert the duplicated value three elements down in the current runtime
frame IFS.
 Category 6 and type 3, duplicate the top two elements on the current runtime
frame IFS and insert the duplicated elements, in the original order, three
elements down in the current runtime frame IFS.
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 Category 6 and type 4, duplicate the top two elements on the current run-
time frame IFS and insert the duplicated elements, in the original order, four
elements down in the current runtime frame IFS.
5.3.7 Return Algorithm
A return instruction has twp different types (Return and Treturn). The Return
type does not return any value from the current method. The Tretrun type has five
different categories (ireturn, lreturn, freturn, dreturn, areturn) that returns the value
from the current method. The event recognizer will perform according to the type
of the return assertion point (Return and Treturn) as indicated in Return algorithm
Listing 5.7.
Listing 5.7: Return algorithm
uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Return(IfCounter)
1. Loop until IFCounter = 0 //IfCounter is if Statement counter of the current method
1.1 IMFS.pop()
1.2 IFCounter−−
2. Destroy the current runtime frame (Current method IFS and Symbol table)
uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.TReturn(IfCounter)
1. Let ReturnValues, IMFSValues be lists
2. Loop until IFCounter = 0 //IfCounter is if Statement counter of the current method
2.1 IMFSValues = IMFS.pop()
2.2 IFCounter−−
3. ReturnValues = IFS.pop()
4. Parent method IFS.push(IMFSValues U ReturnValues).
5. Destroy the current runtime frame (Current method IFS and Symbol table)
Suppose that, the current runtime frame IFS has one element 0out, IMFS is
empty and the event recognizer receives information from the Treturn assertion
point.
The event recognizer pops one element from the current runtime frame IFS, and
checks the IMFS whether it has any elements to be popped and combined with
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Current method Symbol table
Parent method Symbol table
IMFS
[0out]
Parent IFS
Current IFS
Current runtime Frame
Parent runtime frame
Figure 5.8: Runtime frame and IMFS after performing the TReturn assertion point
the popped element from the current runtime frame IFS. Then the event recognizer
pushes all popped elements [0out] onto the parent runtime frame IFS. The last
step of the Treturn assertion point is to Destroy the current runtime frame (IFS
and Symbol Table) as illustrated in Figure 5.8. The event recognizer pushes the
current method return label onto the parent method IFS to trace and control the
information flow of the returned labels.
5.3.8 Load Field Algorithm
The load field assertion point has two types (getstatic and getfield). These report
to the event recognizer that a field is about to be loaded. Then the event recognizer
pushes the field label onto the current runtime frame IFS.
Listing 5.8: Load field algorithm
uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.LoadField(String fieldName)
2. Let V= Symbol Table.get(fieldName)
3. If V == null
3.1 IFS.push(fieldName)
else
3.1 IFS.push(V)
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As indicated in load field algorithm Listing 5.8 that if the type of the loaded
field is getstatic then the current runtime frame Symbol Table returns null. Then
the event recognizer pushes the field name as received from load field assertion point.
Assuming that the current runtime frame Symbol Table location 0 contains 0out,
location 0fd contains Const, both stacks (current runtime frame IFS and IMFS)
are empty and the event recognizer receives from the load field assertion point the
load field named 0fd. Then the event recognizer gets the 0fd value from the current
runtime frame Symbol Table and pushes the 0fd value onto the current runtime
frame IFS as illustrated in Figures 5.9a and 5.9b.
Symbol table of the current method
IFS IMFS
Current Runtime Frame
0
0fd
0out
Const
Figure 5.9a: Runtime frame and IMFS before performing the LoadField assertion
point
Symbol table of the current method
IFS IMFS
Current Runtime Frame
0
0fd
[Const]
0out
Const
Figure 5.9b: Runtime frame and IMFS after performing the LoadField assertion
point
5.3.9 Store Field Algorithm
The store field assertion point has two types of instructions (putfield and putstatic).
The store field algorithm causes the event recognizer to pop the top element from
the current runtime frame IFS and all contents of the IMFS. It then combines all
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popped elements into one list and stores the list in location FieldName of the current
runtime frame Symbol Table.
Listing 5.9: StoreField algorithm
uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.StoreField(String fieldName)
1. Let Values and S be a lists
2. Values = IFS.pop()
3. Values = Values U IMFS
4. Symbol Table.put(FieldName, Values).
Suppose that the current runtime frame IFS has one label [Const], IMFS has
two elements the top element is [Const] and the bottom element is [/home/file.txt]
and the current runtime frame Symbol table has one label 0out in location 0.
The event recognizer receives information from the store field assertion point that the
field named 0fd is about to be stored. The event recognizer pops the top element
from the current runtime frame IFS Const and all elements of the IMFS Const,
/home/file.txt. Then all popped elements will be combined as Const, /home/file.txt
and stored in the current runtime frame Symbol table location 0fd as illustrated in
Figures 5.10a and 5.10b.
Thus, the popped label from the current runtime frame (IFS) [Const] is explicitly
flowing to the field named 0fd and all labels in the IMFS ([Const] and [/home/-
file.txt]) are implicitly flowing to the same field 0fd as illustrated in Figure 5.10b.
5.3.10 Union Algorithm
Each of the union instruction family (Table 4.1) is responsible for popping two labels
from the top of the current runtime frame IFS. These two labels will be pushed as
one element after combining them, independent of their types.
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Symbol table of the current method
IFS IMFS
Current Runtime Frame
0 0out
[/home/file.txt]
[Const]
[Const]
Figure 5.10a: Runtime frame and IMFS before performing the StoreField assertion
point
Symbol table of the current method
IFS IMFS
Current Runtime Frame
0
0fd
0out
[/home/file.txt]
Const, /home/file.txt
[Const]
Figure 5.10b: Runtime frame and IMFS after performing the StoreField assertion
point
Listing 5.10: Union algorithm
uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Union()
1. Let x = IFS.pop()
2. Let y = IFS.pop()
3. IFS.push(x U y)
Assume that, the current runtime frame IFS has two elements, the top one is a
label [Const] and the bottom element is a label of static field named [0out]. The
event recognizer receives information from the union assertion point that one of the
union instruction is going to be performed. The event recognizer will pop the two
top elements from the current runtime frame IFS. These values are combined and
pushed as one element onto the current runtime frame IFS as shown in Figure 5.11a
and 5.11b.
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Symbol table of the current method
IFS IMFS
Current Runtime Frame
0
0fd
0out
Const
[0out]
[Const]
Figure 5.11a: Runtime frame and IMFS before performing the Union assertion point
Symbol table of the current method
IFS IMFS
Current Runtime Frame
0
0fd
[Const, 0out]
0out
Const
Figure 5.11b: Runtime frame and IMFS after performing the Union assertion point
5.3.11 New Algorithm
The event recognizer receives the new object name from the New assertion point
and pushes the object reference name onto the current runtime frame IFS.
Listing 5.11: New object algorithm
uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.New(String objectName)
1. IFS.push(objectName)
Symbol table of the current method
IFS
IMFS
Runtime frame of the current method
[0java.io.FileInputStream]
Figure 5.12: Runtime frame and IMFS After performing the New assertion point
The new assertion point will inform the event recognizer that a new object is
about to be created. The event recognizer will push the object reference name
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[0java.io.FileInputStream] onto the current runtime frame IFS as illustrated in Fig-
ure 5.12.
5.3.12 New Array Algorithm
The new array assertion point has three different instructions (newarray, anewarray,
multianewarray) as indicated in Table 4.1. The new array assertion point will inform
the event recognizer that a new array object is about to be created. The event
recognizer pops the top element from the current runtime frame IFS indicating the
array size and pushes the reserved array object name 0NewArray onto the current
runtime frame IFS as shown in Figure 5.13.
Listing 5.12: NewArray object algorithm
uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.NewArray(ArrayObjectName)
1. IFS.pop() // Array size
2. IFS.push(ArrayObjectName)
Symbol table of the current method
IFS
IMFS
Current Runtime Frame
[0NewArray]
Figure 5.13: Runtime frame and IMFS After performing the New array assertion
point
5.3.13 Monitor Algorithm
The monitor assertion point has two different instructions (monitorenter, moni-
torexit) as indicated in Table 4.1. The Monitor assertion point is asking the event
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recognizer to pop the top element in current runtime frame IFS as indicated in
Listing 5.13.
Listing 5.13: Monitor algorithm
uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Monitor()
1. x= IFS.pop()
Assuming that the current runtime frame IFS has two elements, the top one is
a label to object reference [I@5fec4ec] and the bottom one is a label to constant
[Const]. The event recognizer receives information from the monitor assertion point
and then the event recognizer pops the top element from the current runtime frame
IFS as shown in the Figures 5.14a and 5.14b.
Symbol Table IFS
IMFS
Runtime frame of the current method
[I@5fec4ec]
[Const]
Figure 5.14a: Runtime frame and IMFS before performing the Monitor assertion
point
Symbol Table IFS
IMFS
Runtime frame of the current method
[Const]
Figure 5.14b: Runtime frame and IMFS after performing the Monitor assertion
point
5.3.14 Native Method Algorithm
The Native method is a method that is written in a language other than the Java
programming language. The event recognizer deals with the native method assertion
point in a way that all its parameters will be combined together as one element and
this element will be returned many times according to the number of the native
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method return values. The Native method assertion point will report to the event
recognizer that the native method is about to be invoked with the parameters and
return value numbers. Then the event recognizer pops the top label or labels from
the current runtime frame IFS according to the parameters number and combine all
popped labels into one list. Then it combines all the contents of the IMFS in the
same list. Finally, it pushes the list of the labels onto the current runtime frame IFS
many times according the return value numbers as indicated by the Native write
method algorithm Listing 5.14.
Listing 5.14: Native method algorithm
uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.NativeMethod(int parametersNumber, int
returnValues)
1. Let L be lists
2. For parametersNumber
2.1 L = L U IFS.pop()
3. L = L U IMFS
4. For returnValues
4.1 IFS.push(L)
Symbol table of the current method IFS IMFS
Runtime frame of the current method
[Const][0out]
[/home/file.txt]
Figure 5.15a: Runtime frame and IMFS before Native method assertion point
Symbol table of the current method IFS IMFS
Runtime frame of the current method
[Const][/home/file.txt, 0out, Const]
Figure 5.15b: Runtime frame and IMFS after Native method assertion point
As an example suppose that the current runtime frame IFS has two elements.
The top element is a label [/home/file.txt] and the bottom element is label [0out] and
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the IMFS has one value [Const]. The event recognizer receives information about
a native method with two parameters and one return value. The event recognizer
pops the top two labels [/home/file.txt] and [0out] from the current runtime frame
IFS and pop all contents of the IMFS [Const]. Then all popped elements from both
stacks will be combined as one element /home/file.txt, 0out, Const. The combined
values will be pushed onto the current runtime frame IFS one time according to the
return value number and the popped elements from the IMFS will be pushed back
in the same order as illustrated in Figures 5.15a and 5.15b
5.3.15 Native Write Method Algorithm
The Native write method assertion point will inform the event recognizer that a
native write method is about to be invoked with its parameters numbers. The event
recognizer deals with the native write method different by than other native meth-
ods because it is the method where the runtime monitoring mechanism intercepts
because there the information flow may take place. To control this flow the event
recognizer pops the label or labels from the current runtime frame IFS according to
the method parameters number. It combines all contents of IMFS with all popped
labels from the IMFS into one list. Finally it sends the popped labels to the runtime
checker as indicated by the Native write method algorithm in Listing 5.15.
Listing 5.15: Native write method algorithm
uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.NativeWrite(int parametersNumber)
1. Let source, destination be empty lists
2. if parametersNumber = 3 then
2.1 Let source = IFS.pop U IFS.pop U IFS.pop // 3 parameters
else
2.1 Let source = IFS.pop // 1 parameter
3. Let destination = IFS.pop
4. source = source U IMFS
5. Let programState = Call uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.RuntimeChecker.Check(source,
destination)
109
CHAPTER 5. RUNTIME MONITORING
6. If programState = false
6.1 Call uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.ExecutionExit()
The event recognizer sends two sets of events containing the execution trace to
the runtime checker. If the runtime checker checks the received set of events and
returns true the execution will continue as normal otherwise the event recognizer
will terminate the program execution.
5.3.16 Invoked Method Algorithm
The invoked Method assertion point reports to the event recognizer that a method
is about to be invoked with the method name and parameters number. Then the
event recognizer pops the top label or labels from the current runtime frame IFS
according to the parameters number and combine all popped labels into one list.
It combines all contents of the IMFS with each popped label in the list of popped
labels from the current runtime frame IFS. Then it stores each element in the list
in new created runtime frame (Symbol Table) as indicated in the invoked method
algorithm List 5.16.
Listing 5.16: Invoked method algorithm
uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Method(String methodName, int
parametersNumber)
1. Let L be list
2. Let i= parametersNumber
3. for i downto 1
3.1 L[i]= IMFS U IFS.pop()
4. Create new runtime frame
5. Let i=0
6. for i to parametersNumber
6.1 New runtime frame Symbol table.put(i,L[i])
Assuming that, the current runtime frame IFS has two elements the top ele-
ment is a label [0out] and the bottom element is a label [Const] and the IMFS
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is empty. The event recognizer is informed about a method invocation named
java.io.PrintStream.println with two parameters. Then the event recognizer cre-
ates a new runtime frame (new IFS and New Symbol table) and pops the top two
elements from the current runtime frame IFS. Finally, it combines each popped el-
ement with the contents of the IMFS and stores them in the new runtime frame
Symbol table as illustrated in Figures 5.16a and 5.16b.
Current method Symbol table
IMFS
Current IFS
Current runtime frame
[0out]
[Const]
Figure 5.16a: Runtime frame and IMFS before performing the invoked Method
assertion point
New method Symbol table
Current method Symbol table
IMFS
Current IFS
New IFS
New runtime Frame
Current runtime frame
[0out]
[Const]
0
1
Figure 5.16b: Runtime frame and IMFS after performing the invoked Method as-
sertion point
5.3.17 Special Method Algorithm
The Special method algorithm is used for instance initialization method invocations.
Each invokespecial method invocation takes three parameters (two arguments val-
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ues and objectref). The Special method assertion point will report to the event
recognizer that a special method is about to be invoked. Then the event recognizer
will pop the top three elements from the current runtime frame IFS and push all
popped elements as one element into the current runtime frame IFS as indicated in
the Special method algorithm Listing 5.17.
Listing 5.17: Special method algorithm
uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.SpecialMethod()
1. Let L be a list
2. L = IFS.pop() U IFS.pop() U IFS.pop()
3. IFS.push(L)
Suppose that the current runtime frame IFS has three elements, the top value
is a label to object reference [0java.io.File], the next label is [0java.io.File] and the
bottom label is [/home/file.txt].
Symbol table of the current method
IFS
IMFS
Runtime frame of the current method
[/home/file.txt ]
[0java.io.File]
[0java.io.File]
Figure 5.17a: Runtime frame and IMFS before the Special method assertion point
Symbol table of the current method
IFS
IMFS
Runtime frame of the current method
/home/file.txt ]
[0 java.io.File,
0java.io.File,
Figure 5.17b: Runtime frame and IMFS after the Special method assertion point
The three elements in the current runtime frame IFS will be popped and pushed
onto the current runtime frame IFS as one element [0java.io.File, 0java.io.File,
/home/file.txt] as shown in Figures 5.17a and 5.17b.
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5.4 Implicit Information Flow Algorithm
As mentioned in Section 4.10 implicit information flow occurs within conditional
or repetitive commands. The stack maybe manipulated in different ways according
to the condition type. Section 5.2.3 described that the event recognizer uses a
shared implicit information flow stack between all runtime frames to control implicit
information flow. The next subsections show the algorithms for all instructions that
deal with the implicit information flow.
5.4.1 Ifcond Algorithm
The Ifcond assertion point has eight different instructions (ifeq, ifne, iflt, ifge, ifgt,
ifle, ifnull, ifnonnull) as indicated in Table 4.1. The Ifcond assertion point causes
the event recognizer to pop the top element from the current runtime frame IFS and
push the popped element onto the top of IMFS as indicated in the Ifcond algorithm
in Listing 5.18.
Listing 5.18: Ifcond algorithm
uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Ifcond()
1. Let L be a list
2. L = IFS.pop()
3. IMFS.push(L)
Suppose that the current runtime frame IFS has two elements, the top element is
label [home/file.txt] and the bottom element is label [Const]. The event recognizer
receives an event from the assertion point and Ifcond then the top element in the
current runtime frame IFS [/home/file.txt] will be popped from the IFS and pushed
onto the IMFS as illustrated in Figures (5.18a and 5.18b.
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Symbol table of the current method IFS IMFS
Current Runtime Frame
[Const]
[/home/file.txt]
Figure 5.18a: Runtime frame and IMFS before Ifcond assertion point
Symbol table of the current method IFS IMFS
Current Runtime Frame
[Const] [/home/file.txt]
Figure 5.18b: Runtime frame and IMFS after Ifcond assertion point
5.4.2 ifcmp Algorithm
The Ifcmp assertion point includes eight different instructions (if icmpeq, if icmpne,
if icmplt, if icmpge, if icmpgt, if icmple, if acmpeq, if acmpne) as indicated in Table
4.1. The Ifcmp assertion point causes the event recognizer to pop the top two labels
from current runtime frame IFS and pushes them as one element onto the top of
IMFS as indicated in the Ifcmp algorithm in Listing 5.19.
Listing 5.19: Ifcmp algorithm
uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Ifcmp()
1. Let L be a list
2. L = IFS.pop() U IFS.pop()
3. IMFS.push(L)
Assume that the current runtime frame IFS has two elements, the top one is a
label [home/file.txt] and the bottom one is a label [Const]. The event recognizer
receives information from the assertion point Ifcmp and then the top two elements in
the current runtime frame IFS [Const], [/home/file.txt] will be popped and pushed
after combining them [/home/file.txt, Const] onto the IMFS as illustrated in Figures
5.19a and 5.19b.
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Symbol table of the current method IFS IMFS
Current Runtime Frame
[/home/file.txt]
[Const]
Figure 5.19a: Runtime frame and IMFS before Ifcmp assertion point
Symbol table of the current method IFS IMFS
Current Runtime Frame
[/home/file.txt, Const]
Figure 5.19b: Runtime frame and IMFS after Ifcmp assertion point
5.4.3 Endif Algorithm
The Endif assertion point reports to the event recognizer about the end of the
conditional region. Then the event recognizer pops the top element from the IMFS
as indicated in the Endif algorithm in Listing 5.20.
Listing 5.20: Endif algorithm
uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer.Endif()
1. IMFS.pop()
Symbol table of the current method IFS IMFS
Current Runtime Frame
[/home/file.txt]
[Const]
Figure 5.20a: Runtime frame and IMFS before performing the Endif assertion point
Symbol table of the current method IFS IMFS
Current Runtime Frame
[/home/file.txt]
Figure 5.20b: Runtime frame and IMFS after performing the Endif assertion point
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Assuming that the IMFS has two elements, the top one is label [Const] and the
bottom element is label [/home/file.txt]. Then the event recognizer will pop the top
element as illustrated in Figures 5.20a and 5.20b.
5.5 Runtime Checker
The runtime checker receives events from the event recognizer that may cause in-
formation flow within the application. The runtime checker determines whether or
not the current events of the execution trace as obtained from the event recognizer
satisfies the information flow policy and sends feedback to the user feedback compo-
nent when it determines that the software is about to enter an insecure state. The
runtime checker essentially checks the received set of events that potentially causes
information flow. Listing 5.21 presents the events check algorithm.
Listing 5.21: Runtime checker check algorithm
uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.RuntimeChecker.Check(list source, list destination)
1. Let i,j = 0
2. for i to source.Length
2.1 Let s = source[i]
2.2 for j to destination.Length
2.2.1 Let d = destination[j]
2.2.2 Let PolicyCheck = uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.InformationFlowPolicy.Check(s, d)
2.2.3 If PolicyCheck = false
2.2.4 return true
else
2.2.4 uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.Userfeedbackcomponent(s, d)
5.6 User Feedback Component
The user feedback component is an interface between our system and the user. An
essential functionality of the user feedback component is that all user interaction
passes through this component. The user feedback component informs the user
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about any feedback received from the runtime checker. As illustrated in our frame-
work Figure 3.2, if the runtime checker determined that this execution would violate
the information flow policy then it sends feedback to the user, the system behaviour
will be changed accordingly, and the policy will be modified according to the user
decision. Chapter 6 describes the user feedback component in detail.
Listing 5.22: User feed back component algorithm
uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.Userfeedbackcomponent(List s, List d)
1. If the user agree about the flow.
1.1 uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.InformationFlowPolicy.Update(s, d)
1.2 Return true
else
1.1 Return false
5.7 Information Flow Policy
An information flow policy is a security policy that defines the authorized paths,
which will be a set of rules that regulate how information must flow to prevent
leak of information. As described in our framework in Section 3.2, the information
flow policy expresses the security requirements as specified by the stakeholder/user
to a set of rules that are understandable by our runtime monitoring mechanism.
However, it is necessary to detect conflicts in information flow policies. For example
if the user defines a new rule it must not conflict with the previous rules. The user
must also be able to modify the flow policies during runtime. Policies are dynamic
and can be changed in response to the user interaction. Chapter 6 describes our
information flow policy in detail.
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5.8 Summary
The presented chapter has discussed the second step, a novel runtime monitor-
ing mechanism and shows how the event recognizer and runtime checker deal with
the information send by the various assertion points. It has provided different al-
gorithms for tracing and controlling explicit and implicit information flow. Our
runtime monitoring mechanism ensures that the program contains only legal flows
that are approved by the user. Traditional runtime monitoring only addresses the
monitoring of safety properties, i.e. Functional requirements. They are not suitable
for monitoring information flow or managing the program behaviour at runtime, as
there is no feedback from the monitor to the observed software.
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Information Flow Policy and User
Interaction
Objectives
 General overview of information flow requirements.
 Describe the information flow policy.
 Explore the user feed back component.
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6.1 Introduction
An information flow policy expresses the stakeholders information flow requirements
with focus on the different sources and destinations of information that exist within
a system and how information may flow between these sources and destinations. In
this chapter the focus is on the information flow policy and user feedback component.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 provides a general
overview of the information flow requirements. Sections 6.3 and 6.4 describes the
information flow policy language. Finally Section 6.5 describes the user feed back
component.
6.2 Information Flow Requirements
Information flow requirements are the stakeholders concerns of information flow
that come with their system at a high level of abstraction. The main target of
the proposed approach is to identify known critical subjects (sources that contain-
ing confidential information) and untrusted objects (destinations that should not
consume that confidential information). Information flow requirements in our ap-
proach are path authorization requirements with constraints on an action that may
be performed to allow or deny subjects flowing to an object. In our framework,
as described in Section 3.2, in the security requirements specification component,
the stakeholders provide the specification of the desired behaviour that a system or
subsystem must possess with respect to sensitive information flow. The stakeholders
should provide the sources of the information and the output channel a sink or a
destination which will be formally expressed in a precise and unambiguous informa-
tion flow policy. To enable our proposed mechanism to allow or deny the flow of
information from source to destination.
120
CHAPTER 6. INFORMATION FLOW POLICY AND USER INTERACTION
6.3 Information Flow Policy
This section is describes how to specify an the information flow policy. An informa-
tion flow policy expresses the stakeholders requirements in precise and unambiguous
form. An information flow policy defines which sources are (dis)allowed to flow to
which destinations and in which sources that attempt to flow to specific destinations
the user should be asked. An information policy consist of a list of information flow
rules.
An Information Flow Rule consists of the following three components:
 Action A.
 Source S.
 Destination D
A S −→ D
Possible actions are + for allowing the flow of the information, - disallowing the
information flow or ? for asking the user to allow or disallow the flow of the infor-
mation.
 A positive information flow form is denoted by + S −→ D to (+ denote
an action, S a source and D a destination) and is used to explicitly allow
information from source S to flow to the destination D. So + is an action that
can leak information from source to destination.
 A negative information flow form is denoted by - S −→ D. Similar to the
positive information flow form but it used to explicitly deny or disallow the
flow of the information from source S to destination D. So - is an action that
can prevent the leak of information from source to destination.
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 A user decision form is denoted by ? S −→ D. Similar to the previous two
forms but it is used in case that user should be asked whether the flow of
the information from source S to destination D is possible. (?) is an action
that can be used to ask the user whether information can flow from source to
destination.
Hence, a positive information flow expresses a flow permission and a negative infor-
mation flow expresses a denial or disallowed flow. Finally, a user decision form flow
expresses that decides interactively whether flow is possible or not. An information
flow policy consisting of a list of policy rules specifies the restrictions on the possible
paths of the information flow.
6.4 Information Flow Policy Language
An information flow policy determines the information flow security measures to
be employed within an application to keep the system secure. An information flow
policy is a set of policy rules that defines the information flow criteria required to
be maintained. The information flow policy works as the reference that controls the
flow of the information while the target program is executing.
6.4.1 Syntax
The syntax of the information flow policy language is described in Listing 6.1. The
policy definition is introduced by the key word policy and three identifiers.
 <ACTION> which can be (+) positive information flow, (-) negative infor-
mation flow or user decision (?).
 <ID> is used for the sources S and destinations D names.
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Listing 6.1: Information flow policy syntax
Policy = (<ACTION> <ID> ”>>>” <ID> )
<ACTION> = ”+” | ”−” | ”?”
<ID> = <LETTER> (<LETTER> | <CHARACTER>)*>
<LETTER>= ”a”−”z”,”A”−”Z”,”0”−”9”,” ”,”/”
<CHARACTER>= ”.”,”:”
6.4.2 Semantic of Information Flow Policy Rules
The semantics of an information flow policy defines the possible behaviour of the
target program that capture the information flow decisions. An information flow
policy rules define the authorized and unauthorized paths of the information flow
and when the system user should be asked about the flow decision.
Allowed flow rule example : Assume that
Action A= +
Source S = /home/msarrab/secret.txt
Destination D = 127.1.66.127:2000
Then the information flow rule is
+ /home/msarrab/secret.txt −→ 127.1.66.127:2000
Hence, information contained in file named /home/msarrab/secret.txt is allowed to
leak to internet socket address 127.1.66.127:2000.
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Disallowed flow rule example : Assume that
Action A= -
Source S = /home/msarrab/secret.txt
Destination D = System.out
Then the information flow rule is.
- /home/msarrab/secret.txt −→ System.out
Hence, file named /home/msarrab/secret.txt is not allowed to leak out of the run-
ning system.
User decision rule example : Assume that
Action A= ?
Source S = /home/msarrab/secert/msarrab.sec
Destination D = 127.1.66.177:3000
Then the information flow rule is.
? /home/msarrab/secert/msarrab.sec −→ 127.1.66.177:3000
According to the rule the user will be asked whether to allow or disallow the leak of
information from the source /home/msarrab/secert/msarrab.sec to the destination
127.1.66.177:3000.
6.4.3 Information Flow Policy Rules Conflict
The problem of the information flow policy rules conflicts has been addressed using
the conflict keyword as indicated in Listing 6.1 Information flow policy syntax.
Whereas, in case of a conflict between allow and denial of the flow of the information
and ask the user one of the three actions has to have the priority. Listing 6.2 provides
the information flow policy with conflicts syntax.
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Listing 6.2: Information flow policy with conflicts syntax
Policy = (<ACTION> <ID> ”>>>” <ID> )* [<CONFLICT>]
<ACTION> = ”+” | ”−” | ”?”
<ID> = <LETTER> (<LETTER> | <CHARACTER>)*>
<LETTER>= ”a”−”z”,”A”−”Z”,”0”−”9”,” ”,”/”
<CHARACTER>= ”.”,”:”
<CONFLICT>= ”Conflict:” (((”+−”) ”>>>” (”+” | ”−” | ”?”))
((”+? ”) ”>>>” (”+” | ”−” | ”?”))
((”−? ”) ”>>>” (”+” | ”−” | ”?”))
((”+−? ”) ”>>>” (”+” | ”−” | ”?”)))
<CONFLICT> is used to address the information flow policy rules conflicts as
follows. In the information flow policy four conflict roles can be specified.
 Conflict between allow and denial the flow, +- >>> + denotes allow the flow
of the information has the priority.
 Conflict between allow the flow and ask user, +? >>> ? denotes ask user has
the priority.
 Conflict between disallow the flow and ask user, -? >>> ? denotes ask user
has the priority.
 Conflict between allow, disallow the flow and ask user, +-? >>> ? denotes
ask user has the priority.
Hence, an information flow policy defines the possible paths that information can
travel securely throughout an application and ultimately between the application
and the outside world. In addition, an information flow policy must precisely specify
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which action has the priority when there is a conflict between the policy rules. List
6.3 illustrates an example of an information flow policy.
Listing 6.3: Example of information flow policy
/* Information flow policy − Written By Mohamed Sarrab, 17/11/10
*/
+/home/msarrab/secret.txt >>> 127.1.66.127:2000
−/home/msarrab/secret.txt >>> System.out
+/home/msarrab/Public/ >>> 162.66.1.123:1000
−/home/msarrab/Public/ >>> System.out
?/home/msarrab/Public/ >>> 162.66.1.177:1000
?/home/msarrab/Public/MSarrab.sec >>> System.out
Conflict: +− >>> +
+? >>> ?
−? >>> ?
+−? >>> ?
As indicated in Listing 6.3 the information flow policy has addressed the conflict
between two or three actions.
6.5 User Feedback Component
The user feedback component is an interface between a user and the monitored
system. An essential functionality of the user feedback component is that all user
interaction passes through this component. The user feedback component informs
the user about any feedback received from the runtime checker. As illustrated in Fig-
ure 3.2 of the framework, if the runtime checker determined that this state execution
would violate the information flow policy then it sends feedback to the user through
the user feedback component, the system behavior will be changed accordingly, and
the information flow policy will be modified according to the user decision.
Assume for example that a program attempts to leak information from source
S=/home/ msarrab/secert/msarrab.sec to destination D=127.1.66.177:3000 then
the runtime checker will check the information flow policy to figure out if the source
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S is allowed or denial to flow this information to destination D. The runtime checker
compares all sources in the information flow policy to find any policy rule that has
the same source as the present source S= /home/ msarrab/secert/msarrab.sec and
then checks the same rule destination if is it equal to the present destination D=
127.1.66.177:3000 and checks the action of the rule, assuming that the action is (?)
as indicated in the next information flow policy rule:
? /home/msarrab/secert/msarrab.sec −→ 127.1.66.177:3000
Figure 6.1: A snapshot of monitored flow
According to the action (?) of the information flow policy rule the user should
be asked as shown in Figure 6.1. The runtime checker sends feedback to the user
through the user feedback component where the user made the decision to approve or
deny the flow of the information from the source /home/msarrab/secert/msarrab.sec
to the destination 127.1.66.177:3000.
The user feedback component may receive information from the runtime checker
about conflicts in the policy rules, where the conflict rule explicitly stated that user
should be asked about the conflict e.g. Listing 6.4 shows an example of information
flow policy rule conflicts.
Listing 6.4: Example of information flow policy rule conflicts
/* Information flow policy − Written By Mohamed Sarrab, 11/12/10
*/
+/home/msarrab/* >>> 127.1.66.127:2000
−/home/msarrab/private/* >>> 127.1.66.127:2000
Conflict: +− >>> ?
+? >>> ?
−? >>> ?
+−? >>> ?
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As indicated in Listing 6.4 there is a conflict between two rules. The first rule
states that the information can flow from any source in path /home/msarrab/ to
destination 127.1.66.127:2000, while the second rule states that any information in
the path /home/msarrab/private/ can not flow to destination 127.1.66.127:2000.
Assuming that the runtime checker received an event from the event recognizer
that source named /home/msarrab/private/secret.txt will flow to destination named
127.1.66.177: 2000. The runtime checker creates a list to store the actions and
checks the information flow policy rules for the source path /home because the
first part of the source path is /home folder. Then checks the second part of the
path /home/msarrab/, the runtime checker will find that any information from this
path can flow (the rule action is +) to destination 127.1.66.127:2000. Which is
applicable to the received source /home/msarrab/private/secret.txt and destination
127.1.66.177: 2000 from the event recognizer, then the runtime checker stores the
action (+) of the current rule in the created list.
However, the runtime checker continues comparing the source /home/msarrab/pri-
vate/* and the destination 127.1.66.127: 2000 of the second rule. The runtime
checker will find that any information from this path /home/msarrab/private/ can
not flow (The rule action is -) to destination 127.1.66.127:2000. Which is ap-
plicable to the received source /home/msarrab/private/secret.txt and destination
127.1.66.177:2000 from the event recognizer, then the runtime checker stores the
action (-) of this rule in the list.
Thus, both rules are applicable to the received source and destination. The runtime
checker compares the stored actions in the list to find out differences. In this case
the actions are different, the first rule action is (+) and the second is (-). The run-
time checker checks the conflict rules in the information flow policy for in-conflict
any flow rules. However, one of the conflict rules stated that +- >>> ? if there
is conflict between allow + and disallow - then the user will be asked. The user
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will receive information through the user feedback component about the conflict as
shown in Figure 6.2.
Figure 6.2: A snapshot of user received information (Rules conflict)
The system execution will proceed according to the user decision. If the user re-
sponds with Yes, that means the source /home/msarrab/private/secret.txt is allowed
to flow to destination 127.1.66.127:2000 and the execution continues as normal. If
the user answers No that means the source /home/msarrab/private/secret.txt is not
allowed to flow to destination 127.1.66.127:2000 and the execution will be termi-
nated.
6.6 Summary
The present chapter introduces the information flow requirements in Section 6.2
where the stakeholders specify the desired strategy and goals about the flow of the
information as illustrated in the framework Figure 3.2. Section 6.4 explains the in-
formation flow policy language and provides examples of the information flow policy
rules. This chapter also addresses the problem of the information flow policy rules
conflicts and how the runtime checker, information flow policy and user feedback
component interact to monitor in-conflict policy rules. Finally, Section 6.5 explores
the user feedback component functionality with more focusing in the user interaction
with runtime monitoring mechanism and the user ability to change and modify the
program behaviour during runtime. As discussed in Chapter 3 that the only channel
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between the user and the monitoring mechanism is the user feedback component. A
user interaction with the runtime monitoring provides a flexible security mechanism
that can control changeable security requirements.
The main motivation of this proposed approach is that most of the previous research
in the information flow control the information flow policy is not in the hand of the
end user. The novelty is the user feedback component in which the user interacts
with the monitoring mechanism during runtime to manage the program behaviours.
One of the key advantage of the user interaction with the monitoring mechanism
during runtime is the ability of the user to change program behaviour or modify
the way that information flows while the program is executing. An interaction with
user provides a flexible and reliable security monitoring mechanism where different
users may have different information flow requirements.
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Prototype
Objectives
 Design the prototype of the runtime monitoring mechanism.
 Discuss the implementation of the framework components.
 Support the research that is presented in this thesis.
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7.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an introduction to the high level design of the prototype used
to control information flow. It also gives a brief introduction to the runtime moni-
toring mechanism components that are used in the prototype and how they interact
with each other to load, instrument and control the flow of the information in the
target class file or class files. The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Sec-
tion 7.2 introduces which Java library chosen for instrumentation process. Section
7.3 describes the Java agent and its specification. Section 7.4 describes the proto-
type architecture of the runtime monitoring mechanism and provides the structure
of each component. Section 7.5 describes all classes in the system and the static
relationships between them. Section 7.6 discusses the execution sequence diagram
of runtime monitoring mechanism.
7.2 Java Library for Instrumentation
The development tool selection is the general decision that was taken at prototype
development stage. Each bytecode instrumentation library has a different way of
working (Chiba & Nishizawa 2003, Aarniala 2005). The selection of the instrumen-
tation library can have a considerable impact on the design and implementation
of the whole runtime monitoring mechanism. Three main libraries were compared
(BCEL, ASM and Javassist). However after considering for each library the ad-
vantages and disadvantages (Joshi 2009), Javassist was chosen as the most suitable
library to achieve our approach objectives.
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7.3 Java Agent Specification
Java agent is deployed as a JAR file. An attribute in the agent file manifest specifies
the agent target class which must be loaded to start the agent. Our framework uses
dynamic instrumentation mechanism (Chapter 4) where all classes that are actually
loaded will be instrumented including the Java core classes. The class loader (Section
4.5.2) can only provide the classes it defines, not the classes that are delegated to
other classes loader thus our approach uses a Java agent to allow all loaded class
files (bytecode) to be instrumented and redefined during runtime on one Java virtual
machine. In our framework the Java agent is started by specifying an option on the
command line. Implementations may also support a mechanism to start agents some
time after the JVM has been started. For example, Listing 7.1 shows the command
line interface for starting our runtime monitoring mechanism.
Listing 7.1: Command line interface
:˜$java −javaagent:JavaAgent.jar uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.testtargets.Welcome
As illustrated in Listing 7.1 on the implementation an agent is started by adding
this option -javaagent:JavaAgent.jar to the command line. The JavaAgent.jar is the
name of the agent. An agent JAR file must conform to the JAR file specification
(Oracle 2010). After the Java Virtual Machine is initialized, the premain method
will be invoked in the order the agents were specified, then the target application
main method will be invoked.
Listing 7.2: Manifest
Manifest−Version: 1.0
Premain−Class: Agent.JavaAgent
Boot−Class−Path: /home/msarrab/workspace/UK.AC.DMU.MSARRAB.RVIF/javassist.jar /
home/msarrab/desktop/JavaAgent.jar
Can−Retransform−Classes: true
Can−Redefine−Classes: true
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As illustrated in Listing 7.2 the following manifest attributes are defined for an
agent JAR file JavaAgent.jar :
Premain-Class
The manifest of the agent JAR file in Listing 7.2 must contain the attribute Premain-
Class. In our framework this is Premain-Class: Agent.JavaAgent. The agent class
implements a public static premain method similar in principle to the main appli-
cation entry point.
Boot-Class-Path
A list of paths to be searched by the bootstrap class loader. Paths represent direc-
tories or libraries that can be referred to as JAR on many platforms. These paths
are searched by the bootstrap class loader after the platform specific mechanisms
of locating a class have failed. Paths are searched in the order listed. Paths in
the list are separated by one or more spaces. A path takes the syntax of the path
component of a hierarchical URI as shown in Listing 7.2.
Boot-Class-Path:
/home/msarrab/workspace/UK.AC.DMU.MSARRAB.RVIF/javassist.jar
/home/msarrab/desktop/JavaAgent.jar
Whereas the first path is to javassist.jar library and the second path is to JavaA-
gent.jar.
Can-Redefine-Classes
Can-Redefine-Classes is the ability to redefine classes needed by this agent. Values
other than true are considered false.
Can-Retransform-Classes
Can-Retransform-Classes is the ability to retransform classes needed by this agent.
Values other than true are considered false.
In order to instrument all loaded classes our runtime monitoring approach uses Java
agent to allow all loaded classes (bytecode) to be instrumented and redefined during
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runtime on the Java virtual machine.
7.4 Prototype Architecture
As depicted by the Figure 7.1, the runtime monitoring mechanism prototype has
been divided into seven major components to fulfil the requirements for controlling
the flow of the information within a single Java program as specified in the Section
6.2. It must be noted that none of these components is standalone and all compo-
nents need to work and interact with each other to achieve the proposed approach
goals as indicated in Section 1.4.
JavaAgent Transformer
Class instrumentation Method instrumentation
Event Recognizer Stack
Runtime Checker
Figure 7.1: Prototype classes
7.4.1 JavaAgent
Agent.JavaAgent
The main aim of this class is to provide services that allow a Java class file to be
instrumented during runtime on the Java Virtual Machine as mentioned in Section
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7.3. This class has two methods premain and redefineClass. The premain method
is similar in principle to the main method application entry point. After the Java
Virtual Machine has initialized the premain method it allows our runtime monitor-
ing mechanism to instrument all loaded classes before the target class file is actually
loaded. The redefineClass method is used to redefine all instrumented classes dur-
ing runtime. At this stage of our runtime monitoring mechanism the Java agent
component should perform the following tasks.
 Get all loaded class files.
 Send all loaded class files to be instrumented.
 Redefine all instrumented classes.
Figure 7.2 describes the JavaAgent class structure.
Agent.JavaAgent
Attributes
Operations
public static void premain(String agentArgs, Instrumentation inst)
private static void redefineClass(Instrumentation inst, Class cc)
Figure 7.2: Structure of JavaAgent.java
7.4.2 Transformer
Agent.MyTransformer
This class provides services to transform all instrumented class files. The class file
transformation occurs before the class is defined by the Java virtual machine. This
class controls all loaded classes after the main class file is loaded. This class has
one method named transformer. The main aim of this method is to transform the
supplied class file and return a new replacement class file. This should be done
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after the transformer is registered with addTransformer. The transformer will be
invoked for all new class definitions and all class redefinitions. Figure 7.3 shows the
MyTransformer class structure.
Agent.MyTransformer
Attributes
Operations
public MyTransformer( )
public byte[] transform(ClassLoader loader, String className,Class
<?> redefiningClass, ProtectionDomain domain, byte[] bytes)
Figure 7.3: Structure of MyTransformer.java
7.4.3 Class Instrumentation
Uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.InstrumentClass
This class aims to instrument the given class file’s bytecode such that the instru-
mented class file produces the required trace information in the given class file. As
illustrated in Figure 7.4 this class has one method named instrument. The main
aim of this method is to send the bytecode of each method in the given class file to
the method body instrumentation.
Uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.InstrumentClass
Attributes
Operations
public static byte[] instrument(String arg, EventRecognizer er)
Figure 7.4: Structure of InstrumentClass.java
7.4.4 Method Instrumentation
Uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.InstrumentMethod
The main aim of this class is to instrument all instructions of the received method
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bytecode according to the method body instrumentation algorithm Listing 4.4 and
as specified in the instruction categories Table 4.1. This class has two methods
methodInstrument and methodPrameters as shown in Figure 7.5. The main aim of
the methodInstrument is to iterate through the code attribute of a given method
and instrument all bytecode instructions based on the instruction’s pushes onto or
pops from the method stack. The methodPrameters method receives the invoked
method signature and returns the parameters number of the invoked method.
Uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.InstrumentMethod
Attributes
Operations
public static void methodInstrument(CtClass cc, CtMethod cm)
public static int methodPrameters(String MethodSignature)
Figure 7.5: Structure of InstrumentMethod.java
7.4.5 Event Recognizer
Uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer
This class is responsible for manipulating all variables and their values using the
explicit information flow stack, the implicit information flow stack and the symbol
table as well as creating a new runtime frame for each invoked method and destroy
it when that method returns. As mentioned in Section 5.2 the event recognizer
uses the current runtime frame (IFS and Symbol table) and implicit information
flow stack (IMFS) to trace the current variables change and uses shared implicit
information flow stack (IMFS) to control the implicit information flow stack. This
class has a number of methods as shown in Figure 7.6. Each method in this class
is responsible for pushing values onto or popping values from the explicit/implicit
information flow stack and store or get data from the symbol table. Method method
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is responsible for creating a new runtime frame (explicit information flow stack and
symbol table) and calling the Return method will destroy the runtime frame. All
other methods in this class manipulating variables and their values according to
each method algorithm as described in the explicit information flow algorithms in
Section 5.3 and implicit information flow algorithms in Section 5.4.
Uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer
Attributes
static MyStack RuntimeFrame = new MyStack()
static Stack<HashSet<String>> IMFS = new Stack<HashSet<String>>()
Operations
public static void Store( Object ss, String s)
public static void Load(Object s, String ss)
public static void LoadField(String s)
public static void StoreField(String s)
public static void Const()
public static void Dup()
public static void lookupswitch()
public static void Union()
public static void tableswitch()
public static void NewArray(String s)
public static void Return(int counterOfCondition)
public static void ifcmp()
public static void ifcond()
public static void Method(String s, int j)
public static void Endif()
public static void Pps()
public static void NativeMethod(int parameter, int returnValues)
public static void SpecialMethod()
public static void Athrow()
public static void NativeWrite(int Parameters, int rr)
public static void New(Object s)
Figure 7.6: Structure of EventRecognizer.java
7.4.6 Stack
Uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.MyStack
The main aim of this class is to trace the flow of the information using runtime frames
(Explicit information flow stack and Symbol table) and implicit information flow
stack as mentioned in Section 5.2. This class has a number of methods (openframe,
currentframe, closeframe, push, pop, peek, get, put and tostring) as shown in Figure
7.7.
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Uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.MyStack
Attributes
Operations
public void openframe()
Stack<StackFrame> stack = new Stack<StackFrame>()
public StackFrame closeframe()
public StackFrame currentframe()
public void push(Set<String> element)
public Set<String> pop()
public Set<String> peek()
public HashSet<String> put(String key, HashSet<String> value)
public String toString()
public HashSet<String> get(String key)
Figure 7.7: Structure of MyStack.java
7.4.7 Runtime Checker
Uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.RunTimeChecker
This class receives the state information from the event recognizer class to check
whether or not the current execution trace as obtained from the event recognizer
satisfies the information flow policy. This class also sends feedback to the user
when it determines that the application is about to enter an insecure state as men-
tioned in Section 5.5. The Runtime checker class essentially checks the received set
of information that potentially causes information flow according to the runtime
checker algorithm shown in Listing 5.21. This class has two methods PolicyCheck
and AskUser. The PolicyCheck method is checking the potential information flow
against a set of rules that are defined in the information flow policy to regulate
the flow of the information within the application. The AskUser method provides
the user with a set of information flow according to the runtime checker algorithm
in Section 5.21. Appindex C shows the source code of the runtime checker class.
Figure 7.8 shows the RunTimeChecker class structure.
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Uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.RunTimeChecker
Attributes
Operations
public static void AskUser(Set<?> st)
public static void Check(Set<String> st1)
Figure 7.8: Structure of RunTimeChecker.java
7.5 Prototype Class Diagram
As shown in Section 7.4 that each class structure is made up of attributes and oper-
ations. Where, attributes define the available information that each class will know
about itself and operations are the available processes that a class can perform.
These processes in class are called methods. The class diagram in Figure 7.9 de-
scribes all classes in the system and the static relationships between these classes.
Table 7.1 lists all used classes in the prototype and their related component in the
proposed framework shown in Figure 3.2.
Class Related Component
Agent.JavaAgent Assertion points
Agent.MyTransformer Assertion points
Uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.InstrumentClass Assertion points
Uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.InstrumentMethod Assertion points
Uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.MyStack Event Recognizer
Uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer Event Recognizer
Runtime Checker
Uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.RunTimeChecker Information flow policy
User feedback
Table 7.1: Class and related component
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Figure 7.9: Prototype class diagram
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7.6 Sequence Diagram
Figure 7.10 illustrates the sequence diagram of execution for the runtime monitor-
ing mechanism. This diagram is based on the prototype implementation of runtime
monitoring mechanism.
JavaAgent MyTransformer InstrumentClass InstrumentMethod EventRecognizer MyStack RuntimeChecker
            Class File
ClassFile
MethodInstrument
Method Instrumented 
Class Instrumented 
     Run
Operation
Performed
 Check
TargetClass
Monitor
Figure 7.10: Prototype sequence diagram
As shown in Figure 7.10 the sequence diagram is a diagram that depicts the inter-
actions among the runtime monitoring mechanism components, including system
participating objects and actors in order to perform the required task.
143
CHAPTER 7. PROTOTYPE
7.7 Summary
This chapter has presented and discussed the fundamentals of the prototype im-
plementation. This chapter has introduced a high level design of the prototype
developed for controlling information flow. It also provided an introduction to the
runtime monitoring mechanism components that are used in the prototype and how
they interact with each other to load, instrument and control the flow of the infor-
mation in the target class files. It also described the runtime monitoring mechanism
class diagram and sequence diagram.
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Case Studies
Objectives
 Give appropriate case study that shows how a Java program will be traced.
 Give appropriate case study of file sharing system showing how the information
flow will be controlled.
 Demonstrate the need and practical applicability of the presented research.
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8.1 Introduction
This chapter provides two case studies to illustrate the practical applicability of the
presented research. The first case study is a small helloWorld program to demon-
strate the work of the instrumentation process as described in Chapter 4 and 5.
The second case study is a file sharing application to show how the contents of the
file will be traced while transfered between a client and a server program. In both
case studies the Java source code, the original bytecode and the instrumented byte-
code will be provided to show how the flow of the information will be traced and
controlled.
8.2 Case Study 1
The presented case study is a small helloWorld Java program to demonstrate the
interaction of instrumentation process, event recognizer and runtime checker com-
ponents in more detail. Listing 8.1 shows that the case study consists of one Java
class named helloWorld.java.
Listing 8.1: Source code of helloWorld.java
1 public class Test {
2 public static void main(String[] args) {
3 System.out.print(”hello world”);
4 }
5 }
The given program in Listing 8.1 has only one method named helloWorld.main().
The class execution starts at the main method’s first line. Statements are executed
one at a time, as ordered in the main method, until the end of the method or another
method invocation as shown at line 3 in our example java.io.PrintStream.print()
method. Table 8.1 lists the execution flow of class helloWorld.java.
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Table 8.1: Execution flow of class helloWorld.java
helloWorld.main()
−→java.io.PrintStream.print()
−→java.io.PrintStream.write()
−→java.io.PrintStream.ensureOpen()
−→java.io.Writer.write()
−→java.lang.String.length()
−→java.io.Writer.write()
−→java.lang.String.getChars()
−→java.lang.System.arraycopy()
−→java.io.Writer.write()
−→java.io.BufferedWriter.flushBuffer()
−→java.io.BufferedWriter.ensureOpen()
−→java.io.Writer.write()
−→java.io.OutputStreamWriter.flushBuffer()
−→sun.nio.cs.StreamEncoder.flushBuffer()
−→sun.nio.cs.StreamEncoder.isOpen()
−→sun.nio.cs.StreamEncoder.implFlushBuffer()
−→sun.nio.cs.StreamEncoder.writeBytes()
−→java.nio.channels.WritableByteChannel.write()
−→java.io.OutputStream.write()
−→java.io.OutputStream.write()
−→java.nio.Buffer.clear()
−→java.nio.Buffer.clearMark()
−→java.lang.String.indexOf()
−→java.lang.String.indexOf()
−→java.io.OutputStream.flush()
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Invoking the built-in method java.io.PrintStream.print(), causes another de-
tour of the execution flow to the java.io.PrintStream.write() method and when
the java.io.PrintStream.write() method completes, it picks up where it left off in
java.io.PrintStream.print(). Finally, it gets back to helloWorld.main() until the
last statement in the program and then terminates. Technically, the helloWorld.java
does not terminate yet at the end of the helloWorld.main() because the Java inter-
preter takes care of cleanup of all created objects and then the execution terminates.
As discussed in Section 4.8 at start up all loaded classes will be instrumented to trace
the execution flow. Table 8.1 lists only the methods used in the execution of hel-
loWorld.main(). There are about 200 Java classes that are instrumented during the
loading phase. A snapshot of our example execution flow has been taken to show
the generated and instrumented bytecode of the first two methods (helloWorld.main,
java.io.PrintStream.print()) and the method that our monitoring mechanism inter-
cepts in java.io.Writer.write(). All the loaded classes original and instrumented
bytecode can be found in Appendix D. Listing 8.2 presents the generated bytecode
of the method helloWorld.main.
Listing 8.2: Original bytecode code of helloWorld.java
0: getstatic #16 = Field java.lang.System.out(Ljava/io/PrintStream;)
3: ldc #22 = ”hello world”
5: invokevirtual #24 = Method java.io.PrintStream.print((Ljava/lang/String;)V)
8: return
List 8.3 shows the instrumented bytecode of the method helloWorld.main.
Listing 8.3: Instrumented bytecode of helloWorld.java
00: ldc #35 = ”0out”
02: invokestatic #40 = Method Monitor.EventRecognizer.LoadField((Ljava/lang/String;)V)
05: getstatic #16 = Field java.lang.System.out(Ljava/io/PrintStream;)
08: invokestatic #43 = Method Monitor.EventRecognizer.Const(()V)
11: ldc #22 = ”hello world”
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13: ldc #44 = ”print”
15: iconst 1
16: iconst 0
17: invokestatic #48 = Method Monitor.EventRecognizer.Method((Ljava/lang/String;II)V)
20: invokevirtual #24 = Method java.io.PrintStream.print((Ljava/lang/String;)V)
23: iconst 0
24: invokestatic #52 = Method Monitor.EventRecognizer.Return((I)V)
27: return
After instrumenting all loaded classes one gets bytecode where assertion points
are inserted. The instrumented classes are ready to execute. When helloWorld.main()
start executing, the event recognizer of the runtime monitoring mechanism in Sec-
tion 5.2 creates a new implicit flow stack (IMFS) and a new runtime frame consisting
of an information flow stack (IFS) and a Symbol able as illustrated in Figure 8.1.
Test.Main Symbol Table
IFS IMFS
[Const]
0out
Figure 8.1: The helloWorld.main runtime frame and IMFS
As depicted in Listing 8.3 Opcode index 02 sends an event to the event recognizer
to load field named 0out. The event recognizer pushes 0out onto the IFS. The second
event is at Opcode index 08 that sends a load constant. The event recognizer
pushes an empty string onto the top of the IFS. The third event is at Opcode
index 17 that informs the event recognizer that another method is about to be
invoked with the name print, 1 parameter and 0 return value as specified at Opcode
indexes 13, 15 and 16 respectively. The event recognizer creates a new runtime frame
(new Symbol table and IFS) for the print method. The print method Symbol table
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has the object reference and the parameter in location 0 and 1 because the event
recognizer popped the top two elements from the current method helloWorld.main
IFS and checks the IMFS if it has any element to combine with each popped element
from the IFS to handle the implicit flow. In our case the IMFS is empty. Then the
event recognizer stores the popped elements in the Print method Symbol table as
illustrated in Figure 8.2.
Test.Main Symbol Table
IFS
IMFS
...
...
[Const]
0out
Print Symbol Table
0
1
Test.Main
Print
Figure 8.2: Runtime frame and IMFS of the current method Print
As mentioned in Section 5.2 only the frame of the executing method, i.e. Print,
is active. This frame will be referred to as the current frame and its method Print
is known as the current method. Listing 8.4 presents the original bytecode of the
current method java.io.PrintStream.print().
Listing 8.4: Original bytecode code of java.io.PrintStream.print
00: aload_1
01: ifnonnull 7
04: ldc #52 = ”null”
06: astore_1
07: aload_0
08: aload_1
09: invokespecial #45 = Method java.io.PrintStream.write((Ljava/lang/String;)V)
12: return
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Listing 8.5 shows the instrumented bytecode of method java.io. PrintStream.print().
Listing 8.5: Instrumented bytecode of java.io.PrintStream.print
00: aload_1
01: dup
02: ldc w #1249 = ”1”
05: invokestatic #1251 = Method Monitor.EventRecognizer.Aload((Ljava/lang/Object;Ljava/lang/String;)V)
08: invokestatic #1253 = Method Monitor.EventRecognizer.ifcond(()V)
11: ifnonnull 30
14: invokestatic #1255 = Method Monitor.EventRecognizer.Const(()V)
17: ldc #52 = ”null”
19: dup
20: ldc w #1256 = ”1”
23: invokestatic #1258 = Method Monitor.EventRecognizer.Store((Ljava/lang/Object;Ljava/lang/String;)V)
26: astore_1
27: invokestatic #1270 = Method Monitor.EventRecognizer.Endif(()V)
30: aload_0
31: dup
32: ldc w #1259 = ”0”
35: invokestatic #1261 = Method Monitor.EventRecognizer.Aload((Ljava/lang/Object;Ljava/lang/String;)V)
38: aload_1
39: dup
40: ldc w #1262 = ”1”
43: invokestatic #1264 = Method Monitor.EventRecognizer.Aload((Ljava/lang/Object;Ljava/lang/String;)V)
46: ldc #1244 = ”write”
48: iconst 1
49: iconst 0
52: invokestatic #1266 = Method Monitor.EventRecognizer.Method((II)V)
55: invokespecial #45 = Method java.io.PrintStream.write((Ljava/lang/String;)V)
58: iconst_1
59: invokestatic #1268 = Method Monitor.EventRecognizer.Return((I)V)
62: return
As indicated in Listing 8.5, Opcode index 05 sends an event to the event recog-
nizer to load the contents of Symbol table location 1 as specified in Opcode index
02. The event recognizer pushes the contents of label 1 onto the current runtime
frame IFS. The second event is at Opcode index 08 that informs the event recognizer
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about the if statement. The event recognizer pops one element from the top of IFS
which is in our case the contents of label 1 [Const] and pushes it onto the top of the
IMFS to control the implicit information flow of [Const] as illustrated in Figure 8.3.
IFS
IMFS
0out
Print Symbol Table
0
1 [Const]
[Const]
Event 1
Event 2
Event 3
Figure 8.3: Runtime frame and IMFS of method Print
The next event will be sent according to the condition at Opcode index 11.
Assuming that the condition is false, the execution flow will jump to Opcode index
27. Because our runtime monitoring creates a region for each condition statement
and manipulates the instruction offset address as described in Section 5.4.
Then the third event is at Opcode index 27 that informs the event recognizer that
the if statement ends, then the event recognizer pops the top element on the IMFS.
Now both stacks (IFS and IMFS) are empty. The next event is at Opcode index 35
that sends the contents of Symbol table location 0 as specified in Opcode index 32.
IFS IMFS
[0out]
Print Symbol Table
[Const]
0
1
0out
[Const]
Figure 8.4: Runtime and IMFS of current method Print
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The event recognizer pushes the contents of label 0 which is [0out] onto the IFS.
The next call to the event recognizer is at Opcode index 43 to load the contents of
Symbol table location 1 as specified in Opcode index 40. Again the event recognizer
pushes the contents of label 1 which is [Const] onto the IFS. Figure 8.4 shows the
current runtime frame and IMFS of print method.
The next event is at Opcode index 52 that informs the event recognizer that another
method is about to be invoked with the name write, 1 parameter and 0 return value
as specified at Opcode indexes 46, 48 and 49 respectively. The event recognizer
creates a new runtime frame (new Symbol table and IFS) for the write method.
Print
Write Symbol Table
Write
0
1
0out
[Const]
IFS
IMFS
...
Print Symbol Table
...0
1
0out
[Const]
Figure 8.5: Runtime and IMFS of current method Write
The event recognizer will pop the top two elements ([Const], [0out]) from the
current method IFS and checks the IMFS if there is any element to be combined
with the popped elements from IFS, in our case IMFS has no element. Figure 8.5
shows the runtime frame and IMFS of the current method write. The execution will
continue in this way creating a runtime frame for each invoked method and pass the
parameters between the methods frame until returning from the method to destroy
its runtime frame. Listing 8.6 presents a snapshot of the instrumented bytecode
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of the method java.io.Writer.write, where our runtime monitoring mechanism will
intercept.
Listing 8.6: A snapshot of instrumented bytecode of java.io.Writer.write
227: aload_0
228: dup
229: ldc w #336 = ”0”
232: invokestatic #338 = Method Monitor.EventRecognizer.Aload((Ljava/lang/Object;Ljava/lang/String;)V)
235: aload 5
237: dup
238: ldc w #339 = ”5”
241: invokestatic #341 = Method Monitor.EventRecognizer.Aload((Ljava/lang/Object;Ljava/lang/String;)V)
244: invokestatic #343 = Method Monitor.EventRecognizer.Const(()V)
247: iconst_0
248: iload_3
249: dup
250: ldc w #344 = ”3”
253: invokestatic #346 = Method Monitor.EventRecognizer.Iload((ILjava/lang/String;)V)
256: ldc w #347 = ”write”
259: iconst 3
260: iconst 0
261: invokestatic #349 = Method Monitor.EventRecognizer.NativeWrite((Ljava/lang/String;II)V)
264: invokevirtual #7 = Method java.io.Writer.write(([CII)V)
As indicated in Listing 8.6, Opcode index 232 sends an event to the event rec-
ognizer to load the contents of label 0 as specified at Opcode index 229. The event
recognizer gets the contents of label 0 [0out] from the current method Symbol table
and pushes it onto the top of IFS of the current method Write. Opcode index 241
sends another event to load the contents of label 5 [Const] as specified at Opcode
index 238. The event recognize pushes [Const] onto the top of IFS. Opcode index
244 sends an event to load constant [Const]. The event recognizer pushes [Const]
onto the IFS. The next event is at Opcode index 253 to load the contents of label
3. The event recognizer gets the contents of label 3 [Const] and pushes it onto the
top of the IFS as shown in Figure 8.6.
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IFS
IMFS
[0out]
Test.Main
Print
Write
[Const]
Write Symbol Table
0
1
2
3
4
5
0out
[Const]
[Const]
[Const]
[Const]
0lock
Write [Const]
[Const]
Figure 8.6: Current runtime frame and IMFS at Opcode index 253
Opcode index 261 informs the event recognizer that a NativeWrite method is
about to be invoked with the name java.io.Write.write, 3 parameter and 0 return
value as specified at Opcode indexes 256, 259 and 260 respectively. The event recog-
nizer pops the top four elements from the IFS 3 parameters and the object reference
([Const], [Const], [Const] and [0out]) and sends them to the runtime checker. The
runtime checker will find out that constants are going to flow to the System.out.
In this case no need to check the information flow policy and send a message to
the UserFeedBack component. Therefore, the execution will continue as normal
without any intercept from our run time mechanism. Figure 8.7 shows the runtime
frame and IMFS of the current method java.io.Writer.write when the execution is
at Opcode index 261.
IFS
IMFS
Test.Main
Print
Write
Write Symbol Table
0
1
2
3
4
5
0out
[Const]
[Const]
[Const]
[Const]
0lock
Write
Figure 8.7: Current runtime and IMFS frame at line 261
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8.3 Case Study 2
To show the feasibility of our approach, this case study presents a peer to peer file
sharing application. In this case study peers are programs that can share information
(files) over the network with other known peers. A peer can transfer files from the
local machine to remote peers using sockets as a means of communication for the
transfer itself. Each peer is an interactive program, asking the user for a file to
transfer to a destination in the network. Once entered the program will open, load
and transfer the file in sizeable chunks to the peer at the destination address. The
case study will show how the information flow is controlled for a single peer executing
on the user’s behalf. The programs that are used in the scope of this case study, the
original byte codes and the instrumented byte codes are presented in Appendix D.
Snapshots of the instrumented bytecode will be provided in this section to show how
our runtime monitoring mechanism can trace and control the flow of information.
The information flow policy of this case study is as shown in Listing 8.7.
Listing 8.7: Case study 2 information flow polic
/* Case study 2 information flow policy − Written By Mohamed Sarrab, 27/12/10
*/
+/home/msarrab/* >>> 127.1.66.122:2000
?/home/Secret/SecretInfo.s >>> 146.227.66.150:2000
Conflict: +− >>> ?
+? >>> ?
−? >>> ?
+−? >>> ?
Listing 8.7 shows the information flow policy for this case study, which consist
of two rules the first rule states that any source from folder /home/msarrab/ is
allowed to flow to destination 127.1.66.122:2000. The second rule states that the
user should be asked if the source /home/Secret/SecretInfo.s is attempt to flow to
destination 146.227.66.150:2000. The source code of the client class is as shown in
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Listing C.7.
Listing 8.8: Source code of Kclient.java
1 public class Kclient {
2 public static void main(String[] args) throws IOException {
3 Socket kkSocket = null;
4 BufferedReader stdIn = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(
5 System.in));
6 while (true) {
7 System.out.println(”Enter file destination <ip:port>”);
8 String dest = stdIn.readLine();
9 String destsplit[] = dest.split(”:”);
10 if (destsplit.length != 2) {
11 System.out.println(”Wrong format! Try again.”);
12 continue;
13 }
14 try {
15 kkSocket = new Socket(destsplit[0], Integer.parseInt(destsplit[1]));
16 }
17 catch (IOException e) {
18 System.err.println(”Couldn’t get I/O for the connection to: ” + dest);
19 continue;
20 }
21 System.out.println(”Enter Source file name:”);
22 String f = stdIn.readLine();
23 File file = new File(f);
24 if (file.exists()) {
25 FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream(file);
26 OutputStream os = kkSocket.getOutputStream();
27 byte b = 0;
28 while (b != 1) {
29 b = (byte) fis.read();
30 os.write(b);
31 }
32 os.flush();
33 os.close();
34 } else {
35 System.out.println(”The specified file is not exist”);
36 System.exit(0);
37 }
38 kkSocket.close();
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39 }
40 }
41 }
The given program in Listing C.7 has only one method named Kclient.main. Table
8.2 shows a snapshot of the possible execution flow of class Kclient.java
Table 8.2: A snapshot of the execution flow of class Kclient.java
Client.main()
−→............
−→............
−→java.net.Socket.getOutputStream()
−→............
−→java.io.FileInputStream.read()
−→java.io.OutputStream.write()
−→java.io.OutputStream.flush()
−→java.io.OutputStream.close()
−→java.net.Socket.close()
Listing 8.9 shows the first snapshot of the instrumented bytecode of the method
Kclient.main, when the client program asks the user to enter the IP address and
port number of the machine.
Listing 8.9: First snapshot of instrumented bytecode of Kclient.main
66: ldc #194 = ”0out”
68: invokestatic #196 = Method Monitor.EventRecognizer.LoadField((Ljava/lang/String;)V)
71: getstatic #35 = Field java.lang.System.out(Ljava/io/PrintStream;)
74: invokestatic #198 = Method Monitor.EventRecognizer.Const(()V)
77: ldc #39 = ”Enter file destination <ip:port>”
79: ldc #199 = ”println”
81: iconst 1
82: iconst 0
83: invokestatic #203 = Method Monitor.EventRecognizer.Method((Ljava/lang/String;II)V)
86: invokevirtual #41 = Method java.io.PrintStream.println((Ljava/lang/String;)V)
89: aload_2
90: dup
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91: ldc #204 = ”2”
93: invokestatic #207 = Method Monitor.EventRecognizer.Aload((Ljava/lang/Object;Ljava/lang/String;)V)
96: ldc #208 = ”readLine”
98: iconst 0
99: iconst 1
100: invokestatic #210 = Method Monitor.EventRecognizer.Method((Ljava/lang/String;II)V)
103: invokevirtual #47 = Method java.io.BufferedReader.readLine(()Ljava/lang/String;)
106: dup
107: ldc #212 = ”3”
109: invokestatic #214 = Method Monitor.EventRecognizer.Store((Ljava/lang/Object;Ljava/lang/String;)V)
112: astore_3
Figure 8.8 illustrates the runtime frame of the current method Kclient.main
and IMFS when the execution is at Opcode index 66 of Listing 8.9 of the method
Kclient.main.
Kclient.main Symbol Table IFS
IMFS[Const]
0in,
0java.io.InputStreamReader,
0java.io.BufferedReader
1
2
main
Figure 8.8: Current runtime frame and IMFS at Opcode index 66
Opcode index 68 sends an event to the event recognizer to load field named 0out
which means System.out. The event recognizer pushes 0out onto the IFS of the
current method. Next event is at line 74 and informs the event recognizer to push
constant [Const] onto the top of the IFS. Figure 8.9 show the runtime frame and
the IMFS of the current method after pushing ([0out], [Const]).
At Opcode index 83 the event recognizer is informed about the next invoked
method named println with one parameter and no return values as specified at
Opcode indexes 79, 81, 82 respectively in Listing 8.9. The event recognizer pops
the top two elements (One parameter [Const] and Object reference [0out]) from the
current method Kclient.main IFS and checks the contents of the IMFS to control
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Kclient.main Symbol Table IFS
IMFS[Const ]
0in,
0java.io.InputStreamReader,
0java.io.BufferedReader
1
2
main
[0out]
[Const]
Figure 8.9: Current runtime frame and IMFS at Opcode index 77
the implicit information flow. Then it sends the popped elements to the new created
Symbol table of the invoked method println.
Kclient.main Symbol Table
IFS
IMFS
[Const ]
0in,
0java.io.InputStreamReader,
0java.io.BufferedReader
1
2
main
[0out]
[Const]
Java.io.Println Symbol Table
1
0
Println
Figure 8.10: Current runtime frame and IMFS at Opcode index 86
The trace of the information flow of the Println method is as has been described
in the first case study 8.2. Figure 8.10 shows the runtime frame and the IMFS at
the invocation of Println Opcode index 86 of Listing 8.9.
Assuming that the execution has been returned from the Println method. The next
event is at Opcode index 93 and informs the event recognizer to load the contents of
label 2 onto the IFS of the current method Kclient.main. Opcode index 100 sends
an event to inform the event recognizer that the next invoked method is readline
with no parameter and one return value as indicated at Opcode indexes 96, 98 and
99 of Listing 8.9. The event recognizer pops one element (0 parameters and the
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object reference) from the IFS and again checks the contents of the IMFS for any
implicit flow and then sends the popped elements (0in, 0java.io.InputStreamReader
and 0java.io.BufferedReader) to the new runtime frame Symbol table.
Figure 8.11: User enters file destination
Assuming that the execution returns from readline which returns a line of text.
Kclient.main Symbol Table
IFS
0in,
0java.io.InputStreamReader,
0java.io.BufferedReader
1
2
main
IMFS
[Const]
146.227.66.150:2000
Figure 8.12: Current frame after return from method readLine
As shown in Figure 8.11, the entered line of text will be pushed onto the top of
IFS of the mother method Kclient.main as it is the return value from the readLine
method as specified at Opcode index 99 in Listing 8.9. Figure 8.12 shows the current
runtime frame and IMFS after return from the readLine method. The next event
is at Opcode index 109 of Listing 8.9 that informs the event recognizer to pop the
top element from the IFS and store it in the Symbol table location 3 of the current
method Kclient.main. Figure 8.13 shows the runtime frame of the current method
and IMFS when the execution is at Opcode index 112.
Suppose that the execution is at Opcode index 354 of the current method
Kclient.main. Listing 8.10 shows a snapshot of the instrumented bytecode of the
method Kclient.main, when the client program asks the user to enter the source file
name.
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Kclient.main Symbol Table
IFS
0in,
0java.io.InputStreamReader,
0java.io.BufferedReader
1
2
main
IMFS
[Const]
146.227.66.150:20003
Figure 8.13: Current runtime frame and IMFS at Opcode index 112
Listing 8.10: Second snapshot of instrumented bytecode of Kclient.main
354: ldc w #302 = ”0out”
357: invokestatic #304 = Method Monitor.EventRecognizer.LoadField((Ljava/lang/String;)V)
360: getstatic #35 = Field java.lang.System.out(Ljava/io/PrintStream;)
363: invokestatic #306 = Method Monitor.EventRecognizer.Const(()V)
366: ldc #88 = ”Enter Source file name:”
368: ldc w #307 = ”println”
371: iconst 1
372: iconst 0
373: invokestatic #309 = Method Monitor.EventRecognizer.Method((Ljava/lang/String;II)V)
376: invokevirtual #41 = Method java.io.PrintStream.println((Ljava/lang/String;)V)
379: aload_2
380: dup
381: ldc w #310 = ”2”
384: invokestatic #312 = Method Monitor.EventRecognizer.Aload((Ljava/lang/Object;Ljava/lang/String;)V)
387: ldc w #313 = ”readLine”
390: iconst 0
391: iconst 1
392: invokestatic #315 = Method Monitor.EventRecognizer.Method((Ljava/lang/String;II)V)
395: invokevirtual #47 = Method java.io.BufferedReader.readLine(()Ljava/lang/String;)
398: dup
399: ldc w #316 = ”5”
402: invokestatic #318 = Method Monitor.EventRecognizer.Store((Ljava/lang/Object;Ljava/lang/String;)V)
405: astore 5
Opcode indexes 357, 363, 373, 384 and 392 send events to the event recognize is
similar to the scenario of entering IP address and port number as indicated in Listing
8.10 but in this case for the source file name as shown in Figure 8.14. Assuming that
the execution returns from readline method and is at Opcode index 395 of Listing
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8.10 which returns a line of text.
Figure 8.14: User enters file name
Figure 8.15 illustrates the changes in the current runtime frame and IMFS after
returning from method readline.
Kclient.main Symbol Table
IFS
0java.net.Socket,
146.227.66.150:2000,
0in,
0java.io.InputStreamReader,
0java.io.BufferedReader
1
2
main
146.227.66.150:2000
/home/Secret/SecretInfo.s
3
IMFS
146.227.66.150:2000,4
Figure 8.15: Current method runtime frame and IMFS at Opcode index 395
The next event is at Opcode index 402 that informs the event recognizer to pop
the contents of IFS and combine it with the IMFS elements and then store them in
the Symbol table location 5 of the current method. Figure 8.16 shows the runtime
frame of the current method and IMFS when the execution is at Opcode index 405.
Kclient.main Symbol Table
IFS
0java.net.Socket,
146.227.66.150:2000,
0in,
0java.io.InputStreamReader,
0java.io.BufferedReader
1
2
main
146.227.66.150:2000
/home/Secret/SecretInfo.s
3
IMFS
146.227.66.150:2000,4
5
Figure 8.16: Current runtime frame and IMFS at Opcode index 405
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Listing 8.11 shows a snapshot of the instrumented bytecode of Kclient.main
method, when the runtime monitoring mechanism intercept before the file flows to
the target socket.
Listing 8.11: Third snapshot of instrumented bytecode of Kclient.main
582: aload 8
584: dup
585: ldc w #385 = ”8”
588: invokestatic #387 = Method Monitor.EventRecognizer.Aload((Ljava/lang/Object;Ljava/lang/String;)V)
591: iload 9
593: dup
594: ldc w #388 = ”9”
597: invokestatic #391 = Method Monitor.EventRecognizer.Iload((ILjava/lang/String;)V)
600: iconst 1
601: iconst 0
602: invokestatic #394 = Method Monitor.EventRecognizer.NativeWrite((II)V)
605: invokevirtual #110 = Method java.io.OutputStream.write((I)V)
Figure 8.17 shows the runtime frame of the current method Kclient.main and
IMFS when the execution is at Opcode index 582.
Kclient.main Symbol Table
0java.net.Socket,
146.227.66.150:2000,
0in,
0java.io.InputStreamReader,
0java.io.BufferedReader
1
2
146.227.66.150:20003
146.227.66.150:2000,4
5 /home/Secret/SecretInfo.s
/home/Secret/SecretInfo.s
0java.io.File
/home/Secret/SecretInfo.s
0java.io.File
0java.io.FileInputStream
0java.net.Socket,
146.227.66.150:2000,
6
7
8
9
IFS
main
IMFS
/home/Secret/SecretInfo.s
0java.io.File
/home/Secret/SecretInfo.s
0java.io.File
0java.io.FileInputStream
Figure 8.17: Current method runtime frame and IMFS at line 582
Opcode index 588 in Listing 8.11 sends an event to load the contents of label 8
as specified in Opcode index 585. The event recognizer gets the contents of label
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8 from the current method Symbol table ([0java.net.Socket, 146.227.66.150:2000])
and push it onto the IFS. Opcode index 597 sends an event to load the contents of
label 9. The event recognizer gets the contents of label 9 from the Symbol table of the
current method ([/home/Secret/SecretInfo.s, 0java.io.File, 0java.io.FileInputStream])
and pushes them onto the top of the IFS. Figure 8.18 illustrates the changes in the
current runtime frame and IMFS at Opcode index 597.
Kclient.main Symbol Table
0java.net.Socket,
146.227.66.150:2000,
0in,
0java.io.InputStreamReader,
0java.io.BufferedReader
1
2
146.227.66.150:20003
146.227.66.150:2000,4
5 /home/Secret/SecretInfo.s
/home/Secret/SecretInfo.s
0java.io.File
/home/Secret/SecretInfo.s
0java.io.File
0java.io.FileInputStream
0java.net.Socket,
146.227.66.150:2000,
6
7
8
9
IFS
main
IMFS
/home/Secret/SecretInfo.s
0java.io.File
/home/Secret/SecretInfo.s
0java.io.File
0java.io.FileInputStream
0java.net.Socket,
146.227.66.150:2000,
/home/Secret/SecretInfo.s
0java.io.File
0java.io.FileInputStream
Figure 8.18: Current method runtime frame and IMFS at Opcode index 597
Opcode index 602 informs the event recognizer that the next invoked method is
NativeWrite with 1 parameter and 0 return value. The event recognizer pops the
top two elements from the IFS ([/home/Secret/SecretInfo.s, 0java.io.File, 0java.io.
FileInputStream] and [0java.net.Socket, 146.227.66.150:2000]) and all elements of
the IMFS ([/home/Secret/SecretInfo.s, 0java.io.File]).
Figure 8.19 shows the runtime frame of the current method and IMFS when the
execution is at Opcode index 602. The event recognizer destroys any value’s name
started by 0 and sends the remaining contents (/home/Secret/SecretInfo.s, 146.227.
66.150:2000 ) to the runtime Checker. The runtime Checker checks this flow against
the information flow policy in Listing 8.7. The second rule in the policy stated that:
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Kclient.main Symbol Table
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146.227.66.150:2000,
0in,
0java.io.InputStreamReader,
0java.io.BufferedReader
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5 /home/Secret/SecretInfo.s
/home/Secret/SecretInfo.s
0java.io.File
/home/Secret/SecretInfo.s
0java.io.File
0java.io.FileInputStream
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/home/Secret/SecretInfo.s
0java.io.File
0java.io.FileInputStream
Figure 8.19: Current method runtime frame and IMFS at Opcode index 602
?/home/Secret/SecretInfo.s >>> 146.227.66.150:2000
The user should be asked for the flow of the source /home/Secret/SecretInfo.s to
destination 146.227.66.150:2000. Then the runtime Checker will monitor the flow
and ask the user as illustrated in Figure 8.20.
Figure 8.20: Monitoring the flow
Our runtime monitoring mechanism asks the user for the next step as shown in
Figure 8.20. If the user rejects the flow then the runtime monitoring mechanism
stops the program execution and if the user allow the flow the runtime Checker
modifies the information flow policy according to the user’s decision.
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8.4 Summary
The presented chapter has discussed two case studies that describe how information
flow can be traced and controlled. The first case study has been provided to show
how the instrumentation process, event recognizer and runtime checker components
interact together to find out any possible information flow within a Java applica-
tion. The general aim of this case study was to show how our runtime monitoring
mechanism works and how information flow can be traced. The second case study
has been provided to show the feasibility of our approach to control the information
flow in a file sharing application, where the actual flows that take place at runtime
are traced and the program is only interrupted when a policy violation does occur.
This means that even unsafe programs may be executed within safe parameters,
i.e. as long as they do not actually violate the information flow policy. The main
purpose of this case study was to demonstrate the work of our approach to control
the information flow.
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Evaluation
Objectives
 Evaluate the research which has been described in this thesis.
 Discuss the limitations of the proposed approach.
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9.1 Introduction
While the previous Chapters 4, 5, 6 discussed some implementation characteristics
relating to individual components, this chapter examines the overall system perfor-
mance. The goal is to provide a runtime verification framework for monitoring and
controlling information flow within Java applications. This chapter will evaluate our
approach based on the success criteria:
 Feasibility of implementation.
 User ability to modify the flow policy during runtime in response to incidents.
 Modifying the behaviour of the program that is leaking confidential informa-
tion according to the user decision.
 Performance overhead, which is broken down further into overhead in compu-
tation time and overhead in memory usage.
The feasibility of the implementation is discussed in Section 9.2. Section 9.3 eval-
uates the user ability to modify the flow policy during runtime in response to in-
cidents. Section 9.4 discusses the modification of the program behaviour that is
leaking confidential information according to the user decision. The examples show-
ing the performance overhead associated with information flow control is described
in Section 9.5.
9.2 Evaluating the Feasibility of Implementation
A straightforward prototype implementation without any optimisation has been de-
scribed in Chapter 7. The prototype shows how the components of the proposed
framework interact together to load, instrument and control the flow of the infor-
mation in the target class file or class files. Limitations of the prototype are both
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functional and performance related. Firstly, not all the functions and algorithms
explained in Chapters 4 and 5 are implemented and thus the prototype will not be
able to trace all information flows. For example the information flow introduced by
exception handling mechanisms are not covered. The performance of the prototype
is certainly worse than technically possible using the presented approach. For ex-
ample string comparisons are not optimised and there is no code level optimisation
to avoid redundant comparisons. The limitations are due to the limited amount of
implementation time. This does not constitute a conceptual problem, but is due to
the amount of effort that would be needed to implement the runtime verification
framework for controlling information flow based on policies. This is out of scope of
this PhD project.
Of course this implementation presents only a prototype to show that monitoring
at runtime can be done with an acceptable performance hit (see section 9.5). It is
not implemented to a level at which it could be readily commercially exploited. For
example the following functionalities are currently missing or are limited in their
applicability:
 Exception, athrow instruction deals with exceptions, but since the current
prototype does not support it yet, so the proposed framework will first have
to be implemented completely, before athrow can do anything useful.
 The Jump subroutine jsr w and jsr are for jump to subroutines are miss-
ing. The execution proceeds at that offset from the address of the instruction.
These instructions can be implemented similar to the goto instruction as de-
scribed in Section 4.10.4 but jsr needs two branch addresses and jsr w needs
four branches addresses.
 Modifying an information flow policy needs more work since the current pro-
totype has not a fully working version.
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In order to give an insight into the current implementation performance and anal-
ysis results, the Section 9.5 presents some examples that are used to evaluate the
prototype performance.
9.3 The User Ability to Modify the Flow Policy
The conceptually most important component is the user feedback component that
acts as an interface between a user and the monitored application. An essential func-
tionality of the user feedback component is that all user interaction passes through
this component. The user feedback component informs the user about any feedback
received from the runtime checker, if the runtime checker determined that this exe-
cution would violate the information flow policy then it sends feedback to the user
through the user feedback component, the information flow policy will be modified
according to the user decision. In other words, while the application is running, the
user feedback component receives feedback from the runtime checker (Steering). If
the application is about to enter an insecure state then the user will be asked to
determine whether the information flow should be aborted or allowed to flow and
continue under a modified policy. One of the motivation of this research is that with
most of the previous work the information flow policy was not in the hand of the
end user.
9.4 Modifying the Behaviour of the Program
Modifying the behaviour of the program that is leaking confidential information
according to the user decision. An interaction with the user is very important in
flexible and reliable information flow control systems because different users may
have different security requirements. An interaction with monitoring mechanism
171
CHAPTER 9. EVALUATION
during runtime enables the user to change application behaviours or modify the way
that information flow while the program is executing.
9.5 Performance
The ability to monitor and control information flow within a Java application comes
at the expense of performance overhead. This overhead is introduced at two distinct
points: memory usage and computation time. The experiments that measures the
performance overhead were conducted on an Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Duo CPU E4600
@ 2.40GHz, running Ubuntu 10.04.1 LTS with the 2.6.32-27-generic (i686) Linux
Kernel.
9.5.1 Memory Usage
This section discusses the target class size before and after instrumentation, memory
used during class loading as part of the instrumentation code for the target classes,
dynamic overhead that may be caused by the runtime classes of the proposed frame-
work and finally it discusses the overall memory used.
In the following we present four programs that measure this overhead. The first
program is a helloworld program and the second is another version of the helloworld
program that prints hello world ten times. The third one considers a program that
opens a file, reads the contents one line at a time and prints the entire contents to
the screen. The file size is 1.6 KB. The last program involves measuring performance
of a QuickSort algorithm for 1000 integer random numbers. The full details and the
code of these examples can be found in Appendix B.
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9.5.1.1 Class Size
As the bytecode of the original target program is instrumented when loading its
classes, the memory size of the target program is expected to be increased when
executing within the framework. In Chapter 4 the instrumentation of bytecode
instructions that cause information flow has been discussed in detail. Revisiting the
presented algorithms 4.9.1 to 4.10.4 it is clear that every instrumentation will add at
least 74 bytes to the original bytecode in the case of a constant instrumentation, see
Section 4.9.1. In the worst case 106 bytes are added to the original bytecode, in the
case of Invokevirtual and Invokestatic operations, see Section 4.9.14.3. Consequently
we expect a program to expand by at least a factor 1 and at most 4. The set up of
the class size experiment is as follows:
 Measure target program size.
 Instrument target program (only target classes)
 Measure size of instrumented target classes.
The results of this experiment show that:
Table 9.1: Comparing original and instrumented class size
Experiment Original size Instrumented size Expansion Ratio
1 582 bytes 778 bytes 1.3
2 690 bytes 1334 bytes 1.9
3 1843 bytes 3328 bytes 1.8
4 2612 bytes 6423 bytes 2.4
The results show that the instrumented bytecode of the target program increases
the size. The first program has the minimum expansion ratio 1.3 due to the fact that
the target program consist of only one method. That program has four bytecode
instructions, one of these bytecode instructions is instrumented 1 to 4 but the others
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are instrumented 1 to 1 and 1 to 2. Program 4 has a larger expansion ratio 2.4 than
the other programs due to the fact that the target program involves eight methods.
Figure 9.1: Comparison of original and instrumented class size
These methods have many operations such as (Invokevirtual and Invokestatic)
which are instrumented as 1 to 4 instructions and many load and store operations
that instrumented as factor 1 to 3 instructions. However, the obtained results are
as expected, i.e. instrumentation will increase the target program size by at least a
factor 1 and at most 4. All assertion points calls in our prototype implementation
are inserted as class methods that use static (early) binding. With a better imple-
mentation that changes all assertion points to be inserted as instance methods that
use dynamic (late) binding may reduce the overall size.
9.5.1.2 Memory Used during Class Loading as part of the Instrumenta-
tion Code
The set up of the experiment is as follows:
 Measure free memory size after run JVM.
 Instrument target program (only target classes).
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 Measure free memory size after instrumenting target classes.
The results of this experiment are as the follows:
Table 9.2: Memory usage of original and instrumented class
Experiment Original class Instrumented class Expansion Ratio
1 243880 bytes 487856 bytes 2.0
2 243899 bytes 731760 bytes 3.0
3 251898 bytes 1223504 bytes 4.8
4 487704 bytes 1955752 bytes 4.0
The results show that compared original and instrumented bytecode of the target
program increases the size of the memory used during loading stage. The third
program has a larger expansion ratio 4.8 than the other programs because its target
class requires more classes to be loaded in order to execute. All these classes are
instrumented during loading stage as explained in Section 4.5.
Figure 9.2: Memory usage of original and instrumented class
9.5.1.3 Dynamic Overhead
The runtime classes of the proposed framework are Event Recognizer, Runtime
Checker and MyStack. Table 9.3 lists each of these runtime classes and their size.
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Table 9.3: The size of framework runtime classes
Class Size
Event Recognizer 8929 bytes
Runtime Checker 2512 bytes
MyStack 2465 bytes
Figure 9.3: Size of framework runtime classes
As indicated in Table 9.3 the Event recognizer has the largest size due to the
fact that all assertion points operations are defined in this class and all trace data
are manipulated in this class which increases the memory usage during runtime. As
explained in Chapter 5 a new runtime frame is created each time a method is invoked.
The runtime frame consists of an information flow stack (IFS) and a Symbol Table.
At any point of the execution, there are thus likely to be many frames and equally
many information flow stacks (IFS) that as expected will increase the used memory
compared to the original application used memory. Thus, the size is as big as the
target program and the data manipulated in the runtime frame.
9.5.1.4 Overall Memory usage
The set up of the experiment as follows:
 Measure free memory size.
 Instrument user and system classes (target and rt.jar classes).
 Measure free memory size after instrumenting user and system classes.
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Table 9.4: Original and instrumented overall Memory usage
Experiment Original Instrumented Expansion Ratio
1 2071646 bytes 11829419 bytes 5.7
2 2086133 bytes 12138858 bytes 5.8
3 2286748 bytes 12852374 bytes 5.6
4 2136934 bytes 13526455 bytes 5.6
As indicated in Table 9.4 that the lowest expansion ratio 5.6 is in the third and
fourth programs and the highest is in the second program. The amount of overall
used memory is increased because the measurement of the memory size is done after
all framework classes, the Java agent class, transformer class, the javaassist package
classes are loaded and all other loaded classes are instrumented during loading stage.
The amount of overall memory usage can be reduced using static analysis techniques
such as (Banerjee & Naumann 2005, Myers 1999) for the system classes. That
analysis how information will flow in the program to determine whether it obeys
some predefined policy with respect to an information flow without running the
program.
Figure 9.4: Original and instrumented overall Memory usage
Overall the experiments show that the memory usage are different between the origi-
nal target program and the same program executing within the proposed framework
due to two main factors. The first factor is that programs loaded different number
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of required classes that they demand to run. The other factor is the Java garbage
collection. The JVM’s heap stores all objects created by the executing program.
The garbage collection is the process that automatically free objects that are no
longer referenced by the program. In addition to freeing unreferenced objects, a
garbage collector may also combat heap fragmentation. Heap fragmentation occurs
through the course of normal program execution. New objects are allocated, and
unreferenced objects are freed such that free blocks of heap memory are left in be-
tween blocks occupied by live objects. Requests to allocate new objects may have to
be filled by extending the size of the heap even though there is enough total unused
space in the existing heap.
As can be seen in the Appendix B that running the same program many time may
uses different amount of memory. These are the main factors impacting on the
memory overhead of the proposed framework is confirmed by measuring the overall
memory usage of both the original target program and the same program executing
within the runtime verification framework for controlling information flow
9.5.2 Computation Time
This section discusses the overhead in loading the target classes, rt.jar classes and
the overhead in executing assertion points. The same presented four programs that
are used to measure the expansion ratio of the memory usage will be used to measure
the computation time. The details of these programs can be found in Appendix B.
9.5.2.1 Overhead in loading and instrumenting target classes
During the loading stage of the target program classes, the framework classes, Javaa-
gent class, transformer class and Javaassist package classes, all required system
classes (rt.jar classes) will be loaded and the target program classes will be loaded
and instrumented. Consequently, the expected time for loading a program is ex-
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panded by at least a factor 5 and at most 11. The set up of the loading target
classes experiment is as follows:
 Measure the elapsed time for loading the target classes.
 Measure the elapsed time for loading and instrument the target classes.
Table 9.5: Target classes loading and instrumented time
Experiment Loading and Instrumenting Time Loading time Expansion Ratio
1 0.043 seconds 0.0055 seconds 7.8
2 0.0561 seconds 0.0059 seconds 9.5
3 0.0905 seconds 0.0089 seconds 10.1
4 0.1230 seconds 0.0159 seconds 7.7
Figure 9.5: Target classes loading and instrumented time
The results show that the loading of original classes and instrumented bytecode
of the target program classes increases the elapsed loading time. The third program
has a larger expansion ratio (10.1) than the other programs due to the fact that
loading this program requires more system classes (rt.jar classes) to be loaded than
the other programs 1, 2 and 4. During the loading stage of all of these programs,
the framework classes, Javaagent class, transformer class and Javaassist package
classes, all required system classes (rt.jar classes) will be loaded and the target
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program classes will be loaded and instrumented. Thus, that time is a reasonable
time to be elapsed for loading all required class to control information flow.
9.5.2.2 Overhead in instrumenting and reloading system (rt.jar) classes
During the instrumentation stage of the system (rt.jar) classes, the framework
classes, Javaagent class, transformer class and Javaassist package classes, will be
loaded. The system (rt.jar) classes will be instrumented and reloaded again. How-
ever, these classes does not require any extra classes to be loaded. Thus the expected
time for instrumenting and reloading system (rt.jar) classes is expand by at least a
factor 1 and at most 4.
The set up of the loading target classes experiment is as follows:
 Measure the elapsed time for loading the system (rt.jar) classes.
 Measure the elapsed time for instrumenting and reloading system (rt.jar)
classes.
Table 9.6: Original loading Time and Instrumenting, reloading time
Experiment Loading and Instrumenting time Loading time Expansion Ratio
1 3.2496 seconds 1.0593 seconds 3.0
2 3.2960 seconds 1.0767 seconds 3.0
3 3.3055 seconds 1.1036 seconds 2.9
4 3.2893 seconds 1.1884 seconds 2.7
The results in Table 9.6 show that the loading of system (rt.jar) classes and
instrumented and reloaded system (rt.jar) classes increases the elapsed loading time.
The first and the second programs have the same expansion ratio 3.0 because both
of them requires approximately the same number of the system (rt.jar) classes to be
loaded and instrumented. Thus, the consumed time is as expected to be at least a
factor 1 and at most 4. The amount of instrumentation and reloading time can be
reduced using static analysis techniques such as (Banerjee & Naumann 2005, Myers
1999) for the system classes e.g. java.lang, java.system and java.security.
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Figure 9.6: Original loading Time and Instrumenting, reloading time
9.5.2.3 Overhead in executing assertion points
The Java language provides two basic kinds of methods, instance methods and class
(or static) methods. When the JVM invokes a class method, it selects the method
to be invoked based on the type of the object reference, which is known at compile-
time. On the other hand, when the virtual machine invokes an instance method, it
selects the method to be invoked based on the actual class of the object, which can
be known at run time. The JVM uses two different instructions to invoke instance
or static methods:
 invokevirtual for instance methods, that pops the objectref and args, invoke
the method at constant pool index
 invokestatic for class methods, that pops args, invoke the static method at
constant pool index.
The proposed approach inserts assertion points as a static method call. Table 9.7
shows the results of a calling class method invokestatic and instance method invoke-
virtual doing nothing for a number of times.
The set up of the experiment is as follows:
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 Measure the elapsed time for n times calling the static method.
 Measure the elapsed time for n times calling the instance method.
Table 9.7: Time cost of static and instance methods
Experiment Number loop Static Method Instance Method
1 1000 0.0 seconds 0.0 seconds
2 10000 0.0 seconds 0.001 seconds
3 100000 0.002 seconds 0.004 seconds
4 1000000 0.006 seconds 0.007seconds
Figure 9.7: Time cost of static and instance methods
Table 9.8 compares the elapsed time for calling static and instance methods. The
results show that in the first experiment equal time from both methods instance
and static. However, in the other experiments the elapsed time for calling instance
method is always greater than the static methods. Due to the fact the calling
instance method involves overhead that the program must first examine the object
to determine its type, select the appropriate method, and then call it. The elapsed
time for calling any type of methods (instance or static) always depends on its
number of arguments (parameters).
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9.5.2.4 Overhead in manipulating runtime frames’ stacks
As described in Section 5.2 the proposed approach creates a new runtime frame
each time a method is invoked. The runtime frame consists of the information flow
stack (IFS) and a Symbol Table for use by the current method. At any point in the
execution, there are thus likely to be many frames and equally many information
flow stacks (IFS) per method invocation and one implicit information flow stack
(IMFS) to control implicit information flow. Thus, the expected elapsed time for
manipulating information flow stack is expanded by at least a factor 3 and at most
7. The set up of the experiment is as follows.
 Measure the execution time of the original classes.
 Measure the execution time of the original classes using our approach.
Table 9.8: Execution time of original classes and using our approach
Experiment Original Using our approach Expansion Ratio
1 0.0008 seconds 0.0025 seconds 3.1
2 0.001 seconds 0.0066 seconds 6.6
3 0.0518 seconds 0.3438 seconds 6.6
4 0.2334 seconds 0.8253 seconds 3.5
Figure 9.8: Execution time of original classes and using our approach
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The results in Table 9.8 show that the first experiment has the smallest expansion
ratio 3.1 and the largest expansion ratio 6.6 is for experiments 2 and 3. These
expansion ratios depends on the number of operations that the inserted assertion
point has, e.g. const assertion point has one operation that push a label to the
information flow stack however, union assertion point pops the top two labels from
the information flow stack, combines them and push them as one element to the
information flow stack as described in Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.10 respectively.
Next experiment shows a comparison between the execution time using our approach
and the execution time using our approach for only explicit information flow. As
explained in Section 5.2.3 the proposed approach uses a shared implicit information
flow stack to control any possible implicit information flow. Thus, we expected no
much time to be added for manipulating implicit information flow stack. The set
up of the experiment is as follows.
 Measure the execution time of the original classes using our approach.
 Measure the execution time of the target classes using our approach for con-
trolling explicit information flow.
Table 9.9: Execution time using our approach with/without implicit information
flow
Experiment With implicit Without implicit Expansion Ratio
1 0.0025 seconds 0.0023 seconds 1.0
2 0.0066 seconds 0.0058 seconds 1.1
3 0.3438 seconds 0.3410 seconds 1.0
4 0.8253 seconds 0.7976 seconds 1.0
The results in Table 9.9 show that the largest expansion ratio 1.1 is at experiment
2. Generally, as expected there is not much time added for manipulating a shared
implicit information flow stack.
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Figure 9.9: Execution time using our approach with/out implicit information flow
9.5.3 Summary of Experiments
The results of the overall experiments show that the original and the same program
executing within the proposed framework introduces an overhead in load and ex-
ecution time. The overhead is due to two main factors. The first factor is that
programs load a different number of required classes that it originally demanded to
run. The other factor is that the proposed approach instruments all loaded classes
and reloads them again to be executed after inserting the required assertion points.
While this is not a negligible overhead, we feel that this penalty is a reasonable
price to pay for the additional security offered by the information flow control and
policy enforcement functionality. We are confident that the overhead can be reduced
by further optimizations in the bytecode instrumentation and runtime monitoring
mechanism.
Reducing the overhead that are due to all loaded classes instrumentation during
compilation time could potentially improve performance furthers, e.g. loading time
can be reduced using static information flow analysis for all system classes. Further-
more, the execution time can be further reduced by skipping the repeated assertion
points and assertion points that are inside a loop could potentially called once.
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9.6 Summary
The core aim of this work was to develop a runtime verification framework for con-
trolling information flow based on policies within a Java application. This chapter
has analysed and evaluated the proposed framework. The beginning of this chapter
considered the feasibility of the prototype implementation The second part of this
chapter evaluates the performance overhead, which was broken down into overhead
in memory usage and overhead in computation time. Memory usage discusses tar-
get class size before and after instrumentation, memory used during class loading as
part of the code instrumentation, dynamic overhead, overall memory usage. Com-
putation time discusses the overhead in loading and instrumenting target classes,
instrumenting and reloading system (rt.jar) classes, executing assertion points and
manipulating runtime frames’ stacks.
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Conclusion and Future Work
Objectives
 Summary of the research which has been described in this thesis.
 Propose future work.
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10.1 Summary of the Thesis
The thesis presented a new framework for policy-based runtime verification of in-
formation flow that supports user interaction during runtime and explicitly states
how the framework components interact to control the flow of information (Chapter
3). The thesis described a flexible approach to information security management so
that the information flow within a program execution conforms to a defined set of
information flow rules (Chapter 6).
The thesis discussed how to control information flows during untrusted program
execution. The approach concentrates on providing a dynamic and adaptable in-
formation security solution by interacting with the user during system execution
in response to information flow events. This approach is advantageous over static
verification as it is configurable and also places control in the hand of the user.
The thesis provided a new instrumentation algorithm to monitor and trace the
program execution, that is applicable to any Java bytecode (Chapter 4). The thesis
presented new algorithms for dynamically tracing and controlling the flow of the
information during runtime, using a new runtime monitoring technique to control
both explicit and implicit information flow (Chapter 5).
The presented approach does not treat the application as a black box (with the
general assumption that once information has passed into it can find its way to any
destination). Instead the actual flows that take place at runtime are traced and the
program is only interrupted when a policy violation does occur. This means that
even unsafe programs, i.e. as long as they do not actually violate the information
flow policy, can be executed within safe parameters.
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The presented approach works for Java bytecode and does not require any modi-
fication to the underlying hardware/software architecture. The prototype implemen-
tation of the presented approach is independent of any specific JVM. The verification
in this approach is performed inside the Java environment and does not rely on any
extra verification tool.
Finally, the thesis demonstrated that security can be achieved by an interactive
process in which the presented framework queries the user for specific information
as security requirements (Chapter 6). These are made available to the software and
are then enforced on the application using a novel runtime verification technique for
tracing information flow.
10.2 Achieving Success Criteria
To answer the research questions that were highlighted in Chapter 1, a new frame-
work for policy-based runtime verification of information flow that supports user
interaction has introduced:
 User ability to modify the flow policy during runtime. The thesis discussed
the user interaction with the monitoring mechanism in Chapters (Chapter
3, 6 and 8). The interaction with users is very important in any flexible
and reliable security monitoring mechanism because different users may have
different security requirements. One of the motivations of this research is that
most of the previous work, the information flow policy is not in the hand of the
end user. To the best of our knowledge it is the first monitoring mechanism
for controlling information flow during runtime that support user interaction.
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 Modifying the behaviour of the program that is leaking confidential infor-
mation according to the user decision. Our monitoring mechanism enables
the user to interact with the monitoring mechanism to change the program
behaviours or modify the way that information flow while the program is ex-
ecuting.
 The functionality and performance of the prototype tool were evaluated by
employing it in several cases studies. The performance results indicates that
the prototype tool is suitable for use within Java applications.
10.3 Contributions
The main contribution of this research is a novel usable security mechanism for
controlling information flow within a software application during runtime. Usable
security refers to enabling users to manage their systems security without defining
elaborate security rules before starting the application. Security will be achieved by
an interactive process to enforce user requirements on the application using runtime
verification technique for tracing information flow. The contributions are detailed
in the following list.
 Runtime Monitoring: The proposed runtime monitoring mechanism en-
sures that the program execution are contains only legal flows that are defined
in the information flow policy or approved by the user. The presented approach
provides a high degree of flexibility to support detecting and monitoring of po-
tential leaking behaviour of a program and the user decides whether to abort
or continue the program execution. The approach ensures that the program
contains only those flows approved by the user.
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 Runtime Management: The behaviour of a program that about to leak
confidential information will be altered by the monitor according to the user
decision. The interaction process enables users to manage their security re-
quirements during runtime.
 User interaction control: The achieved user interaction with the monitoring
mechanism during runtime enable users to change the program behaviours
while the program is executing. The presented approach provides a high degree
of flexibility to support the user’s ability to modify the way that information
flow.
10.4 Future Work
The most immediate need in our current prototype implementation is the dynamic
policy modification by the user. Currently, the information flow policy is simply
written out as code that is read by our prototype implementation. The prototype
implementation should be able to manage complex information policies that can
succinctly capture a wide range of user information flow requirements.
Performance measurements using the proposed approach show that the system
incurs expected overhead. Optimisations are needed to reduce this overhead, some
of which have been outlined in Section 9.2.
The prototype would require an expansion of the implementation to include more
of Java bytecode features, e.g. exceptions are heavily used in Java, and can intro-
duce new control flows, and therefore new indirect leaks. Other works have already
addressed this issue (Myers 1999, Pottier & Simonet 2003), and it should not be too
difficult to add these to the proposed approach.
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Another future work direction is the examination of how much information is
leaked, and the amount of the information flow to allow users to make more in-
formed decisions.
The presented research only addresses the information flow within one applica-
tion. This is sufficient to protect against untrusted applications executed in user
space, but fails to address mandatory information flow control within open multi-
user environments. One aspect of future work that is already addressed in ongoing
research projects is the integration of the proposed approach in a wider information
system context.
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Appendix A
Instructions and its Opcodes
Opcode Instruction Opcode Instruction Opcode Instruction Opcode Instruction
0x00 nop 0x01 aconst null 0x02 iconst m1 0x03 iconst 0
0x04 iconst 1 0x05 iconst 2 0x06 iconst 3 0x07 iconst 4
0x08 iconst 5 0x09 lconst 0 0x0a lconst 1 0x0b fconst 0
0x0c fconst 1 0x0d fconst 2 0x0e dconst 0 0x0f dconst 1
0x10 bipush 0x11 sipush 0x12 ldc 0x13 ldc w
0x14 ldc2 w 0x15 iload 0x16 lload 0x17 fload
0x18 dload 0x19 aload 0x1a iload 0 0x1b iload 1
0x1c iload 2 0x1d iload 3 0x1e lload 0 0x1f lload 1
0x20 lload 2 0x21 lload 3 0x22 fload 0 0x23 fload 1
0x24 fload 2 0x25 fload 3 0x26 dload 0 0x27 dload 1
0x28 dload 2 0x29 dload 3 0x2a aload 0 0x2b aload1 1
0x2c aload 2 0x2d aload 3 0x2e iaload 0x2f laload
0x30 faload 0x31 daload 0x32 aaload 0x33 baload
0x34 caload 0x35 saload 0x36 istore 0x37 lstore
0x38 fstore 0x39 dstore 0x3a astore 0x3b istore 0
0x3c istore 1 0x3d istore 2 0x3e istore 3 0x3f lstore 0
0x40 lstore 1 0x41 lstore 2 0x42 lstore 3 0x43 fstore 0
0x44 fstore 1 0x45 fstore 2 0x46 fstore 3 0x47 dstore 0
0x48 dstore 1 0x49 dstore 2 0x4a dstore 3 0x4b astore 0
0x4c astore 1 0x4d astore 2 0x4e astore 3 0x4f iastore
0x50 lastore 0x51 fastore 0x52 dastore 0x53 aastore
0x54 bastore 0x55 castore 0x56 sastore 0x57 pop
0x58 pop2 0x59 dup 0x5a dup x1 0x5b dup x2
0x5c dup2 0x5d dup2 x1 0x5e dup2 x2 0x5f swap
0x60 iadd 0x61 ladd 0x62 fadd 0x63 dadd
0x64 isub 0x65 lsub 0x66 fsub 0x67 dsub
0x68 imul 0x69 lmul 0x6a fmul 0x6b dmul
0x6c idiv 0x6d ldiv 0x6e fdiv 0x6f ddiv
0x70 irem 0x71 lrem 0x72 frem 0x73 drem
0x74 ineg 0x75 lneg 0x76 fneg 0x77 dneg
0x78 ishl 0x79 lshl 0x7a ishr 0x7b lshr
0x7c iushr 0x7d lushr 0x7e iand 0x7f land
0x80 ior 0x81 lor 0x82 ixor 0x83 lxor
0x84 iinc 0x85 i2l 0x86 i2f 0x87 i2d
0x88 l2i 0x89 l2f 0x8a l2d 0x8b f2i
0x8c f2l 0x8d f2d 0x8e d2i 0x8f d2l
0x90 d2f 0x91 i2b 0x92 i2c 0x93 i2s
0x94 lcmp 0x95 fcmpl 0x96 fcmpg 0x97 dcmpl
0x98 dcmpg 0x99 ifeq 0x9a ifne 0x9b iflt
0x9c ifge 0x9d ifgt 0x9e ifle 0x9f if icmpeq
0xa0 if icmpne 0xa1 if icmplt 0xa2 if icmpge 0xa3 if icmpgt
0xa4 if icmple 0xa5 if acmpeq 0xa6 if acmpne 0xa7 goto
0xa8 jsr 0xae freturn 0xaa tableswitch 0xa9 ret
0xac ireturn 0xad lreturn 0xab lookupswitch 0xaf dreturn
0xb0 areturn 0xb2 getstatic 0xb6 invokevirtual 0xb1 return
0xb4 getfield 0xb3 putstatic 0xb7 invokespecial 0xb5 putfield
0xb8 invokestatic 0xbd anewarray 0xb9 invokeinterface 0xbb new
0xbc newarray 0xbe arraylength 0xba xxxunusedxxx1 0xbf athrow
0xc0 checkcast 0xc3 monitorexit 0xc2 monitorenter 0xc1 instanceof
0xc4 wide 0xc6 ifnull 0xc5 multianewarray 0xc7 ifnonnull
0xc8 goto w 0xc9 jsr w 0xca breakpoint 0xfe impdep1
0xff impdep2
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Experiments Result
Example 1:
This example considers a HelloWorld program.
Listing B.1: Source code of HelloWorld.java
package uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.testtargets;
/**
*
* @author Mohamed Sarrab (STRL, DMU, UK)
* Msarrab@dmu.ac.uk
*/
public class HelloWorld {
public static void main(String[] args) {
System.out.println(”Hello World”);
}
}
For the over all memory usage we achieved the following result:
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Table B.1: Comparing Memory Usage
Original Instrumented
2050512 11831128
2046720 11828928
2047920 11826968
2046696 11828928
2047920 11831128
2046696 11828928
2284408 11831583
2047920 11837064
2050896 11828856
2046776 11820680
Mean Mean
2071646 Bytes 11829419 Bytes
Max deviation Max deviation
237712 Bytes 16384 Bytes
For the speed we achieved the following result for ten different run:
Table B.2: Original system and user classes elapsed time
System Classes - Loading time User Class - Loading time Execution Time
1.067 0.005 0.001
1.061 0.005 0.000
1.048 0.005 0.001
1.066 0.005 0.001
1.063 0.004 0.001
1.046 0.005 0.001
1.059 0.007 0.000
1.057 0.006 0.001
1.070 0.007 0.001
1.056 0.006 0.001
Mean Mean Mean
1.0593 seconds 0.0055 seconds 0.0008 seconds
Max deviation Max deviation Max deviation
0.024 seconds 0.003 seconds 0.001 seconds
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Table B.3: Instrumented system and user classes elapsed time
System Classes - Load and instrument time User Class - Load and instrument time Execution Time
3.244 0.003
3.242 0.002
3.247 0.002
3.246 0.003
3.239 0.043 0.002
3.249 0.003
3.269 0.003
3.245 0.002
3.249 0.003
3.266 0.003
Mean Mean Mean
3.2496 seconds 0.043 seconds 0.0025 seconds
Max deviation Max deviation Max deviation
0.03 seconds 0.0 seconds 0.001 seconds
Table B.4: Using our approach for only explicit information flow
Execution Time
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.003
0.002
0.002
0.003
0.002
0.003
0.002
Mean
0.0023 seconds
Max deviation
0.001 seconds
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Example 2:
This example considers a program that involves one class has one method with ten
lines. This example has been presented as one method with ten lines of println
instead of using for loop due to measure the memory usage and instrumentation of
the required assertion points.
Listing B.2: Source code of HelloWorldProgram.java
package uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.testtargets;
/**
*
* @author Mohamed Sarrab (STRL, DMU, UK)
* Msarrab@dmu.ac.uk
*/
public class HelloWorldProgram {
public static void main(String[] args) {
System.out.println(”Hello World”);
System.out.println(”Hello World”);
System.out.println(”Hello World”);
System.out.println(”Hello World”);
System.out.println(”Hello World”);
System.out.println(”Hello World”);
System.out.println(”Hello World”);
System.out.println(”Hello World”);
System.out.println(”Hello World”);
System.out.println(”Hello World”);
}
}
For speed we achieved the following result.
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Table B.5: Comparing Memory Usage
Original Using our approach
2040532 12327992
2264387 12067752
2041736 12070037
2036715 12330264
2040512 12249488
2284347 12078240
2036715 12067792
2041755 12061856
2037920 12065872
2036715 12069295
Mean Mean
2086133 Bytes 12138858 Bytes
Max deviation Max deviation
247632 Bytes 268408 Bytes
Table B.6: Original system and user classes elapsed time
System Classes - Loading time User Class - Loading time Execution Time
1.073 0.005
1.076 0.005
1.084 0.005
1.070 0.004
1.075 0.005 0.001
1.084 0.006
1.081 0.005
1.071 0.006
1.070 0.007
1.083 0.007
Mean Mean Mean
1.0767 seconds 0.0055 seconds 0.001 seconds
Max deviation Max deviation Max deviation
0.014 seconds 0.003 seconds 0.0 seconds
Table B.7: Instrumented System and user classes elapsed time
System Classes - Load and instrument time User Class - Load and instrument time Execution Time
3.296 0.056 0.007
3.295 0.057 0.006
3.296 0.056 0.005
3.296 0.056 0.007
3.297 0.056 0.008
3.297 0.056 0.006
3.296 0.056 0.005
3.296 0.056 0.008
3.295 0.056 0.009
3.296 0.056 0.005
Mean Mean Mean
3.296 seconds 0.0561 seconds 0.0066 seconds
Max deviation Max deviation Max deviation
0.0 seconds 0.001 seconds 0.004 seconds
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Table B.8: Using our approach for only explicit information flow
Execution Time
0.005
0.006
0.005
0.006
0.006
0.007
0.005
0.006
0.007
0.005
Mean
0.0058 seconds
Max deviation
0.002 seconds
Example 3:
This example considers a program that opens a file, reads the contents one line at
a time and prints the entire contents into the screen. The file size is 1.6 KB.
Listing B.3: Source code of ReadFileAndPrint.java
package uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.target;
/**
*
* @author Mohamed Sarrab (STRL, DMU, UK)
* Msarrab@dmu.ac.uk
*/
import java.io.*;
public class ReadFileAndPrint {
public static void main(String[] args) throws IOException {
try {
String file = ”/home/msarrab/a/a1.txt”;
File f = new File(file);
if (!f.exists()) {
System.out.println(”The specified file is not exist”);
System.exit(0);
} else {
FileInputStream finp = new FileInputStream(f);
byte b = 0;
do {
b = (byte) finp.read();
System.out.print(b);
} while (b != −1);
finp.close();
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}
} catch (IOException e) {
System.out.println(e.getMessage() + ” in the specified directory.”);
}
}
}
For the memory usage we achieved the following result:
Table B.9: Comparing Memory Usage
Original Using our approach
2284336 13046232
2286784 12820108
2286784 13042008
2286784 12808392
2287928 12848387
2287928 12764576
2286744 12766776
2286744 12808280
2286704 12808392
2286744 12810592
Mean Mean
2286748 Bytes 12852374 Bytes
Max deviation Max deviation
3592 Bytes 281656 Bytes
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For speed we achieved the following result.
Table B.10: Original system and user classes elapsed time
System Classes - Loading time User Class - Loading time Execution Time
1.104 0.009 0.054
1.105 0.008 0.045
1.103 0.009 0.054
1.104 0.013 0.054
1.103 0.008 0.052
1.103 0.008 0.051
1.103 0.008 0.048
1.103 0.009 0.051
1.106 0.008 0.057
1.102 0.009 0.052
Mean Mean Mean
1.1036 seconds 0.0089 seconds 0.0518 seconds
Max deviation Max deviation Max deviation
0.004 seconds 0.005 seconds 0.012 seconds
Table B.11: Instrumented system and user classes elapsed time
System Classes - Load and instrument time User Class - Load and instrument time Execution Time
3.3 0.087 0.341
3.305 0.096 0.345
3.297 0.088 0.346
3.301 0.089 0.342
3.320 0.089 0.345
3.290 0.089 0.341
3.325 0.088 0.345
3.308 0.095 0.347
3.315 0.095 0.342
3.297 0.09 0.344
Mean Mean Mean
3.3058 seconds 0.0905 seconds 0.3438 seconds
Max deviation Max deviation Max deviation
0.035 seconds 0.009 seconds 0.006 seconds
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Table B.12: Using our approach for only explicit information flow
Execution Time
0.340
0.341
0.341
0.340
0.343
0.341
0.341
0.343
0.340
0.340
Mean
0.341 seconds
Max deviation
0.003 seconds
Example 4:
This example considers a program that involves measuring performance with Quick-
Sort algorithm for 1000 integer random numbers.
Listing B.4: Source code of QuickSort.java
package uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.target;
/**
*
* @author Mohamed Sarrab (STRL, DMU, UK) Msarrab@dmu.ac.uk
*/
public class QuickSort {
private long[] data;
private int len;
public QuickSort(int max) {
data = new long[max];
len = 0;
}
public void insert(long value) {
data[len] = value;
len++;
}
public void display() {
System.out.print(”Data: ”);
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for (int j = 0; j < len; j++)
System.out.print(data[j] + ” ”);
System.out.println(””);
}
public void quickSort() {
recQuickSort(0, len − 1);
}
public void recQuickSort(int left, int right) {
if (right − left <= 0) // if size <= 1 already sorted
return;
else // size is 2 or larger
{
long pivot = data[right]; // rightmost item
// partition range
int partition = partitionData(left, right, pivot);
recQuickSort(left, partition − 1); // sort left side
recQuickSort(partition + 1, right); // sort right side
}
}
public int partitionData(int left, int right, long pivot) {
int leftPtr = left − 1; // left (after ++)
int rightPtr = right; // right−1 (after −−)
while (true) { // find bigger item
while (data[++leftPtr] < pivot);
// find smaller item
while (rightPtr > 0 && data[−−rightPtr] > pivot);
if (leftPtr >= rightPtr) // if pointers cross, partition done
break;
else
swap(leftPtr, rightPtr);
}
swap(leftPtr, right); // restore pivot and return pivot location
return leftPtr;
}
public void swap(int d1, int d2) {
long temp = data[d1];
data[d1] = data[d2];
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data[d2] = temp;
}
public static void main(String[] args) {
int maxSize = 1000; // array size
QuickSort arr = new QuickSort(maxSize); // create array
for (int j = 0; j < maxSize; j++) // fill array with random numbers
{
long n = (int) (java.lang.Math.random() * 99);
arr.insert(n);
}
arr.display();
arr.quickSort();
arr.display();
}
}
For the memory usage we achieved the following result:
Table B.13: Comparing Memory Usage
Original Using our approach
2136712 13518541
2136712 13539021
2136691 13504627
2137828 13518541
2136868 13514953
2136728 13515408
2136728 13523079
2137634 13524177
2136728 13577191
2136712 13529017
Mean Mean
2136934 Bytes 13526455 Bytes
Max deviation Max deviation
1137 Bytes 72564 Bytes
For speed we achieved the following result.
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Table B.14: Original system and user classes elapsed time
System Classes - Loading time User Class - Loading time Execution Time
1.186 0.018 0.240
1.186 0.015 0.208
1.191 0.018 0.207
1.188 0.014 0.217
1.190 0.015 0.243
1.188 0.018 0.221
1.189 0.017 0.253
1.191 0.015 0.245
1.185 0.015 0.221
1.190 0.014 0.280
Mean Mean Mean
1.1884 seconds 0.0159 seconds 0.2334 seconds
Max deviation Max deviation Max deviation
0.006 seconds 0.004 seconds 0.073 seconds
Table B.15: Instrumented system and user classes elapsed time
System Classes - Load and instrument time User Class - Load and instrument time Execution Time
3.322 0.122 0.797
3.268 0.123 0.861
3.291 0.127 0.802
3.284 0.120 0.763
3.294 0.125 0.812
3.282 0.121 0.851
3.285 0.126 0.819
3.292 0.115 0.833
3.293 0.127 0.864
3.282 0.125 0.852
Mean Mean Mean
3.2893 seconds 0.1230 seconds 0.8253 seconds
Max deviation Max deviation Max deviation
0.054 seconds 0.012 seconds 0.089 seconds
Table B.16: Using our approach for only explicit information flow
Execution Time
0.754
0.802
0.783
0.788
0.809
0.822
0.817
0.791
0.812
0.798
Mean
0.7976 seconds
Max deviation
0.068 seconds
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Source Code
As can be seen from the source code that most of the methods and classes are
declared with the access modifier public, where classes are visible to all classes
everywhere and methods can be called by any object. Declaring a public method
defines its access level. Of course this implementation presents only a prototype to
show that monitoring at runtime can be done with an acceptable performance hit.
It is not implemented to a level at which it could be readily commercially exploited.
For example the the public modifier can be change to private modifier.
Listing C.1: Source code of JavaAgent.java
package Agent;
import java.lang.instrument.ClassDefinition;
import java.lang.instrument.Instrumentation;
import java.lang.instrument.UnmodifiableClassException;
import uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.EventRecognizer;
import javassist.NotFoundException;
/**
*
* @author Mohamed Sarrab (STRL, DMU, UK)
* Msarrab@dmu.ac.uk
*/
public class JavaAgent {
/**
* JavaAgent defines already loaded classes.
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* and registers the transformer
*/
private static MyTransformer transformer = new MyTransformer();
@SuppressWarnings(”unchecked”)
public static void premain(String agentArgs, Instrumentation inst) {
if (inst.isRedefineClassesSupported()) {
{
System.err.println(”IsRedefineClassesSupported? Supported ”);
}
if (inst.isRetransformClassesSupported()) {
System.err.println(”IsRetransformClassesSupported? Supported”);
EventRecognizer.RuntimeFrame.openframe();
}else
System.err.println(”IsRetransformClassesSupported? Not supported”);
Class[] loaded = inst.getAllLoadedClasses();
for (Class<?> cc : loaded) {
try {
redefineClass(inst, cc);
} catch (NotFoundException e) {
// TODO Auto−generated catch block
e.printStackTrace();
} catch (ClassNotFoundException e) {
// TODO Auto−generated catch block
e.printStackTrace();
} catch (UnmodifiableClassException e) {
// TODO Auto−generated catch block
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
} else {
System.err.println(”isRedefineClassesSupported Not Supported”);
}
inst.addTransformer(transformer);
EventRecognizer.initialising = false;
}
@SuppressWarnings(”unchecked”)
private static void redefineClass(Instrumentation inst, Class cc)
throws NotFoundException, ClassNotFoundException,
UnmodifiableClassException {
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if ((cc.getName().equalsIgnoreCase(”java.io.PrintStream”)) ||
(cc.getName().equalsIgnoreCase(”java.io.InputStream”))||
(cc.getName().equalsIgnoreCase(”java.io.FileInputStream”))||
(cc.getName().equalsIgnoreCase(”java.nio.channels.WritableByteChannel”)))
{
byte bytes[] = uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.InstrumentClass.instrument(cc.getName());
if (bytes != null) {
ClassDefinition definition = new ClassDefinition(cc, bytes);
inst.redefineClasses(definition);
} else {
System.err.println(”Class: ” + cc.getName()
+ ” could not be instrumented.”);
}
}
}
}
Listing C.2: Source code of MyTransformer.java
package Agent;
import java.lang.instrument.ClassFileTransformer;
import java.lang.instrument.IllegalClassFormatException;
import java.security.ProtectionDomain;
/**
* @author Mohamed Sarrab (STRL, DMU, UK)
* Msarrab@dmu.ac.uk
*/
import uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework.InstrumentClass;
import javassist.NotFoundException;
public class MyTransformer implements ClassFileTransformer {
/**
* all future class definitions will be seen by mytransformer.
*/
public MyTransformer() {
super();
}
public byte[] transform(ClassLoader loader, String className,
Class<?> redefiningClass, ProtectionDomain domain, byte[] bytes)
throws IllegalClassFormatException {
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char CA[] = className.toCharArray();
System.out.println();
System.out.println(”In The Transformer ” + className);
for (int i = 0; i < CA.length − 1; i++) {
if (CA[i] == ’/’)
CA[i] = ’.’;
}
String classn = new String(CA);
System.out.println(”Transformer to Transform Class: ” + classn);
try {
if (classn.startsWith(”uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.target”)) // after the
{
bytes = InstrumentClass.instrument(classn);
System.out.println(”Transfer class= ” + className);
}
} catch (NotFoundException e) {
// TODO Auto−generated catch block
e.printStackTrace();
System.out.println(”Error: ” + e.getMessage());
}
return bytes;
}
}
Listing C.3: Source code of InstrumentClass.java
package uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework;
import java.io.IOException;
import javassist.CannotCompileException;
import javassist.ClassPool;
import javassist.CtClass;
import javassist.CtMethod;
import javassist.Modifier;
import javassist.NotFoundException;
import javassist.bytecode.InstructionPrinter;
/**
* @author Mohamed Sarrab (STRL, DMU, UK)
* Msarrab@dmu.ac.uk
*/
public class InstrumentClass {
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public final static boolean DEBUG = true;
/**
* Returns the instrumented bytecode for the class named as <code>arg</code>
* Linked to the EventRecognizer er.
*
* @param arg The fully classified name of the class to be instrumented
* @param er The reference to the EventRecognizer that the instrumentation code
* will invoke.
* @return The instrumented bytecode or <code>null</code> if the class could not be instrumented.
*
* @throws NotFoundException If class named <code>arg</code> could not be found.
*/
public static byte[] instrument(String arg)
throws NotFoundException {
ClassPool pool = ClassPool.getDefault();
CtClass cc = pool.get(arg);
if (cc.isFrozen()) {
System.out.println(”Class is frozen ”+ cc);
return null;
} else {
if (cc.getName().startsWith(”uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.target”)){
}
CtMethod[] declaredMethods = cc.getDeclaredMethods();
System.out.println(”cc= ”+cc);
for (CtMethod cm : declaredMethods) {
if(cm.getMethodInfo().isMethod()){
int modf = cm.getModifiers();
if (
(!Modifier.isNative(modf))
&& (!Modifier.isAbstract(modf))
)
{
if (DEBUG) {
System.out.println();
System.out.println(”Original Method code: ”+ cm.
getMethodInfo());
InstructionPrinter.print(cm, System.out);
System.out.println();
}
if (DEBUG) {
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System.out.println(”Instrumented Method: ”+cm.
getMethodInfo());
}
InstrumentMethod.methodInstrument(cc, cm);
}
}
}
}
byte[] bytes = null;
try {
System.out.println(”getting bytecode...”);
bytes = cc.toBytecode();
} catch (IOException e) {
// TODO Auto−generated catch block
e.printStackTrace();
} catch (CannotCompileException e) {
// TODO Auto−generated catch block
e.printStackTrace();
} finally {
cc.defrost();
}
return bytes;
}
}
Listing C.4: Source code of InstrumentMethod.java
package uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework;
import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream;
import java.io.PrintStream;
import javassist.CannotCompileException;
import javassist.ClassPool;
import javassist.CtClass;
import javassist.CtMethod;
import javassist.Modifier;
import javassist.NotFoundException;
import javassist.bytecode.*;
import javassist.expr.ExprEditor;
import javassist.expr.MethodCall;
/**
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* @author Mohamed Sarrab (STRL, DMU, UK)
* Msarrab@dmu.ac.uk
*/
public class InstrumentMethod {
public final static boolean DEBUG = true;
static int PrametersNumber = 0;
static int ReturnNumber = 0;
static String MethodName = null;
static String MethodrefType = null;
static String MethodN = null;
static int temp = 0;
static int Native=0;
/**
* Returns the instrumented bytecode for the CtMethod named as
* <code>cm</code> Linked to the EventRecognizer er.
*
* @param cc
* The CtClass of the class to be instrumented
* @param cm
* The CtMethod of the method to be instrumented
* @param er
* The reference to the EventRecognizer that the instrumentation
* code will invoke.
*/
public static void methodInstrument(CtClass cc, CtMethod cm) {
int IF_Condition = 0;
StringBuffer sb = new StringBuffer();
ClassPool pool = ClassPool.getDefault();
CodeAttribute ca = cm.getMethodInfo().getCodeAttribute();
ByteArrayOutputStream out = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
PrintStream p = new PrintStream(out);
InstructionPrinter.print(cm, p);
sb.append(out.toString());
ConstPool cp = ca.getConstPool();
ClassFile cf = cc.getClassFile();
try {
CtClass cc1 = pool.get(EventRecognizer.class.getName());
ClassFile cf1 = cc1.getClassFile();
int index = 0;
CodeIterator ci = ca.iterator();
while (ci.hasNext()) {
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index = ci.next();
int op = ci.byteAt(index);
switch (op) {
case Opcode.ACONST_NULL:
case Opcode.ICONST_M1:
case Opcode.ICONST_0:
case Opcode.ICONST_1:
case Opcode.ICONST_2:
case Opcode.ICONST_3:
case Opcode.ICONST_4:
case Opcode.ICONST_5:
case Opcode.LCONST_0:
case Opcode.LCONST_1:
case Opcode.FCONST_0:
case Opcode.FCONST_1:
case Opcode.FCONST_2:
case Opcode.DCONST_0:
case Opcode.DCONST_1:
case Opcode.BIPUSH:
case Opcode.SIPUSH:
case Opcode.LDC:
case Opcode.LDC_W:
case Opcode.LDC2_W:
MethodInfo minf1 = cf1.getMethod(”Const”);
Bytecode b1 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
b1.addInvokestatic(cc1, minf1.getName(), minf1
.getDescriptor());
byte[] code = b1.get();
ci.insert(index,code);
break;
case Opcode.ILOAD:
String instrI = InstructionPrinter.instructionString(ci,index, cp);
String OpStackI3 = instrI.substring(6);
MethodInfo mi3 = cf1.getMethod(”Iload”);
Bytecode I3 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
I3.add(89);
I3.addLdc(OpStackI3);
I3.addInvokestatic(cc1, mi3.getName(), mi3.getDescriptor());
byte[] Icode3 = I3.get();
ci.insertEx(Icode3);
break;
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case Opcode.LLOAD:
String instrL = InstructionPrinter.instructionString(ci,
index, cp);
String CharOpStackL3 = instrL.substring(6);
MethodInfo minL3 = cf1.getMethod(”Lload”);
Bytecode L3 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
L3.add(89);
L3.addLdc(CharOpStackL3);
L3.addInvokestatic(cc1, minL3.getName(), minL3
.getDescriptor());
byte[] Lcode3 = L3.get();
ci.insertEx(Lcode3);
break;
case Opcode.FLOAD:
String instrF = InstructionPrinter.instructionString(ci,
index, cp);
String CharOpStackF3 = instrF.substring(6);
MethodInfo minF3 = cf1.getMethod(”Fload”);
Bytecode F3 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
F3.add(89);
F3.addLdc(CharOpStackF3);
F3.addInvokestatic(cc1, minF3.getName(), minF3
.getDescriptor());
byte[] Fcode3 = F3.get();
ci.insertEx(Fcode3);
break;
case Opcode.DLOAD:
String instrD = InstructionPrinter.instructionString(ci,
index, cp);
String CharOpStD3 = instrD.substring(6);
MethodInfo minD3 = cf1.getMethod(”Dload”);
Bytecode D3 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
D3.add(89);
D3.addLdc(CharOpStD3);
D3.addInvokestatic(cc1, minD3.getName(), minD3
.getDescriptor());
byte[] Dcode3 = D3.get();
ci.insertEx(Dcode3);
break;
case Opcode.ALOAD:
String instrType3 = InstructionPrinter.instructionString(
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ci, index, cp);
char CharOpStack3 = instrType3.charAt(6);
MethodInfo minf3 = cf1.getMethod(”Aload”);
Bytecode b3 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
b3.add(89);
b3.addLdc(Character.toString(CharOpStack3));
b3.addInvokestatic(cc1, minf3.getName(), minf3
.getDescriptor());
byte[] code3 = b3.get();
ci.insertEx(code3);
break;
case Opcode.ILOAD_0:
case Opcode.ILOAD_1:
case Opcode.ILOAD_2:
case Opcode.ILOAD_3:
String inI4 = InstructionPrinter.instructionString(ci,
index, cp);
String ChOpStackI4 = inI4.substring(6);
MethodInfo mifI4 = cf1.getMethod(”Iload”);
Bytecode Ib4 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
Ib4.addLdc(ChOpStackI4);
Ib4.addInvokestatic(cc1, mifI4.getName(), mifI4
.getDescriptor());
byte[] Icode4 = Ib4.get();
ci.insertEx(Icode4);
break;
case Opcode.FLOAD_0:
case Opcode.FLOAD_1:
case Opcode.FLOAD_2:
case Opcode.FLOAD_3:
String inf4 = InstructionPrinter.instructionString(ci,
index, cp);
String ChOpStackf4 = inf4.substring(6);
MethodInfo miff4 = cf1.getMethod(”Fload”);
Bytecode Fb4 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
Fb4.add(89);
Fb4.addLdc(ChOpStackf4);
Fb4.addInvokestatic(cc1, miff4.getName(), miff4
.getDescriptor());
byte[] Fcode4 = Fb4.get();
ci.insertEx(Fcode4);
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break;
case Opcode.DLOAD_0:
case Opcode.DLOAD_1:
case Opcode.DLOAD_2:
case Opcode.DLOAD_3:
String ind4 = InstructionPrinter.instructionString(ci,
index, cp);
String ChOpStackd4 = ind4.substring(6);
MethodInfo mid4 = cf1.getMethod(”Dload”);
Bytecode db4 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
db4.add(89);
db4.addLdc(ChOpStackd4);
db4.addInvokestatic(cc1, mid4.getName(), mid4
.getDescriptor());
byte[] dcode4 = db4.get();
ci.insertEx(dcode4);
break;
case Opcode.ALOAD_0:
case Opcode.ALOAD_1:
case Opcode.ALOAD_2:
case Opcode.ALOAD_3:
String instrType4 = InstructionPrinter.instructionString(
ci, index, cp);
String CharOpStack4 = instrType4.substring(6);
MethodInfo minf4 = cf1.getMethod(”Aload”);
Bytecode b4 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
b4.add(89);
b4.addLdc(CharOpStack4);
b4.addInvokestatic(cc1, minf4.getName(), minf4
.getDescriptor());
byte[] code4 = b4.get();
ci.insertEx(code4);
break;
case Opcode.LLOAD_0:
case Opcode.LLOAD_1:
case Opcode.LLOAD_2:
case Opcode.LLOAD_3:
String inT4 = InstructionPrinter.instructionString(ci,
index, cp);
String ChOpStack4 = inT4.substring(6);
MethodInfo mif4 = cf1.getMethod(”Lload”);
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Bytecode Lb4 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
Lb4.add(89);
Lb4.addLdc(ChOpStack4);
Lb4.addInvokestatic(cc1, mif4.getName(), mif4
.getDescriptor());
byte[] Lcode4 = Lb4.get();
ci.insertEx(Lcode4);
break;
case Opcode.IALOAD:
case Opcode.LALOAD:
case Opcode.FALOAD:
case Opcode.DALOAD:
case Opcode.AALOAD:
case Opcode.BALOAD:
case Opcode.CALOAD:
case Opcode.SALOAD:
case Opcode.IADD:
case Opcode.LADD:
case Opcode.FADD:
case Opcode.DADD:
case Opcode.ISUB:
case Opcode.LSUB:
case Opcode.FSUB:
case Opcode.DSUB:
case Opcode.IMUL:
case Opcode.LMUL:
case Opcode.FMUL:
case Opcode.DMUL:
case Opcode.IDIV:
case Opcode.LDIV:
case Opcode.FDIV:
case Opcode.DDIV:
case Opcode.IREM:
case Opcode.LREM:
case Opcode.FREM:
case Opcode.DREM:
case Opcode.ISHL:
case Opcode.LSHL:
case Opcode.ISHR:
case Opcode.LSHR:
case Opcode.IUSHR:
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case Opcode.LUSHR:
case Opcode.IAND:
case Opcode.LAND:
case Opcode.IOR:
case Opcode.LOR:
case Opcode.IXOR:
case Opcode.LXOR:
MethodInfo minf5 = cf1.getMethod(”Union”);
Bytecode b5 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
b5.addInvokestatic(cc1, minf5.getName(), minf5
.getDescriptor());
byte[] code5 = b5.get();
ci.insert(index, code5);
break;
case Opcode.LSTORE:
case Opcode.FSTORE:
case Opcode.DSTORE:
case Opcode.ASTORE:
case Opcode.ISTORE_0:
case Opcode.ISTORE_1:
case Opcode.ISTORE_2:
case Opcode.ISTORE_3:
case Opcode.LSTORE_0:
case Opcode.LSTORE_1:
case Opcode.LSTORE_2:
case Opcode.LSTORE_3:
case Opcode.FSTORE_0:
case Opcode.FSTORE_1:
case Opcode.FSTORE_2:
case Opcode.FSTORE_3:
case Opcode.DSTORE_0:
case Opcode.DSTORE_1:
case Opcode.DSTORE_2:
case Opcode.DSTORE_3:
case Opcode.ASTORE_0:
case Opcode.ASTORE_1:
case Opcode.ASTORE_2:
case Opcode.ASTORE_3:
String instrType6 = InstructionPrinter.instructionString(
ci, index, cp);
String CharOpStack6 = instrType6.substring(7);
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MethodInfo minf6 = cf1.getMethod(”Store”);
Bytecode b6 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
b6.add(89);
b6.addLdc(CharOpStack6);
b6.addInvokestatic(cc1, minf6.getName(), minf6
.getDescriptor());
byte[] code6 = b6.get();
ci.insert(index, code6);
break;
case Opcode.ISTORE:
String instrType7 = InstructionPrinter.instructionString(
ci, index, cp);
String CharOpStack7 = instrType7.substring(7);
MethodInfo minf7 = cf1.getMethod(”iStore”);
Bytecode b7 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
b7.add(89);
b7.addLdc(CharOpStack7);
b7.addInvokestatic(cc1, minf7.getName(), minf7
.getDescriptor());
byte[] code7 = b7.get();
ci.insert(index, code7);
break;
case Opcode.IASTORE:
case Opcode.LASTORE:
case Opcode.FASTORE:
case Opcode.DASTORE:
case Opcode.AASTORE:
case Opcode.BASTORE:
case Opcode.CASTORE:
case Opcode.SASTORE:
MethodInfo minf8 = cf1.getMethod(”astore”);
Bytecode b8 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
b8.addInvokestatic(cc1, minf8.getName(), minf8
.getDescriptor());
byte[] code8 = b8.get();
ci.insert(index, code8);
break;
case Opcode.GETSTATIC:
byte bb1 = ca.getCode()[index + 1];
byte bb2 = ca.getCode()[index + 2];
int index1 = (bb1 << 8) | bb2;
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String FieldName = ”0”
+ cf.getConstPool().getFieldrefName(index1);
Bytecode be1 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
MethodInfo minff1 = cf1.getMethod(”LoadField”);
be1.addLdc(FieldName);
be1.addInvokestatic(cc1, minff1.getName(), minff1
.getDescriptor());
byte[] cd = be1.get();
ci.insert(index,cd);
break;
case Opcode.GETFIELD:
byte bee1 = ca.getCode()[index + 1];
byte bee2 = ca.getCode()[index + 2];
int indeex1 = (bee1 << 8) | bee2;
String FieldN = ”0”
+ cf.getConstPool().getFieldrefName(indeex1);
Bytecode bbe1 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
MethodInfo minfff1 = cf1.getMethod(”LoadField”);
bbe1.addLdc(FieldN);
bbe1.addInvokestatic(cc1, minfff1.getName(), minfff1.getDescriptor()
);
byte[] cdd = bbe1.get();
ci.insert(index, cdd);
break;
case Opcode.PUTSTATIC:
case Opcode.PUTFIELD:
byte bb11 = ca.getCode()[index + 1];
byte bb21 = ca.getCode()[index + 2];
int index10 = (bb11 << 8) | bb21;
String FieldName10 = ”0”
+ cf.getConstPool().getFieldrefName(index10);
MethodInfo minf10 = cf1.getMethod(”StoreField”);
Bytecode b10 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
b10.addLdc(FieldName10);
b10.addInvokestatic(cc1, minf10.getName(), minf10
.getDescriptor());
byte[] code10 = b10.get();
ci.insert(index, code10);
break;
case Opcode.NEW:
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byte bb3 = ca.getCode()[index + 1];
byte bb4 = ca.getCode()[index + 2];
int index33 = (bb3 << 8) | bb4;
String ObjectRefName11 = cf.getConstPool().getClassInfo(
index33);
MethodInfo minf11 = cf1.getMethod(”New”);
Bytecode b11 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
b11.addLdc(ObjectRefName11);
b11.addInvokestatic(cc1, minf11.getName(), minf11
.getDescriptor());
byte[] code11 = b11.get();
ci.insert(index, code11);
break;
case Opcode.DUP:
case Opcode.DUP_X1:
case Opcode.DUP_X2:
case Opcode.DUP2:
case Opcode.DUP2_X1:
case Opcode.DUP2_X2:
MethodInfo minf12 = cf1.getMethod(”Dup”);
Bytecode b12 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
b12.addInvokestatic(cc1, minf12.getName(), minf12
.getDescriptor());
byte[] code12 = b12.get();
ci.insert(index, code12);
break;
case Opcode.SWAP:
MethodInfo minf13 = cf1.getMethod(”Swap”);
Bytecode b13 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
b13.addInvokestatic(cc1, minf13.getName(), minf13
.getDescriptor());
byte[] code13 = b13.get();
ci.insert(index, code13);
break;
case Opcode.POP:
MethodInfo minf14 = cf1.getMethod(”Pop”);
Bytecode b14 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
b14.addInvokestatic(cc1, minf14.getName(), minf14
.getDescriptor());
byte[] code14 = b14.get();
ci.insert(index, code14);
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break;
case Opcode.POP2:
MethodInfo minf15 = cf1.getMethod(”Pop2”);
Bytecode b15 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
b15.addInvokestatic(cc1, minf15.getName(), minf15
.getDescriptor());
byte[] code15 = b15.get();
ci.insert(index, code15);
break;
case Opcode.NEWARRAY:
case Opcode.ANEWARRAY:
MethodInfo minf16 = cf1.getMethod(”NewArray”);
Bytecode b16 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
b16.addLdc(”0NewArray”);
b16.addInvokestatic(cc1, minf16.getName(), minf16
.getDescriptor());
byte[] code16 = b16.get();
ci.insert(index, code16);
break;
case Opcode.IF_ACMPEQ:
case Opcode.IF_ACMPNE:
case Opcode.IF_ICMPEQ:
case Opcode.IF_ICMPGE:
case Opcode.IF_ICMPGT:
case Opcode.IF_ICMPLE:
case Opcode.IF_ICMPLT:
case Opcode.IF_ICMPNE:
IF_Condition++;
MethodInfo minf17 = cf1.getMethod(”ifcmp”);
Bytecode b17 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
b17.addInvokestatic(cc1, minf17.getName(), minf17
.getDescriptor());
byte[] code17 = b17.get();
ci.insertEx(index, code17);
break;
case Opcode.IFEQ:
case Opcode.IFGE:
case Opcode.IFGT:
case Opcode.IFLE:
case Opcode.IFLT:
case Opcode.IFNE:
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case Opcode.IFNULL:
case Opcode.IFNONNULL:
IF_Condition++;
MethodInfo minf19 = cf1.getMethod(”ifcond”);
Bytecode b19 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
b19.addInvokestatic(cc1, minf19.getName(), minf19
.getDescriptor());
byte[] code19 = b19.get();
ci.insertEx(index, code19);
break;
case Opcode.INVOKEVIRTUAL:
case Opcode.INVOKEINTERFACE:
case Opcode.INVOKESTATIC:
Native=0;
byte by1 = ca.getCode()[index + 1];
byte by2 = ca.getCode()[index + 2];
int indexx1 = (by1 << 8) | by2;
PrametersNumber = 0;
ReturnNumber = 0;
String className = null;
MethodName = null;
MethodrefType = null;
if (op == Opcode.INVOKEINTERFACE) {
MethodName = cf.getConstPool()
.getInterfaceMethodrefName(indexx1);
MethodrefType = cf.getConstPool()
.getInterfaceMethodrefType(indexx1);
} else
{
className = cf.getConstPool().getMethodrefClassName(indexx1);
if (className != null)
{
MethodName = cf.getConstPool().getMethodrefName(
indexx1);
MethodrefType = cf.getConstPool().getMethodrefType(indexx1);
PrametersNumber = methodPrameters(MethodrefType);
ReturnNumber = methodReturnValue(MethodrefType);
cm.instrument(new ExprEditor() {
public void edit(MethodCall m)
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throws CannotCompileException {
String MthodN = m.getMethodName();
if (MthodN.equalsIgnoreCase(MethodName)) {
try {
if (Modifier.isNative(m.getMethod()
.getModifiers())
|| (Modifier.isAbstract(m
.getMethod()
.getModifiers()))) {
PrametersNumber = methodPrameters(m.getSignature());
ReturnNumber = methodReturnValue(m.getSignature());
Native=1;
}
} catch (NotFoundException e) {
// TODO Auto−generated catch block
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
}
});
}else
{
cm.instrument(new ExprEditor() {
public void edit(MethodCall m)
throws CannotCompileException {
MethodName = m.getMethodName();
try {
if (Modifier.isNative(m.getMethod()
.getModifiers())
|| (Modifier.isAbstract(m
.getMethod()
.getModifiers()))) {
PrametersNumber = methodPrameters(m
.getSignature());
ReturnNumber = methodReturnValue(m
.getSignature());
Native=1;
}
} catch (NotFoundException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
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}
});
}
if (op == Opcode.INVOKEVIRTUAL)
PrametersNumber++;
}
if (Native==0){
MethodInfo minfMethod = cf1.getMethod(”Method”);
Bytecode bby4 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
//bby4.addIconst(InstrumentClass.run);
bby4.addLdc(MethodName);
bby4.addIconst(PrametersNumber);
//bby4.addIconst(ReturnNumber);
bby4.addInvokestatic(cc1, minfMethod.getName(),
minfMethod.getDescriptor());
byte[] ccode = bby4.get();
ci.insert(index, ccode);
break;
}
else{
if (MethodName.equalsIgnoreCase(”write”))
{
MethodInfo minfWrite = cf1
.getMethod(”NativeWrite”);
Bytecode bby2 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
bby2.addIconst(PrametersNumber);
bby2.addIconst(ReturnNumber);
bby2.addInvokestatic(cc1, minfWrite.getName(),
minfWrite.getDescriptor());
byte[] codeee = bby2.get();
ci.insert(index, codeee);
temp = 1;
break;
}
else
{
MethodInfo minfN = cf1.getMethod(”NativeMethod”);
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Bytecode bby3 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
//bby3.addIconst(InstrumentClass.run);
bby3.addIconst(PrametersNumber);
bby3.addIconst(ReturnNumber);
bby3.addInvokestatic(cc1, minfN.getName(), minfN
.getDescriptor());
byte[] coode = bby3.get();
ci.insert(index, coode);
break;
}
}
case Opcode.INVOKESPECIAL:
byte bb6 = ca.getCode()[index + 1];
byte bb7 = ca.getCode()[index + 2];
int index67 = (bb6 << 8) | bb7;
String className1 = null;
if (op == Opcode.INVOKEINTERFACE) {
MethodN = cf.getConstPool()
.getInterfaceMethodrefName(index67);
MethodrefType = cf.getConstPool()
.getInterfaceMethodrefType(index67);
className1=cf.getConstPool().
getInterfaceMethodrefClassName(index67);
}
else
{
className1=cf.getConstPool().getMethodrefClassName(index67
);
MethodrefType = cf.getConstPool().getMethodrefType(
index67);
MethodN = cf.getConstPool().getMethodrefName(index67);
if (MethodN == null) {
cm.instrument(new ExprEditor() {
public void edit(MethodCall m)
throws CannotCompileException {
MethodN = m.getMethodName();
PrametersNumber = methodPrameters(m
.getSignature());
ReturnNumber = methodReturnValue(m
.getSignature());
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}
});
}
}
if (!MethodN.equalsIgnoreCase(”<init>”)) {
if (MethodN.equalsIgnoreCase(”readBytes”)) {
CtClass ct = pool.get(className1);
CtMethod ccm = ct.getDeclaredMethod(MethodN);
int modf = ccm.getModifiers();
if ((Modifier.isNative(modf))
|| (Modifier.isAbstract(modf))) {
MethodInfo minfreadbyte = cf1.getMethod(”
NativeMethod”);
Bytecode bby1 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
bby1.addIconst(methodPrameters(MethodrefType));
bby1.addIconst(methodReturnValue(MethodrefType));
bby1.addInvokestatic(cc1, minfreadbyte.getName(),
minfreadbyte.getDescriptor());
byte[] codde = bby1.get();
ci.insert(index, codde);
}
}
else if(op==Opcode.INVOKESPECIAL)
{
MethodInfo mfMethod = cf1.getMethod(”Method”);
Bytecode be4 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
be4.addLdc(MethodN);
be4.addIconst(methodPrameters(MethodrefType)+1);
be4.addInvokestatic(cc1, mfMethod.getName(),
mfMethod.getDescriptor());
byte[] cde = be4.get();
ci.insert(index, cde);
break;
}
}else if (MethodN.equalsIgnoreCase(”<init>”)) {
MethodInfo minf67 = cf1.getMethod(”SpecialMethod”);
Bytecode b67 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
b67.addInvokestatic(cc1, minf67.getName(), minf67
.getDescriptor());
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byte[] code67 = b67.get();
ci.insert(index, code67);
break;
}
case Opcode.MONITORENTER:
case Opcode.MONITOREXIT:
MethodInfo minf373 = cf1.getMethod(”Monitor”);
Bytecode b373 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
b373.addInvokestatic(cc1, minf373.getName(), minf373 .getDescriptor
());
byte[] code373 = b373.get();
ci.insert(index, code373);
break;
case Opcode.IRETURN:
case Opcode.LRETURN:
case Opcode.FRETURN:
case Opcode.DRETURN:
case Opcode.ARETURN:
MethodInfo minf20 = cf1.getMethod(”TReturn”);
Bytecode b20 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
b20.addIconst(IF_Condition);
b20.addInvokestatic(cc1, minf20.getName(), minf20
.getDescriptor());
byte[] code20 = b20.get();
ci.insert(index, code20);
break;
case Opcode.RETURN:
MethodInfo minf23 = cf1.getMethod(”Return”);
Bytecode b23 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
b23.addIconst(IF_Condition);
b23.addInvokestatic(cc1, minf23.getName(), minf23
.getDescriptor());
byte[] code23 = b23.get();
ci.insert(index, code23);
break;
}
}
int i = 0;
CodeIterator cii = ca.iterator();
int ifoffsetAddress;
int gotoffsetAddress;
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while (cii.hasNext()) {
i = cii.next();
int op = cii.byteAt(i);
if (op==Opcode.IFEQ ||
op==Opcode.IFGE ||
op==Opcode.IFGT ||
op==Opcode.IFLE ||
op==Opcode.IFLT ||
op==Opcode.IFNE ||
op==Opcode.IFNULL||
op==Opcode.IFNONNULL||
op==Opcode.IF_ACMPEQ ||
op==Opcode.IF_ACMPNE ||
op==Opcode.IF_ICMPEQ ||
op==Opcode.IF_ICMPGE ||
op==Opcode.IF_ICMPGT ||
op==Opcode.IF_ICMPLE ||
op==Opcode.IF_ICMPLT ||
op==Opcode.IF_ICMPNE ) {
byte bb1 = ca.getCode()[i + 1];
byte bb2 = ca.getCode()[i + 2];
int offset = (bb1 << 8) | (bb2);
ifoffsetAddress =i+offset;
if (i>ifoffsetAddress){
IF_Condition−−;
MethodInfo minif2 = cf1.getMethod(”Endif”);
Bytecode b23 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
b23.addInvokestatic(cc1, minif2.getName(), minif2
.getDescriptor());
byte[] code23 = b23.get();
cii.insert(i, code23);
}
if (i<ifoffsetAddress){
int opp = cii.byteAt(ifoffsetAddress −3);
if (opp!= Opcode.GOTO){
IF_Condition−−;
MethodInfo minif2 = cf1.getMethod(”Endif”);
Bytecode b23 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
b23.addInvokestatic(cc1, minif2.getName(),
minif2
.getDescriptor());
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byte[] code23 = b23.get();
cii.insertEx(ifoffsetAddress, code23);
}
if (opp== Opcode.GOTO){
IF_Condition−−;
byte bby1 = ca.getCode()[i+offset−2];
byte bby2 = ca.getCode()[i+offset−1];
int offs = (bby1 << 8) | (bby2);
gotoffsetAddress=i+offset+offs−3;
int insert= ifoffsetAddress−3;
if (offs<0){
MethodInfo minif1 = cf1.getMethod(”Endif”);
Bytecode b23 = new Bytecode(ca.
getConstPool());
b23.addInvokestatic(cc1, minif1.
getName(), minif1
.getDescriptor());
byte[] code23 = b23.get();
cii.insertEx(insert, code23);
}
else{
MethodInfo minif1 = cf1.getMethod(”Endif”);
Bytecode b23 = new Bytecode(ca.getConstPool());
b23.addInvokestatic(cc1, minif1.getName(), minif1
.getDescriptor());
byte[] code23 = b23.get();
cii.insert(gotoffsetAddress, code23);
}
}
}
}
}
InstructionPrinter.print(cm, p);
InstructionPrinter.print(cm, System.out);
cc.writeFile();
cc.defrost();
} catch (Exception e) {
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e.printStackTrace(System.out);
System.out.println(”Error occured while redefining method ”
+ cm.getLongName());
}
}
public static int methodPrameters(String s) {
int PrametersNumber = 0;
String ss;
if (s!=null){
if (s.indexOf(”(”) + 1 != (s.indexOf(”)”))) {
ss = s.substring(s.indexOf(”(”) + 1, s.indexOf(”)”));
int i = 0;
while (i < ss.length()) {
if (Character.isLetter(ss.charAt(i))) {
PrametersNumber++;
if (ss.charAt(i) == ’L’) {
while (ss.charAt(i) != ’;’) {
i++;
}
}
if (ss.charAt(i) == ’[’) {
i++;
}
if (ss.charAt(i) == ’(’) {
i++;
}
}
i++;
}
}
}
return PrametersNumber;
}
public static int methodReturnValue(String s) {
int ReturnNumber = 0;
if (s!=null){
String ss = s.substring(s.indexOf(”)”) + 1);
int i = 0;
while (i < ss.length()) {
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if (Character.isLetter(ss.charAt(i))) {
ReturnNumber++;
if (ss.charAt(i) == ’L’) {
while (ss.charAt(i) != ’;’) {
i++;
}
}
if (ss.charAt(i) == ’[’) {
i++;
}
}
i++;
}
if (ss.equals(”V”) == true) {
ReturnNumber = 0;
}
}
return ReturnNumber;
}
}
Listing C.5: Source code of EventRecognizer.java
package uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework;
import java.lang.String;
import java.util.HashSet;
import java.util.Iterator;
import java.util.Stack;
import javassist.NotFoundException;
/**
* @author Mohamed Sarrab (STRL, DMU, UK)
* Msarrab@dmu.ac.uk
*/
public class EventRecognizer {
/**
* Manipulates the Symbol tables, IFSs and IMFSs using stack and frame class
*/
static Stack<HashSet<String>> IMFS = new Stack<HashSet<String>>();
public static MyStack RuntimeFrame = new MyStack();
public static void Store(Object ss, String s) {
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HashSet<String> st = (HashSet<String>) RuntimeFrame.pop();
HashSet<String> st1 = new HashSet<String>();
Iterator<String> ci = st.iterator();
while (ci.hasNext()) {
Object e = ci.next();
st1.add(e.toString());
}
Object[] rray = st1.toArray();
for (int i = 0; i < rray.length; i++) {
st1.add(rray[i].toString());
}
if (ss != null)
st1.add(ss.toString());
RuntimeFrame.put(s, st1);
StackPrint();
}
public static void iStore(int ss, String s) {
HashSet<String> st = (HashSet<String>) RuntimeFrame.pop();
HashSet<String> st1 = new HashSet<String>();
Iterator<String> ci = st.iterator();
while (ci.hasNext()) {
Object e = ci.next();
st1.add(e.toString());
}
Object[] rray = st1.toArray();
for (int i = 0; i < rray.length; i++) {
st1.add(rray[i].toString());
}
st1.add(String.valueOf(ss));
RuntimeFrame.put(s, st);
StackPrint();
}
public static void astore() {
RuntimeFrame.pop();
RuntimeFrame.pop();
RuntimeFrame.pop();
StackPrint();
}
public static void Load(Object s, String ss) {
HashSet<String> set = (HashSet<String>) RuntimeFrame.get(ss);
set.add(s.toString());
245
APPENDIX C. SOURCE CODE
RuntimeFrame.push(set);
StackPrint();
}
public static void Aload(Object s, String ss) {
if (!RuntimeFrame.get(ss).equals(null)) {
System.out.println(”not null”);
HashSet<String> set = (HashSet<String>) RuntimeFrame.get(ss);
set.add(s.toString());
RuntimeFrame.push(set);
} else {
HashSet<String> set = new HashSet<String>();
set.add(s.toString());
RuntimeFrame.push(set);
}
StackPrint();
}
public static void Lload(Long s, String ss) {
HashSet<String> set = (HashSet<String>) RuntimeFrame.get(ss);
set.add(s.toString());
RuntimeFrame.push(set);
StackPrint();
}
public static void Fload(int run, Float s, String ss) {
HashSet<String> set = (HashSet<String>) RuntimeFrame.get(ss);
set.add(s.toString());
RuntimeFrame.push(set);
StackPrint();
}
public static void Iload(String ss) {
System.out.println(”ss= ” + ss);
HashSet<String> set = (HashSet<String>) RuntimeFrame.get(ss);
set.add(”Const”);
System.out.println(”s= ” + set);
RuntimeFrame.push(set);
StackPrint();
}
public static void Dload(Double s, String ss) {
HashSet<String> set = (HashSet<String>) RuntimeFrame.get(ss);
set.add(Double.toString(s));
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RuntimeFrame.push(set);
StackPrint();
}
public static void LoadField(String s) {
HashSet<String> st = new HashSet<String>();
st.add(s.toString());
RuntimeFrame.push(st);
StackPrint();
}
public static void LoadIntField(int s) {
HashSet<String> st = (HashSet<String>) RuntimeFrame.get(Integer
.toString(s));
String aString = Integer.toString(s);
st.add(aString);
RuntimeFrame.push(st);
StackPrint();
}
public static void StoreField(String s) {
HashSet<String> st = (HashSet<String>) RuntimeFrame.pop();
RuntimeFrame.put(s, st);
StackPrint();
}
public static void Const() {
HashSet<String> st = new HashSet<String>();
st.add(”Const”);
RuntimeFrame.push(st);
StackPrint();
}
public static void tableswitch() {
HashSet<String> st1 = (HashSet<String>) RuntimeFrame.pop();
IMFS.push(st1);
StackPrint();
}
public static void lookupswitch() {
HashSet<String> st1 = (HashSet<String>) RuntimeFrame.pop();
IMFS.push(st1);
StackPrint();
}
public static void Dup() {
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HashSet<String> st = (HashSet<String>) RuntimeFrame.pop();
RuntimeFrame.push(st);
RuntimeFrame.push(st);
StackPrint();
}
public static void Union() {
HashSet<String> set1 = (HashSet<String>) RuntimeFrame.pop();
HashSet<String> set2 = (HashSet<String>) RuntimeFrame.pop();
set1.addAll(set2);
RuntimeFrame.push(set1);
StackPrint();
}
public static void New(Object s) {
HashSet<String> st = new HashSet<String>();
st.add(s.toString());
RuntimeFrame.push(st);
StackPrint();
}
public static void Return(int counterOfCondition) {
while (counterOfCondition > 0) {
IMFS.pop();
counterOfCondition−−;
}
RuntimeFrame.closeframe();
StackPrint();
}
public static void TReturn(int counterOfConditions) {
HashSet<String> ReturnValue = (HashSet<String>) RuntimeFrame.pop();
HashSet<String> set = new HashSet<String>();
while (!IMFS.empty()) {
HashSet<String> set1 = (HashSet<String>) IMFS.pop();
ReturnValue.addAll(set1);
set.addAll(set1);
}
Iterator<String> it = ReturnValue.iterator();
while (it.hasNext()) {
String element = it.next();
HashSet<String> s = new HashSet<String>();
s.add(element);
IMFS.push(s);
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}
while (counterOfConditions > 0) {
IMFS.pop();
counterOfConditions−−;
}
StackPrint();
RuntimeFrame.closeframe();
RuntimeFrame.push(ReturnValue);
StackPrint();
}
public static void Swap() {
HashSet<String> st = (HashSet<String>) RuntimeFrame.pop();
HashSet<String> st1 = (HashSet<String>) RuntimeFrame.pop();
RuntimeFrame.push(st);
RuntimeFrame.push(st1);
StackPrint();
}
public static void ifcmp() {
HashSet<String> st = (HashSet<String>) RuntimeFrame.pop();
HashSet<String> st1 = (HashSet<String>) RuntimeFrame.pop();
st.addAll(st1);
System.out.println(”1= ” + st);
System.out.println(”2= ” + st1);
IMFS.push(st);
StackPrint();
}
public static void ifcond() {
HashSet<String> st = (HashSet<String>) RuntimeFrame.pop();
IMFS.push(st);
StackPrint();
}
public static void Endif() {
IMFS.pop();
StackPrint();
}
public static void Pop() {
RuntimeFrame.pop();
StackPrint();
}
public static void Pop2() {
RuntimeFrame.pop();
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RuntimeFrame.pop();
StackPrint();
}
public static void Method(String s, int j) {
int f = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < j; i++) {
HashSet<String> st = (HashSet<String>) RuntimeFrame.pop();
System.out.println(”Start Method: ” + s + ” , pop()= ” + st);
if (f == 0) {
RuntimeFrame.openframe();
f++;
}
RuntimeFrame.put(Integer.toString(i), st);
}
StackPrint();
}
public static void NativeMethod(int parameter, int returnValues) {
HashSet<String> set1 = new HashSet<String>();
for (int i = 0; i < parameter; i++) {
HashSet<String> st = (HashSet<String>) RuntimeFrame.pop();
set1.addAll(st);
}
for (int i = 0; i < returnValues; i++) {
RuntimeFrame.push(set1);
}
StackPrint();
}
public static void NewArray(String s) {
HashSet<String> st = new HashSet<String>();
st.add(s);
RuntimeFrame.push(st);
StackPrint();
}
public static void SpecialMethod() {
HashSet<String> set1 = (HashSet<String>) RuntimeFrame.pop();
HashSet<String> set2 = (HashSet<String>) RuntimeFrame.pop();
HashSet<String> set3 = (HashSet<String>) RuntimeFrame.pop();
set1.addAll(set2);
set1.addAll(set3);
RuntimeFrame.push(set1);
StackPrint();
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}
public static void NativeWrite(int Parameters, int rr) {
HashSet<String> set1 = new HashSet<String>();
for (int i = 0; i <= Parameters; i++) {
HashSet<String> st = (HashSet<String>) RuntimeFrame.pop();
set1.addAll(st);
}
System.out.println(”Flow where? i do not know ” + set1);
for (int i = 0; i < rr; i++) {
RuntimeFrame.push(set1);
}
}
public static void Monitor() {
RuntimeFrame.pop();
StackPrint();
}
public static void StackPrint() {
System.out.println(”Runtime Frames : ”
+ RuntimeFrame.currentframe().IFS);
System.out.println(”Runtime Frames : ”
+ RuntimeFrame.currentframe().Symbol_Table);
System.out.println(”Contens of IMFS: ” + IMFS);
}
}
Listing C.6: Source code of MyStack.java
package uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework;
import java.util.HashSet;
import java.util.Hashtable;
import java.util.Iterator;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.Stack;
/**
* @author Mohamed Sarrab (STRL, DMU, UK)
* Msarrab@dmu.ac.uk
*/
public class MyStack {
Stack<StackFrame> stack = new Stack<StackFrame>();
public void openframe() {
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stack.push(new StackFrame());
}
public StackFrame closeframe() {
return stack.pop();
}
public StackFrame currentframe() { return stack.peek(); }
public void push(Set<String> element) {
currentframe().IFS.push(element);
}
public Set<String> pop() {
return currentframe().IFS.pop();
}
public Set<String> peek() {
return currentframe().IFS.peek();
}
public HashSet<String> put(String key, HashSet<String> value) {
return currentframe().Symbol_Table.put(key, value);
}
public HashSet<String> get(String key) {
return currentframe().Symbol_Table.get(key);
}
public String toString() {
return stack.toString();
}
class StackFrame {
Hashtable<String, HashSet<String>> Symbol_Table = new Hashtable<String, HashSet<
String>>();
Stack<Set<String>> IFS = new Stack<Set<String>>();
public HashSet<String> put(String key, HashSet<String> value) {
System.out.println(key+” ”+ value);
return Symbol_Table.put(key, value);
}
public HashSet<String> get(String key) {
return Symbol_Table.get(key);
}
public void clear() {
IFS.clear();
}
public boolean empty() {
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return IFS.empty();
}
public Iterator<Set<String>> iterator() {
return IFS.iterator();
}
public Set<String> lastElement() {
return IFS.lastElement();
}
public Set<String> peek() {
return IFS.peek();
}
public Set<String> pop() {
return IFS.pop();
}
public Set<String> push(Set<String> item) {
return IFS.push(item);
}
public int size() {
return IFS.size();
}
public Object[] toArray() {
return IFS.toArray();
}
public <T> T[] toArray(T[] a) {
return IFS.toArray(a);
}
public String toString() {
return IFS.toString() + Symbol_Table.toString();
}
}
}
Listing C.7: Source code of RunTimeChecker.java
package uk.ac.dmu.msarrab.vif.framework;
import java.io.BufferedReader;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.InputStreamReader;
import java.lang.String;
import java.util.ArrayList;
import java.util.Iterator;
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import java.util.List;
import java.util.Set;
/**
* @author Mohamed Sarrab (STRL, DMU, UK)
* Msarrab@dmu.ac.uk
*/
public class RunTimeChecker {
/**
* Checks the flow of the information against the information flow policy
* and monitor the flow to the user
*/
public static void Check(Set<String> st1) throws IOException {
List<String> list = new ArrayList<String>(st1);
for (int j = 0; j < list.size(); j++) {
String value = list.get(j);
if (!value.startsWith(”java.”) && (!value.startsWith(”[”))
&& (!value.startsWith(”0”)) && (!value.startsWith(”1”))
&& (!value.isEmpty())) {
System.err.println(value + ” will flow to −−> System.out”);
BufferedReader stdIn = new BufferedReader(
new InputStreamReader(System.in));
stdIn.readLine();
break;
}
}
}
public static void AskUser(Set<?> st) {
System.out.println(”Checked Set= ” + st);
Iterator<?> rr = st.iterator();
while (rr.hasNext()) {
Object element = rr.next();
System.out.println(”==========” + element.toString());
}
}
}
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Byte Code of Case Studies 1 and 2
Due to the big size of the instrumented bytecode of the class files that are used
in case studies 1 and 2, the thesis has an associated CD that has the original and
instrumented bytecode of both case studies (Section 8.2 and Section 8.3).
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